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Abstract 
In recent years, because of the extraordinary growth speed and the pace of development 
with the high yield of investment, China, is playing one of the most important strategic 
roles on the world economic stage. The position and standing of the Chinese currency, the 
Renminbi, has been one of the most popular and continuous topic discussing throughout 
the world. China has for a long time complained about the manipulation of exchange rates 
of its currency Renminbi, citing the raising of these issues by multilateral forums such as 
IMF and the G20, who urge China to raise RMB rates. However, the reactions and 
attitude of Beijing have been unpredictable. In the empirical researches of the Chinese 
currency, there is hardly any which attempt to quantify the situation. It is therefore 
important and necessary to fill this research gap by establishing econometric models for 
forecasting the future trends of the Renminbi. This PhD research focuses on forecasting 
the future trends of Chinese currency based on an analysis of Chinese exchange markets 
and the macroeconomic environments. 
This research focuses on analysing the Chinese foreign trade, exchange market, policies, 
currency prices both qualitatively and quantitatively, to try to find out what are the 
connections between micro and macroeconomic phenomena and estimating them with 
economic models, in order to forecast exchange rate trends and the future state of 
financial markets. 
This study will start by g1vmg an introduction to the Chinese monetary system and 
foreign exchange markets at different time periods. Through the research, significant 
relationships of currency prices, foreign trade exports, foreign direct investments and the 
GDP have been found. When real effective real exchange rates rise, the forecast of net 
export in the future 5 years will fall, so will the foreign direct investments. At the same 
time, it will stimulate increases on GDP and domestic demands. These study also 
researches on global credit and financial crisis occurred in 2008 followed by a long-term 
global range recession and find out the essential reason of it was global imbalances 
between the economies of eastern and western countries. Because there are many 
similarities of what happened in the German foreign exchange reform history to today's 
China, Germany is the country which will be used to predict the future trend of Chinese 
foreign exchange markets and monetary system. The prediction is also confirmed 
quantitatively by econometric models. Starts from traditional linear model to more 
advanced non-linear dynamic models are applied to simulate the Chinese real exchange 
rates. What is more, the underground black market RMB exchange rates are used to assist 
the data analyses. Ultimately both quantitative and qualitative analyses give a similar 
conclusion for the future trend of RMB price movements. It will continually rise as well 
the price index. 
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"China is undergoing an economic revolution which may well be looked upon 
as the cumulative effect of the penetration of foreign trade. In its 
consequences China's trade is by no means a fact of little importance. It is 
rather the first and most easily measured of the whole interrelated set of 
phenomena which will make China of tomorrow as different from the China 
of the past as is modern Europe from the Middle Ages. " 
Charles Frederick Remer, 1926 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Research Background 
While western countries were struggling to cope with an economic decline, on the other 
side of the globe, a huge country was attracting more interest because of the fast pace of 
its development, high yield of investment, and its impressive economic growth. This 
country is China, which is and has been playing an increasingly important strategic role 
on the world economic stage. Because of the high profit margins realisable, it is even 
more advantageous for other countries to be seen as a foreign trade partner with China 
and to be part of what is sometimes called "The China Dream" particularly so for those 
who are chasing big returns and profits from Chinese markets. As a result of this the 
exchange rate of the Chinese currency, the Renminbi (RMB) has aroused global focus 
and interest in recent years. If the current speed of development is maintained, China will 
inevitably surpass the US within twenty years on the foreign trade market. Because China 
has now become such a huge exporter, many Chinese enterprises are using the RMB to 
settle trades or to acquire foreign companies. 
However, although the Chinese RMB is a hot topic, to date, there has not been a 
systematic study on forecasting the Chinese RMB exchange rate quantitatively. Most of 
the empirical studies focus on analysing Chinese foreign exchange markets, foreign 
policies or exchange rates and foreign trade researches. There is a research gap in 
modelling Chinese currency rates quantitatively. It is therefore important and necessary to 
establish an economic model which is geared directly to China to make more realistic 
predictions about the movement of its foreign exchange market and currency exchange 
rates. 
The current Chinese official foreign exchange market, regulated by the latest policies 
implemented from 2006, is under a managed floating regime. There is a middle price for 
the current rate in the trading day, which is the closing price of the last trading day. The 
exchange rate of Chinese currency RMB against U.S. Dollar can only vary by up to 0.3 
1 
percent from this middle price. For other currencies, Euros, Yens, Hong Kong Dollars, 
etc, the fluctuation of the currency band is ±3 percent. Nominal quotations are not 
permitted to exceed 1 percent from the middle price. The cash price quotation cannot be 
over 4 percent. 
China's exchange rate and price system is quasi-flexible and is partly decided by the 
authorities. The main Chinese financial assets flow is still controlled strictly by the 
authorities. Starting from 201 1 ,  Hong Kong has been the first RMB offshore centre and 
authorities schedule to build a second one in London in 20 1 2. Foreign trade companies 
and foreign investors are also encouraged to make their payments in RMB. However, for 
normal individuals there are still tight restrictions on using and holding foreign currencies. 
Because of the amazing growth speed of the Chinese economy, the rest of the world is 
looking at China and attempting to predict the future actions of the authorities on the 
financial markets and on the exchange policies. It cannot be stressed too much that the 
question as to what the future of Chinese foreign exchange markets and its currency 
prices will be has attracted immense attention throughout the whole of the financial world. 
This research will focus on these popular questions, analysing Chinese foreign trade, 
exchange market policy and currency prices both qualitatively and quantitatively, to try to 
find out what are the connections between micro and macroeconomic phenomena and 
estimating them through economic models, in order to forecast exchange rate trends and 
the future state of financial markets. It will start by giving an introduction to the Chinese 
monetary system and foreign exchange markets, then illustrate the links between currency 
prices and the Chinese foreign trade, to what extent they influence foreign direct 
investment. To forecast the future of Chinese exchange markets and the RMB moving 
trend, Germany, the country which experienced similar experience on exchange market 
reform as China has been picked as a fair and suitable comparison. From the historical 
events which happened in Germany, the future trend of China is predicted. To support 
this prediction quantitatively, an economic model is applied. Starting from a traditional 
linear model to more advanced non-linear dynamic model applications are made to 
simulate the Chinese real exchange rates. In the empirical study, this non-linear model 
has very rear been adopted to analyse Chinese foreign exchange markets. What is more, 
the underground black market RMB exchange rates are applied to the model, to assist the 
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official market rates in analysing the RMB movement in history and forecasting future 
trends. 
1.2 Empirical researches and econometric methodologies 
The ultimate objective of this research is to forecast the future trend of Chinese foreign 
exchange markets and prices of its currency RMB via both qualitative and quantitative 
analyses. The quantitative analyses are brought out by econometric methodologies. As 
mentioned previously, after giving an introduction to the Chinese monetary system and 
foreign exchange markets background, an econometric model is applied to formulate and 
forecast foreign trade, real effective exchange prices, foreign direct investments and GDP 
of China. This model applies Broyden's  method to compute the actual data and make 
forecastss. 
After this econometric model, further models are mainly focused on real exchange rates, 
either CPI based, PPI based or RPI based real exchange rates. There have been many 
empirical studies in which estimated models have been used to forecast real exchange 
rates, for instance, the research of M-F-D model (Mundell, 1 963 ; Fleming, 1 962; 
Dombusch, 1 97 6) indicates that real fundamentals to some extent can determine the 
equilibrium of real exchange rates and its changes. (Edwards, 1 988; Williamson, 1 994; 
Hinkle & Montiel, 1 999) However, the random walk model (Meese and Rogoff, 1 983; 
Meese, 1 990) is more advanced than M-F-D model in verifying the appreciation of the 
real exchange rate from an increased real interest rate differential. 
In an earlier study of Chinese real exchange rates, Chou and Shih ( 1 998) focused on the 
RMB real exchange movements of the Purchase Power Parity. They believed that the 
RMB was overvalued during the 1 980s and started to be undervalued from the early 
1 990s. The research by Ma (2000) specifies that the RMB was overvalued after 1 995 in 
terms of the regression against government expenditure, domestic bank loans, foreign 
trade and the domestic interest rate premium. Tyers et. al (2008) adopt the real effective 
exchange rate model by Devarajan, Lewis and Robinson ( 1990, 1 993) to estimate the real 
effective exchange rate under the situation of foreign trade and national accounts. They 
indicate that the RMB real exchange rate is unambiguously undervalued during the period 
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1 996 to 2000. Very substantial contributions were made to official foreign reserves in 
1994-1997. The main methodology for analysing the real exchange rates used in this 
study is listed below: 
1.2.1 Unit root test (Stationarity test) 
Granger & Newbold (1974) suggest spurious regression term exists in the time series data 
which will lead to test result errors, for example the test result shows there is a significant 
relationship between two variables, but in fact there is not. This is the reason why the unit 
root test (stationarity test) should take priority before other tests. 
The unit root test performed as a null hypothesis test. The concept of "unit root process" 
comes from time series analysis literature. There are many researches mentioned about 
this test, the oldest R/S, based on the rescaled range by Hurst ( 1 95 1  ), the famous Dickey 
and Fuller (DF) (1979) or Augmented Dickey Fuller Tests (ADF), the widely used 
Lagrange multiplier (KPSS) test introduced by Kwiatowski, Phillips, Schmidt and Shin 
( 1 992), or the later re scaled variance V /S statistic by Giraitis et al. (200 1 ). 
In this study, the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) will be used as the main test. This test 
for unit root augments the equation with additional lagged differences to solve problems 
of autocorrelation in the disturbance term of the regression which has not been modelled. 
If ignored, it will cause a correct null hypothesis to be rejected more frequently than it 
should be. 
1.2.2 Causality test 
After the stationarity test, two series, such as the black market rate and the official rate, 
need to have their relationship tested. When two data series have the same order (through 
the unit root test), the Granger causality test will be used to test their causality 
relationship. 
When the relationship between two variables is being measured, a very important area is 
the causality relationship, which one influences the other or whether one variable can 
help to forecast the other. In this study the Granger causality test is used for testing the 
causality relationship. 
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1 .2.3 Cointegration test 
The concept of Cointegration approach was first introduced by Engle and Granger ( 1 987) 
with their two-step residual based test. The problems of this approach are: firstly, the lack 
of power in unit root and cointegration tests; secondly, there is a simultaneous equations 
bias when the causality runs between both variables; thirdly, it is impossible to test any 
hypothesis about the cointegrating relationship at the first of the 2 steps. 
The formal way for cointegration test is the J ohansen (1 988, 1 990) maximum likelihood 
estimator based on the ECM, in the context of vector autoregressions (V ARs ). Compared 
with Engle and Granger approach, it considers the error structure of the data processes 
and allows interactions in the determination of the relevant economic variables. It can test 
the symmetry and proportionality conditions as well. Therefore, Johansen maximum 
likelihood test is applied in this study. 
1 .2.4 Intervention test 
In China, the changes are often more political rather than economtc. Therefore, 
government policies often have a very important effect on exchange rate movements. 
Because the influences of policy changes are more like to be based on qualitative data 
rather than quantitative. For more accurate analysis result, the variables need to be 
quantified. Here the intervention analysis noted by Box & Tiao ( 1 975) to transfer the 
qualitative data into quantitative will be used. The brief procedure is: 
1 .  Calculates the maximum likelihood value for the parameters in the autocorrelation 
function of the prior period. 
2 .  Whether the prior phase and the later phase be  changed by  the policy can be  tested 
from the form of the noise model, whether it still remain essentially the same. 
3 .  B y  comparing the maximum likelihood value of the parameters for the two phases, 
we can find out whether this policy has an effect or not. 
Apart from these econometric approaches, an econometric ARIMA model with two time 
dummies will formulate and test the exchange rate prices. 
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1 .2.5 Non-linear dynamic regime switching model 
The nonlinear model was first applied for real exchange rate analysis to solve the PPP 
puzzle, i .e. the power problem. When the real exchange rates follow a nonlinear 
adjustment process, the standard unit root test may have a low power problem in rejecting 
the random walk null hypothesis. The false null hypothesis of unit root behaviour can be 
rejected at a very low power when the true model is nonlinearly mean-reverting. 
(DeGrauwe and Vansteenkiste, 200 1 ;  Kilian and Taylor, 200 1 ;  Michael et al., 1 997; 
Taylor, 200 1 )  
The regime switching model used to catch the nonlinearity means reverting has two main 
types dependent on regimes which are determined by either observable variables or 
unobservable stochastic process. The former with both discrete jump and smooth 
transition can be caught by a threshold autoregression model .  The latter is often examined 
by the Markov switching model. 
1.2.5.1 Smooth Threshold A uto-Regression model (STAR) 
The symmetric threshold Autoregressive (TAR) model is suggested for measuring the 
PPP deviations and RER reversion by Michael, et al. (1 994). Then more sophisticated 
models of measuring smooth real exchange rate adjustment (against discrete adjustment), 
the Smooth Transition Autoregressive (STAR) was suggested (Terasvirta, 1 994; Dumas, 
1 994; Bertola and Caballero, 1 990; Taylor et al. ,  200 1 and Kilian and Taylor, 2003). 
In this research an exponential threshold autoregressive (ESTAR) model and logistic 
smooth transition autoregressive model introduced by Taylor, et al. (200 1 ), Coakley and 
Fuertes (200 1 )  is applied to estimate the real exchange rates series. 
1.2.5.2 Markov-Switching model (MS) 
The Markov switching model applies unobservable reg1me variables to generate the 
dependent variable, i.e. the probability of an exogenous unobservable Markov chain. This 
model has widely used after being introduced by Hamilton ( 1 989) to characterise 
economic series data. Markov-Switching model is able to detect the rise of regimes which 
have been occurred in the past through assigning probabilities to the occurrence of 
different regimes, even when transitions occurred temporarily. 
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In this study, the MS model is used for generating real exchange rates, exchange 
appreciations and depreciations are estimated as switching regimes of stochastic process. 
1.2.6 Data and statistic software packages 
All the data used in the research are secondary data. The research focuses on the 
exchange rates for the Chinese currency, the RMB, therefore, the historic data about the 
exchange rate between RMB and some other currencies have been used. Through the 
analysis of economic reasons influencing the currency price change, econometric models 
of market activity and the exchange rate will be formulated and tested, and then used to 
generate forecasts of future market activity and the exchange rate. Macro and micro 
economic indexes will be used, e.g. the GDP, GNP, foreign reserves, gross foreign export 
values, etc. 
In this study, most data is collected via the Datastream database. Data applied for 
econometric analyses are monthly data with a small amount of annual data. The Chinese 
data are mainly original from China National Bureau of Statistics and International 
Monetary Fund database (IMF). Majority data for other countries are from the IMF 
database. 
The main statistics software packages used for simulate models are EViews and 
OxMetrics. The details of original model equations are given in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7. 
1.3 Statement of research aims 
The main aim for this study is to try to forecast and highlight the future trend of the 
Chinese currency RMB and the exchange market of China, including producing 
econometric models of the RMB real exchange rate which will be capable of forecasting 
and applying the macro and micro economic analyses to the Chinese exchange market. 
The specific research questions of this thesis follow the order as below: 
1 .  What is the situation of the Chinese monetary system and the foreign exchange market 
in the past and at present? (Chapter 2) 
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2. To what extent the exchange rates influence foreign trade? (Section 3 .2) 
3. What are the relationships between Chinese foreign trade, real effective exchange rates, 
foreign direct investments and GDP? What is the future trend of these variables? (Section 
3 .3) 
4. Similarities between the situation of the Chinese financial markets today and the 
German markets around 1 970s. (Chapter 4) 
5 .  How can China reference the historic experiences in developing and administrating the 
foreign exchange market and its currency prices? (Chapter 4) 
6. Analysis of the key reasons which resulting in the 2008 global financial crisis. (Section 
5 .2) 
7. Discussion about the main reasons which have caused global imbalances. (Section 5 .3) 
8 .  Based on the "Chimerica" phenomena, to what extent does the Chinese economy and 
its position influence the US? (Section 5.3) 
9 .  Is there any causal link existing between the official and the black exchange rate of 
China? (Section 7.2) 
1 0. To what extent have the government policies had effect upon both the official 
exchange and the black exchange market? (Section 7.2) 
1 1 . What are the differences between CPI, RPI and PPI based RMB real exchange rates? 
(Section 7 .3)  
1 2. Using the Smooth Threshold Auto-Regression (STAR) model to simulate the RMB 
real exchange rates and estimate the regime transition situation, calculating the middle 
points, bands and the speed of regime transition? (Section 7.4) 
1 3 .  Using the Markov-Switching (MS) model to estimate the regime transition situation 
of RMB real exchange rates by stochastic analysis. What is the regime distribution 
situation? How long is the duration for the real exchange rates staying in a specific 
regime? How fast the rate switching from one regime to another? (Section 7.5) 
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14 .  Forecast the future trend of RMB real exchange rates by MS model. (Section 4 .6) 
1.4 Thesis Structure 
This PhD thesis is organised as follows: 
Chapter 2 is the history and background review of the Chinese monetary system, foreign 
exchange markets and its currency. In this section, the monetary system and the 
background of Chinese foreign exchange market is introduced based on their 
development stages in different time periods. 
Chapter 3 discusses the situation of Chinese foreign trade and how the RMB exchange 
rate price movements can change the trade profit margin. An econometric forecast model 
is built into this section to formulate the foreign trade, real effective exchange prices, 
foreign direct investments and GDP of China. 
Chapter 4 compares a similar situation between the Chinese foreign exchange market and 
its currency today with Germany in 1 969 and the early 1 970s. Many similarities and 
development processes are found. The German model can be used as a reference into 
Chinese markets. 
Chapter 5 discusses the global imbalances situation in the international financial markets 
and to what extent the Chinese RMB has effect on these affairs. This chapter links China 
with its main trading partners and estimates the relationships between them in trading 
balance perspectives. 
Chapter 6 is the main research review of empirical studies in the real exchange rate area. 
This chapter demonstrates a variety of researches and different model specifications, 
following the time and technical progress trends. The methodologies introduced in this 
section starts from early stage tradition real exchange model to linear and non-linear 
dynamic stochastic models. 
Chapter 7 involves most of the data analyses in this study. This chapter starts with 
illustrating the relationship of the official and underground black market exchange rates, 
followed by an ARIMA model to confirm the links between black market prices and the 
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real exchange prices. Non-linear dynamic model STAR and Markov-Switching models 
are applied to analyse the CPI based, PPI based and RPI based real exchange prices. 
Chapter 8 Includes all the study results and conclusions above and gives suggestion for 
further research. 
1 0 
Chapter 2 Chinese Monetary System and Foreign 
Exchange Market Review 
2.1  Timeline and different periods of Chinese Renminbi1 history 
2.1 . 1  Timeline 1 979- 201 0  
1 .  Before the 1 979 economy reforms, there was no regulated foreign exchange market in 
China. In 1 980 the Bank of China set up a swap transaction for foreign exchange. Holders 
used their quota2 to exchange specific amounts of currency they needed from the Bank of 
China. 
2. The Chinese government decided to add an International Rate for Trade Settlements 
(IRTS) to the official exchange rate from 1 98 1 .  IRTS rate, which was higher 
(depreciated)3 than the official rate, played the role of a parallel4 exchange rate, and was 
abolished at the end of 1 984. It was the debut of parallel marketing in the Chinese foreign 
exchange market. 
3 .  The experiment of the crawling peg ended and the use of parallel rate stopped in 1 986. 
The official rate has been, as some critics described, "misleading" for the 5 years from 
1 986 to 1 99 1 .  
4 .  The parallel exchange rate of the RMB was used again together with the official 
exchange rate in 1 988.  Authorities announced that prices of the parallel exchange market 
would follow a managed floating exchange rate regime in April 1 99 1 .  
1 Renminbi is the name of the official currency in China, which is abbreviated to RMB, similar as the Sterling in Britain. 
The measuring unit is "Yuan", as a unit of pound in UK. The fractional unit is Cent, one Yuan equals to one hundred 
cents. The ISO code ofRMB is CHY (Chinese Yuan). 2 At the beginning of Chinese economy reform, the authorities assigned the foreign exchange quota to the export 
enterprises. The awarding amount depended on the ability of yielding profit of every single enterprise. 
3 At that moment, RMB was mainly pegged with US Dollar, the prices were marked by direct quotation, IRTS rate was 
RMB 2.8 Yuan per USD while the official rate was 1 .53 Yuan per USD. 
4 In some other research papers, the parallel market in China is also named "swap market". Because the parallel market 
indicates a market co-exists with the official market, and China did not have its real official exchange market until l994. 
Therefore, strictly, the unshaped exchange market under the authority permission of using a different exchange rate 
from the official rate fixed by the government should be named swap market rather than parallel market. 
1 1  
5 .  On 1 st January 1 994, the Chinese authorities unified the double exchange rate system 
and the foreign exchange market had major reforms. The official market after unification 
was under a managed floating exchange rate system. Exchange prices depended partly on 
market demand and supply and were partly pegged with the dollar prices for stability. The 
RMB/USD official exchange rate was 8 .6 Yuan per Dollar. In April 1 994, the first 
official foreign exchange market was established in Shanghai, China. An inter-bank 
foreign exchange rate was adopted to replace the swap rates. 
6. The Chinese government announced the acceptance of Article VIII of GATT1 on 1 st 
December 1 996, which marked the total free convertibility of current accounts. 
Restrictions on capital account items continued to exist. 
8. During the Asian financial crisis of 1 997- 1 998 the Chinese central government had 
taken measures to maintain a stable RMB and fixed the price against US Dollar at above 
8.28 level. In the autumn of 1 998, the authority applied a series actions focused on 
foreign exchange flight, money laundring, smuggling, tax fraud, etc. The Foreign 
Exchange Swap Centre closed permanently. 
9. China became a member of World Trade Organization (WTO) in December 200 1 .  
However, China did not open its market totally. 
1 0. The Chinese authorities revaluated the RMB by a managed floating rate which was 
based on a basket of currencies instead of a single pegged US Dollar by 2 1 st July 2005 . 
The daily fluctuation was allowed within 0.3% on both sides. 
1 1 . Chinese foreign exchange reserves reached 853.7 billion USD in 2006, exceeding 
Japan and becoming the highest in the world. 
12 .  Chinese currency RMB became one of the international settlement currencies in July 
2009. The application was first applied in the Hong Kong market. 
1 "The General Agreement on Tariff and Trade"' came into force in 194 7 by the World Trade Organization. 
12 
2.1.2 Different periods in the history of Chinese foreign exchange 
2.1.2.1 1953-1978, under the planned economic control 
Before the 1 979 economic reforms, the use of a planned economy in China was applied 
and based on the macroeconomic control by the government. The Chinese authorities 
adjusted the foreign exchange balance by regulating the RMB exchange rate. The 
exchange policy was based mainly on the parity of domestic and foreign market prices of 
export commodities, considering also the import commodities and the purchasing parity 
of overseas remittances. The government kept control of the foreign exchange balance by 
mandatory plan. There was no foreign debt at that period and any foreign direct 
investment was forbidden. Therefore, the exchange rate of the RMB had gradually 
alienated from its real foreign trade role being instead an adjustment tool only. The RMB 
exchange rate prices were considered overvalued during this period. 
After World War II, the fast development and rapid industrialization of the Soviet Union 
exerted a strong impression to the other communist countries including China. China 
referenced itself to the Soviet Union system in the post-war recovery after 1 949. Most 
policies or government decisions followed this system. Governments made five-year 
plans. Malcolm (Former Soviet Union, China, 1 993, pp.292) describes that in most 
developing countries which followed the Soviet Union model, the fiscal policies were 
decided by two departments together: the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of 
Planning. The former decides the government consumption expenditures whilst the latter 
controls the manner of government capital expenditure. There are two reasons for their 
use of control. The control can both keep pace of large structural changes and also correct 
failures in recovery. 
Under this system, the outputs of enterprises were scheduled or even restricted according 
to the five-year plan and the most recent year data. There were restrictions on holding 
foreign currencies. All foreign currencies were concentrated by the government and 
assigned by authorities. Any enterprise or person was forbidden to hold foreign currency. 
All inflow foreign currencies must sell to the state at an official price. 
At first, the exchange price of RMB to other currencies was established by the purchasing 
power parity rather than by the gold standard. Because of the U.S .  involvement in Korea 
War, the relationship between the U.S. and China had deteriorated since 1 950. Therefore, 
1 3  
the RMB was referenced by British Sterling and the Soviet Union Rouble at that time. 
The price was calculated by the weighted average of three indices: the ratio of export 
goods price 1 ,  the ratio of import goods price2 , and the purchasing ratio of overseas 
Chinese3 . After 1 973 post Bretton-woods system, the RMB was pegged by multilateral 
currencies and was maintained at an overvalued price. The "currencies basket" for 
referencing changed many times in two years and eventually the RMB price was fixed at 
the middle level of exchange prices with the US dollar and the Deutsch Mark in 
November 1 975 . During this period, RMB prices were set by the authorities at an 
overvalued level, for cheaper import goods measured by the RMB. The overvalued 
currency permitted increasing imports to satisfy the needs of building the new country. 
Therefore, relatively, the overvalued domestic currency frustrated exports going the other 
way 
2.1.2.2 1979-1993, the economy transferring period 
From 1 979, China began to open its conservative economy and started an economic 
reform including a reform of the foreign exchange market. From October 1 980, the Bank 
of China launched the swap business between surplus and deficit units in 1 2  cities, when 
in order to purchase foreign currency all transactions were required to be within the 
retention quotas. The quota holders were permitted to sell their holdings to the state 
owned banks. They allowed the quota sold to be within a 1 0% fluctuation. Then in the 
August of the following year, 1 98 1 ,  the use of IRTS (International Rates of Trade 
Settlements) marked the establishment of the swap market. 
The IR TS market was based on the cost of earnings for a unit foreign exchange through 
exporting which was higher (depreciated) than the official rate. The swap exchange prices 
in this market were calculated by the export average cost of foreign exchange at current 
issue plus 1 0% profit which was fixed at 2.8 Yuan per dollar at the beginning whilst the 
official price was 1 .5 Yuan per Dollar. The IRTS market foundation was the foreign 
exchange retention scheme which allowed Chinese exporters to retain claims on a 
fraction of their export proceeds. The 40% retention ratio was determined by the 
(Domestic Cost of Every single Export Goods) W . " d 1 * etgocte Average The ratio of export good price FoB . . Proportwn of Export on Certatn Penod (Domestic Cost of Every Single Import Goods-Consumption) W . h d A 2 
The ratio of im ort ood rice= _FoB 
* etg te verage 
p g p 
Proportwn a f Import on Certain Period 3 The purchasing ratio of overseas Chinese= Li�ing casts of overseas Chinese Family Living in China * Exchange Price 
Ltving Costs a f Overseas Chinese Family Living Abroad 
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government. The weighted average of the official and the swap rates was determined by 
the retention ratio. 
Meanwhile, the official rate which was used for non-traded exchange settlements was 
calculated by a basket of foreign currencies. The official rate fell from 1 .  7 yuan per dollar 
to 2.35 Yuan per dollar during 1 98 1  to 1 984 as the dollar appreciated in the international 
exchange market. At the end of 1 984, the official rate was adjusted down close to the 
IRTS rate. The use of both official rate and IRTS rate added the difficulty of the statistics 
and management of the foreign exchange, therefore, when the IR TS price come close to 
the official rate at the ending of 1 984, it was abolished. The unified official rate was fixed 
by the authority at 2 .8 Yuan per dollar on 1 January 1 985. The exchange rate of RMB fell 
from 2.8 Yuan per dollar to 5 .22 Yuan per dollar until 1 7  November 1 990. The gradually 
reduction was the feedback of the rise of export foreign exchange costs but had lagged 
after the change of inflation. 
From October 1 986, the authorities allowed foreign investment enterprises to trade with 
each other using swap rate in some coastal cities and special economic zones 1 •  The 
transaction price was negotiated by the participating parties. Local companies still use the 
fixed swap rate set by the authorities. 
Later in March 1 988, applied swap exchange prices formally co-existed at the same time 
with the official rate. From 28th September, 1 988, Shanghai took marginal pricing auction 
into the swap exchange market. For this auction regime, the lowest price of successful 
bids was accepted and used in all transaction until the next auction. The transaction 
quantity was based on market supply and demand. This auction system was replaced by 
Dutch auction at 1 st August 1 990. 
More than 80% foreign exchange transactions were conducted in the swap market to 1 992. 
The rate in the swap market was higher than the official rate because the government 
provided subsidies to exporters. In the two years 1 99 1  and 1 992, the RMB was over 
valued which resulted in a large depreciation. Authority adjusted the official exchange 
rate from 4.7 ( 1 990), 5 .4 ( 1 992) to 5.8 ( 1 993) Yuan per US dollar. 
1 The coastal cities were mainly located in the Southeast coast and Shanghai was the central city. The special economic 
zones here were the Guangzhou and Shenzhen economic zones. 
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2.1.2.3 1994-2001, the preliminary period of "Socialism Market Economy" 
At the end of 1 993, the swap rate of RMB against USD was 8.72 Yuan per USD while 
the official rate was 5.72 Yuan per USD. The massive gap caused financial market 
confusion and inconvenience. Hence, for the development of foreign market, the ruling 
party in 1 994 demanded the reform of the foreign exchange management system; built a 
managed floating exchange rate market under unified regulation in order that the RMB 
could become the general convertible currency. The official exchange rate and swap rate 
were integrated and based on supply and demand from 1 st Jan 1 994 at a rate of 8.7 Yuan 
per Dollar. From the policy announced by the People' s  Bank of China (the Chinese 
central bank) on the first day of 1 994, the exchange rate of inter-bank market could float 
0.3 percent on both sides of the middle price. The daily closing price of each currency in 
inter-bank market transactions is set as the middle price of the next trading day. Exchange 
rates between RMB and USD, RMB and Japanese Yen were allowed a 1 percent daily 
fluctuation. The buying and selling price differential could not exceed 0. 1 5  percent of the 
middle price. In addition, an inter-bank exchange market, Chinese Foreign Exchange 
Centre was established in Shanghai on 1 st April 1 994, then run officially from 4th April .  
This the first Chinese foreign official exchange market adopted a managed floating 
regime. This market permitted a fluctuating rate around a certain margin. The People's  
Bank of China was pursuing an essential intervention to maintain stable RMB prices. In 
fact, the managed floating exchange rates had been tied to a de facto dollar peg after 1 997. 
The developing economy and inflation rate increase caused the nominal exchange rate of 
the RMB to stay within a small amount of appreciation from 1 993 to 1 997 until the Asian 
crisis. During the Asian financial crisis, the RMB rate depreciated over three years. 
Economic downturn worldwide implied the deflation of main trade partner countries, e.g. 
Europe and Japan. 
In this period, the foreign exchange system, settlement and sales implemented in 1 994 
forced enterprises to buy or sell large parts of their foreign deposits to the appointed bank 
using the current trading day price. Enterprises were only allowed to hold a small part of 
foreign currencies for daily use. Foreign trade surplus and exchange, settlement and sales 
systems enfaced more selling than buying of foreign deposits. The People's  Bank of 
China had to monitor and intervene in the market price to make sure the daily fluctuation 
was below 0.3 percent. Therefore, the price decision was more affected by political 
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macro-adjustment than by the economic supply and demand. In December 200 1 ,  China 
became a member of the World Trade Organisation after long and tough discussions and 
negotiations. The political adjustments gradually reduced afterwards. China and its 
foreign exchange market entered a new period after acceding to the WTO. 
2.1.2.4 2002-present, the development and improvement of Chinese "Socialist Market 
Economy" period 
The rate forming mechanism of the RMB was reformed on 2 1  July 2005. The exchange 
rate was still under a managed floating regime which was determined by the market and 
adjusted by assessing the value of a new basket of currencies. Chinese RMB rate was no 
longer pegged only to the US dollar; instead, authorities assessed many selected 
currencies to give a consistent weighted currency basket as a reference. This multilateral 
exchange index guarantees stable RMB and price equilibrium. 
The new policy implemented from 2006 adjusted the variation. The exchange rate of 
RMB-USD can vary by only 0.3 percent from the middle price. For other currencies such 
as Euros, Yens, Hong Kong Dollars, etc., the fluctuation of the currency band was 3%. 
Nominal quotations should not exceed 1 percent from the middle price. The cash price 
quotation are not allowed to exceed 4 percent. 
On 6th July 2009, the RMB has been one of the official international settlement currencies. 
The agreement was signed between the Bank of China and 1 1  other, mainly Asian banks t .  
This application of the agreement reduced the currency risk of  foreign investments. 
Therefore, it should to a certain extent stimulate more investment. 
At the end of the 2000s, RMB prices were under wide pressures to rise. There was a long 
and a wide range of critics who pointed out that the Chinese authorities had been 
manipulating its currency at an undervalued level. The RMB raise pressure came directly 
from Chinese main trading partners, represented by the US, also supported by other world 
major economic institutions, for example, the International Monetary Fund, the European 
Central Bank, etc. Under this pressure, although the price of RMB against the Dollar had 
stayed at 8 .28 Yuan per Dollar for more than seven years, the price started moving from 
June 2005 and rose gradually to a peak price of 6.79 Yuan per Dollar in September 2008. 
l These 1 1  banks include Standard Chartered Bank, Bank of East Asia, Malayan Banking Berhad, Oversea-Chinese 
Banking Corp, Hana Bank Hong Kong, etc. 
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The price had grown by more than 20%. The RMB appreciation stopped in 2008. Its 
prices against Dollar varied around 6 .8  Yuan per Dollar but restarting from 2009, there 
was once again more rise pressure coming from western countries. 
2.2 Chinese Monetary system background and foreign exchange 
market review 
2.2.1 Monetary system in China 
In China, the monetary policies are based on four mam elements, ultimate targets, 
intermediate targets, monetary policy instruments, and the transmission mechanism. 
Ultimate target indicates the macroeconomic control target of monetary policies. 
Intermediate targets are variables chosen by authorities to implement the ultimate targets .  
The intermediate targets have two components: intermediary agent objectives and 
operating objectives. Intermediary agent objectives are adjustable targets according to the 
central bank observing the realisability of ultimate targets, so that the central bank can use 
operating objectives to achieve intermediary agent objectives. Policy instruments are 
levers to adjust intermediate targets by the central bank. According to the ultimate targets, 
Chinese central bank applies monetary policy instruments through financial institutions 
and market transactions. The effects are transmitted towards influential enterprises and 
individuals in producing investments, expenditures, etc. This process is defined as 
monetary transmission mechanism. 
2.2.1.1 Ultimate targets of Chinese monetary policies 
The main goals of macroeconomic controls are restraining inflation, economic growth, 
maintaining stable employment rates and an acceptable international payment balance. 
However, these goals are not able to be implemented together at once. 
If the main target is to maintain high speed economic growth then consumer prices and 
inflation increases will occur. On the other hand a stable level of employment rates 
requires a certain level of money supply to stimulate economic growth hence in this case, 
it is difficult to restrain inflation. The long term practices of China prove that only one or 
two policy goals can be satisfied in any given period, or even only a single target is 
achievable especially in the primary stages of economic reform. Under these 
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circumstances to be able to adopt dual or multi target monetary policies, asset shortages 
require massive investment assets such as an increase in the circulation of money supply 
in order to support temporary high economic growth which in turn would affect the whole 
economic stability. Inflation and large market fluctuations pushed authorities to apply 
coercive adjustments. 
The "Decisions about the economic structure reform by China State Council" issued in 
December 1 993 established the major target of Chinese monetary policy: "the promotion 
of economic growth must be based on maintaining a stable currency". 
2.2.1.2 Intermediate targets of Chinese monetary policies 
The intermediate target is one of the most important elements of the monetary policies 
used to accomplish the progress and to decide the effects of the policies implemented. 
The time delay between the implementation of ultimate targets and policy instruments 
results in the necessity of setting intermediate targets. Intermediate targets must consist of 
three key characteristics: measurable, controllable, and correlative. Measurable indicates 
that there is accurate data about intermediate targets. Controllable means authorities are 
able to manipulate intermediate targets for practising the intentions of the monetary 
policy. Correlative means there must be a visible transmission relationship between 
policy instruments and ultimate targets, which make sure the influences on intermediate 
targets are predictable. 
In China, before the middle 1 990s, the authorities applied direct control levers. The 
indicators of the total credit and amount of money issued were the intermediate targets of 
monetary policies. After 1 994, the single state owned banking system had been gradually 
transferred into a multi financial institution system. The proportion of newly gained loans 
from non-state owned financial institution to the total newly gained loan increased from 
20% in 1 990 to 49% in 1 996. Enterprises raised capital by floating shares in capital 
markets. Fluctuations of foreign currency capital increased the effects on the domestic 
supply and demand. Under these circumstances, intervention by state owned banks has 
less ability to satisfying the macroeconomic control intentions. 
As a result, the central bank reduced the scale of credit control and since 1 994, allowed 
foreign exchange transactions. In 1 996, the People's Bank of China (the central bank of 
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China) adopted domestic money supply as one of the agent objectives and published data 
of MO, Ml  and M21 . 
During the direct control era, the index of total credit has been used both as one of the 
agent objectives and the operating objectives. After entering the indirect control era, the 
operating objectives have not been fixed or announced officially by the central banl<.. In 
the routing operation, two indices were monitored by the People' s  Bank of China: the 
excess reserve rates of commercial banks, and the inter-bank offered rates (CIBOR) or 
the bound buyback rates. 
2.2.1.3 Monetary policy instruments 
Monetary instruments can be categorised into quantity based instruments or pnce 
adjusting instruments according to the way they influence markets. The former includes 
reserve-deposit ratios, re-lending and re-discount rates, credit policies, etc, and affect 
markets through adjusting the quantity of money supply. The latter includes for example 
interest rates and foreign exchange rates, and are able to influence financial costs and the 
expected income from market subjects, in order to affect their activities and market 
transactions. The open market operation instrument is both quantity based and price 
adjusting instrument. 
Chinese economic reforms during the 1 990s gradually turned the macroeconomic control 
from direct towards indirect control. Together with the financial marketisation the 
authorities had more experiences in applying different policy instruments and tended to 
adopt more price adjusting instruments. The monetary policy instruments would have 
become more efficient if the inter-bank control system and monetary transmission 
mechanism had been more sophisticated. 
2.2.1.4 Monetary policy transmission mechanism 
Before Chinese economic reform, the monetary policy transmission routing was a simple 
process and was able to transmit directly from the policy maker, the central bank, to the 
ultimate objectives. After the economic reforms, a re-established central bank system 
helped the financial system in China to improve. 
1 MO is money in circulation and in bank vaults. M l  is the narrow money, includes funds that are readily accessible for 
spending. M2 is the wide money, equals M l plus savings deposits, time deposits less than $ 1 00,000 and money market 
deposit accounts for individuals. 
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During the 1 980s, China was under a planned economic structure. Monetary policies 
transmission system used mainly the bank loan procurable in acting the market objectives, 
most of which are state owned banks and enterprises. The money market transmission 
process had not been formally shaped. 
In the 1 990s, the development of money market and interest rate marketisation assisted 
the development of the Chinese financial market. The monetary policy transmission 
follows the process that starts from the central bank toward the financial market, then 
through financial institutions to influential individuals. The transmission mechanism 
follows an order comprising four elements : policy instruments, operating objectives, 
agent objectives, and ultimate targets. The monetary policy transmission mechanisms 
over different periods are listed on Table 1 .  
As the reforms moved forward, restrictions to leading and deposit rates of financial 
institutions were released. Quotation prices of Shanghai Inter-Bank Offered Rate 
(SHIBOR) have been public since January 2007. The tighter linkage among the monetary 
market, bond market and central bank market operation reveal a Chinese financial market 
becoming more sensitive to monetary policies. 
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Table 2 . 1  Chinese monetary policy transmission mechanism over different periods 
Pre economic reform Primary/initial stage of Entering indirect 
stage ( 1 948- 1 973) the economic reform macroeconomic 
( 1 979- 1 997) control (from 1 998) 
Policy Credit cash plan, Credit cash plan, Credit policies, 
instruments Credit policies, Credit policies, Interest rate policies, 
Interest rate policies, Interest rate policies, Reserve deposit 
Administrative Reserve deposit ratios, ratios, 
operations. Re-lending, Open market 
Re-discount, operations, 
Open market Re-lending, 
operations, Re-discount, 
Special deposits 1 ,  Special deposits, 
Window guidance2• Window guidance. 
Operating NIA Volume of credit Monetary base. 
objectives (initial stage), 
Monetary base (end of 
the stage). 
Agent NIA Volume of credit Money supply 
objectives (initial stage), 
Combination of credit 
volume and money 
supply (end of the 
stage). 
Ultimate Stable economy Economy development Economy 
targets and stable consumer development and base 
price (initial stage), on maintaining 
Economy development domestic currency 
and base on value stable 
maintaining domestic 
currency value stable 
(end of the stage). 
1 Special Deposits are the central bank absorb over liquidity capital from commercial banks and other financial 
institutions by using certain accounts that guarantee a very attractive interest rate and automatic interest capitalisation. 
2 Window guidance is benevolent compulsion that has been used to persuade banks and other financial institutions to 
stick to official guidelines. The central bank puts moral pressure on commercial banks and other financial institutions to 
make them operate in a way that is consistent with furthering the good of the economy with national needs. 
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2.2.2 Foreign exchange market development, authority management and 
related areas 
2.2.2.1 Pre-1994 
The foreign exchange reforms of 1 994 together with relative policies introduced in China 
pre 1 994 marked this year as the threshold of the establishment of a formal foreign 
exchange market. China' s foreign exchange system and policy making were service for 
its foreign trade. Meanwhile, most of the foreign trade deals were handled by state owned 
foreign trade corporations. By using central planning controls authorities could intervene 
all the foreign trade activities. 
During the pre-economic reform era (before1 979), Chinese central government controlled 
all import and export activities in the country. The basic target of foreign trade activity in 
the national economic plan was to use the foreign exchange generated by exports to 
import goods and services beyond the domestic productive capacity. Under this system, 
all the profits from the foreign trade activities had to be surrendered to the government 
whilst the government used the central budget to cover all the foreign trade losses. 
The economic reforms concerning the foreign trade started in 1 979 and included three 
aspects: breaking down of the state monopoly thereby encouraging competitions; 
secondly, abandoning the use of central planning restrictions and replacing them by 
allowing market forces to play their role in the economy; thirdly, cutting down the 
connection of foreign trade companies with the authorities. These companies have to be 
in charge of financing their own deficits and holding their rewards as well. According to 
these new aspects, in order to build a market based regulatory framework the period from 
1 979 to 1 994 can be defined as the initial stage of the foreign trade market reform. The 
policies encouraged an increased number of foreign trade companies. 
According to data from the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, the 
number of foreign trade corporations boomed from 400 at the end of 1 98 1  to more than 
1 0,000 by 1 994, a 25 fold increase. In 1 98 1 ,  there were 1 0  traditional foreign trade 
corporations, their total export volume took 76.6 percent, and their import that year took 
8 1 .3 percent of the total export and import of the whole country. There was a fast 
development of other foreign trade companies. The proportion of export and import of 
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these 1 0  corporations was reduced to only 1 0  percent of the total export and 1 6.9  percent 
of the total import by 1 992. 
A series of reform policies had been applied to assist the economic developments, for 
example, opening major coastal areas for inflows of foreign investments, in 1 984, the 
RMB exchange prices were adjusted against USD from 2 .80 Yuan per USD in August 
1 985 to 3 .7  Yuan per USD by July 1 986, applied swap exchange rate 1 exclusive for 
certain corporations to stimulate the foreign trade activities, etc. 
The swap exchange market had a fast rate of development. By 1 988, there were about 90 
foreign exchange swap centers in the countrywide and the transaction volume reached 6.3 
billion US dollars and took about 1 1 .4 percent of total imports. In that year, the high 
inflation rate (27 percent) and nearly doubled trade deficit compared with the previous 
year resulted in a swap rate 83 percent higher (RMB becomes more depreciate against 
dollar) than the official rate. 
In 1 989, both political and economic circumstances2 pushed the central government to 
adopt tighter policies. The predicament had been reversed in two years and by 1 990, 
inflation rates dropped and the trade balance returned to surplus. 
Entered 1 99 1 ,  authorities put the focuses on fading away export subsidies. The restriction 
of individual transactions on the swap market had been abolished by the end of 1 99 1 .  
Therefore, the proportion of swap market to the total China' s foreign exchange 
transaction increased from 50 percent before to 80 percent after this year. (Lardy, 1 992) 
2.2.2.2 After 1994 exchange reform 
The abandon of using swap rate and the adoption of interbank market in April 1 994 
marked the ending of the dual rate system. Authorities unified the foreign exchange 
market between the official market and the swap market. The 1 994 exchange reform has 
gradually shaped a formal exchange market for China. It released the restriction to 
enterprises buying and selling foreign exchange through banks. 
1 More details about the dual rate system included both official exchange rates and swap exchange rates in Chinese 
history will be discussed on Chapter IV, Para4.3. 
2 The "Tian-An-Men Square Incidence" on 4th June 1989, together with the collapses of communism system of many 
countries included the Soviet Union created a tricky situation for Chinese government. On economic area, there were 
high inflation rate and foreign trade deficits. 
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During this period, the Bank of China, as the key subject in the foreign exchange market, 
was under the leadership of the People' s  Bank of China (the central bank) to control the 
retail foreign exchange transactions. The central bank was also the largest buyer of 
foreign exchange who absorbed more than 60 percent of the total sells. 
The foreign exchange market had a fast development after the 1 994 reform. There was a 
booming on the supply of the foreign exchange. For the market sterlisation, People's  
Bank of China had to purchase the excess foreign exchange supply on the market, most of 
which were US dollars. After absorbing massive amounts of foreign exchanges, Chinese 
foreign reserves had been tripled from 30. 1 billion USD in April 1 994 to 1 05 billion USD 
at the end of 1 996. 
In 1 996, foreign exchange reform has stepped further under the leading of Chinese central 
government, to release controls on domestic enterprises as well as individuals. Foreign 
exchange banks around some coastal cities 1 had been established to provide relevant 
services. Domestic individuals were allowed to keep their foreign exchange in their bank 
account. It was forbidden before 1 996. Before, individuals had to surrender the foreign 
exchange they own to the designated bank, the Bank of China. Foreign exchange market 
improvement created the foundation for China entering into the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). China accepted WTO obligations, including Article VIII, the full 
current account convertibility in December 1 996. 
1 These banks located in the southeast coast of China in Dalian, Jiangsu, Shanghai, and Shenzhen. 
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Table 2.2 China National Foreign Reserves and Current Account Balances 
(in billion USD) 
Foreign exchange reserves Current account balances 
1 990 28.6 12 
1 99 1  42.7 1 3 .3 
1 992 1 9.4 6.4 
1 993 2 1 .2 - 1 1 .9 
1 994 5 1 .6 7.7 
1 995 73 .6 1 6.2 
1 996 1 05 72.4 
1 997 1 39.9 36.9 
1 998 145  3 1 .4 
1 999 1 54.7 2 1 . 1  
2000 1 65 . 6  20.5 
Source: IMF data 
2.2.2.3 1997 Asian financial crisis and afterwards 
The Asian financial crisis started in 1 997 made seriously negative influences on 
neighbors of China, especially had bad effects on their currency prices. Under this 
circumstance, Chinese central government promised to maintain the exchange rate of 
RMB against USD at a stable price. Chinese also used its foreign exchange reserves held 
by the central bank in the Hong Kong market to strike speculators who buy long and sell 
short trying to make the RMB price falling down. Meanwhile, authorities also tighten the 
restrictions on financial market and exchange market, for example, higher restrictions 
were applied to control capital inflows and outflows. All these implements helped the 
RMB maintain stability successfully. The adoption of tight policies continued to 1 998. 
Authorities adopted a series of regulations to supervise foreign exchange transactions, in 
order to crack down the frauds of existing regulations and enhance their ability of 
regulating immature foreign exchange market. 
After negotiating with the World Trade Organization (WTO) about the GATT 
commitment, China accepted the Article VIII of the WTO obligations, the current 
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account convertibility in December 1 996. The 1 997 Asian financial crisis gave a lesson to 
the Chinese central government that higher risks will be brought together with the capital 
account opening up. China slowed down its capital account convertibility pace. The 
conservative policies included prudent fiscal and monetary policy, maintaining adequate 
foreign reserves, and managed floating exchange rates. These actions have also been 
supported by many researches. Jiang ( 1 999), Jing (200 1 ), Shang (2000), and Wu et al. 
(200 1 )  show their agreement of prudential attitude to the full capital account 
convertibility. 
2.2.2.4 2001 Accession to the World Trade Organization 
WTO approved China' s accession on l Oth November 200 1 .  China has moved into its last 
frontier of foreign exchange reform during the 2000s. In order to reduce the risks and 
strengthen the foreign exchange market, China launched another currency reform in July 
2005 . This reform emphasized on increasing the RMB prices from undervalued to what 
western countries and Chinas main trading partners expected, also swap the single 
pegging system with the US dollar to multilateral pegging system. Under this system, 
RMB prices are referenced by a currency basket. From 2 1 st July 2005, China started using 
market force based adjustments to intervene the exchange market. The RMB exchange 
prices were referenced by "a basket of currencies", which was also known as the 
"managed floating exchange regime". 
The inter-bank foreign exchange spot transactions included RMB exchange to US dollar, 
Hong Kong dollar, Japanese Yen, Euro and British Sterling. Weighted average of RMB 
prices against these foreign currencies in the inter-bank market were set as the middle 
price of the next trading day. After 8th August 2005, more financial institutions and non­
financial enterprises have been allowed to take part in the spot foreign exchange market 
transactions. According to the data by Wu (2008, pp69), the total number of institutions 
in the inter bank exchange market reached 268 by the end of 2007, including 8 1  banking 
members. There were 2 1  domestic banks and 60 foreign banks. In order to lower the risk 
of influencing directly from USD or the US unstable, Goldstein (2007) indicates that 
interventions from Chinese authorities pushed the RMB raising by injecting massive 
amounts into the market: 20 billion USD per month on average in 2006, and 45 billion 
per month in the first quarter of 2007. 
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The half opened foreign exchange market and about 20 percent raise of RMB value did 
not satisfied the western countries. The pressure for more freedom on foreign exchange 
market transactions and RMB price rising continued put on China. Burdekin and Siklos 
(2008) quoted People' s  Daily that "Emphasized that the fixed exchange rate had 
'jeopardized' the independence of Chinese monetary policy". During the 2009 to 20 1 0  
period, China's main trading partners with U S  as the leading country, and some main 
economic organizations included the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank 
urged China to open its financial market further and appreciate its domestic currency 
RMB. Chinese central government insisted in the tough line on these pressures. The main 
monetary target of them is to maintain the financial market stable, and guarantee the 
economic increases at the same time. 
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Chapter 3 
3.1 Introduction 
RMB price and the Chinese Foreign Trade 
China has become one of the most important countries in international trade markets. With 
the current growth speed, China will probably surpass the US within twenty years. Because 
China has already been a huge exporter, many Chinese enterprises are using RMB to settle 
trade or even to acquire foreign companies. Authorities are keen to encourage using RMB as 
the settle currency in international trade. An approval of using RMB to pay for imports and 
sell exports was passed in June 201 0. Hong Kong is the biggest RMB offshore market. 
Authorities scheduled and signed an agreement with UK government to build the second 
RMB offshore centre in London. By the end of November 201 0, trade worth 58 billion US 
Dollars had been settled in RMB. 
Copeland (2005) interprets that the main fluctuations of the exchange rate is caused by the 
change of trade market supply and demand. According to the economic theory, there are three 
major reasons which can affect the exchange market supply and demand: international traders, 
foreign investors and speculators. For the first group, export dealings only occur when the 
product price estimated by domestic currency is higher than by foreign currency, there profit 
margin increases. If the domestic currency value rises, the targeting export country currency 
depreciates relatively, thus imports increase and the exports decrease. After importers have 
settled the deal with domestic currency and need to exchange them to achieve the margin, the 
supply of domestic currency increases in the same was and same as the demand for foreign 
currency. 
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For the second group the foreign investors, affect markets more directly through influencing 
the supply of foreign currencies when they depreciate relatively depreciate against the 
domestic currency. As assets maintain their value or become worthier more counted by 
domestic currency, there will be more investor preference to use foreign currency by buying 
domestic currency through direct investments to domestic markets. 
In these three causalities, only the speculator cannot be predicted. Obviously the trade 
markets are determinant by currency prices. Therefore, the RMB price is one of the 
determined variables in Chinese international trade. This chapter will demonstrate the 
relationship between the RMB price and its foreign trade. To find out to what extent domestic 
currency price movements will influence the profit margin of trading companies and the 
foreign trade participants affect currency prices on the other direction. The relationships of 
Chinese foreign trade, foreign direct investments and RMB prices will be illustrated by the 
econometric model. 
This chapter includes four parts. The next section will give a brief review of the international 
trade situation of China, followed by illustrations of how currency price changes influence 
the foreign trade profit. The third section will use the econometric model to demonstrate the 
relationships between trade, investment and exchange prices. This part will also give the 
forecast of these three variables. The last section discusses the behaviour of foreign trade 
participants in foreign exchange markets. 
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3.2 Chinese international trade situation 
3.2.1 Chinese foreign trade situation after joining WTO 
Since 200 1 ,  China hasbeen a member of the WTO, and since then its currency has been 
gradually appreciating under the international pressures. Meanwhile, the international 
payment imbalances have continually increased. The Chinese international payment 
imbalance reflects the central bank sterilisation strategy. From the economic reform started in 
1 979, the Chinese currency has been pegged stable with the US dollar, even during the 1 997, 
the Asian crisis. 
Since being a WTO member in 200 1 ,  the foreign trade development contributes more than a 
quarter of the whole growth of China. The largest proportion of Chinese export flows into its 
neighbouring Asian countries. According to the data from the Chinese Ministry of Commerce, 
in 2009, about 47 percent of the total exports were absorbed by Asia, 22 percent digested by 
the European Union and 20 percent North America. 
The Non-Deliverable Forward (NDF) price of RMB was cheaper than the spot value until 
December 2002 but above from then on. The errors and omissions item in China' s balance of 
payments shifted from negative to positive in the same year. And from the following year 
until today, both current and capital accounts show their large scale and increasing surplus. 
After 200 1 ,  there were presumptions that the RMB should appreciate and indeed the RMB 
price gradually appreciated upwards against the US dollar since the revaluation of July 2005 . 
In a decade, the current account surplus, capital account surplus, and the changes in foreign 
reserves have increased from 3 percent in average to over 1 0  percent of the total GDP (Table 
3 . 1  ). The figure shrank between 2007 and 2008 as a resulted of the international recession. 
However, at the same time as all the western countries were experiencing negative figures of 
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their economic indexes, China was able to keep its increase at a remarkable plus 8 percent. 
The overall increase in Chinese foreign reserves was $4 1 7  billion and it was 9.5 percent of 
the total GDP in 2008. 
The ending of the fixed pegging of the Chinese currency RMB with the US dollar meant that 
the substantial increases of surpluses and the RMB price stability required the authority to 
intervene almost daily to buy the excess foreign currency on the exchange market. Based on 
250 trading days per year, the purchased foreign exchange was more than 1 billion per day 
over 3 years. To balance these purchases, there had to be the equivalent amount of RMB held 
in the bank' s reserve account. This situation stimulated the local money supply to accelerate, 
and caused the inflation to a certain level. 
After experiencing several episodes such as monetary acceleration inflation, or even social 
shocks (in 1 989 and 1 993, see data analysis in Chapter 7), the Chinese authorities had learnt 
the skills required of keeping the RMB sterilisation from the past 2-3 decades history and 
also some other Asian countries operations. For example, releasing the RMB from the system 
after purchasing the foreign currencies. 
The techniques of the Chinese authorities operations was summarised by Greenwood (2008) 
and included three main areas. First, the authority raised reserve requirement deposits of 
commercial banks, increasing from 6 percent in 2003 to 1 6.5 percent in 2008. Second, the 
central bank issued RMB-denominated (sterilisation) bills and bonds which had reached 1 0% 
of bank deposits. Therefore, today more than 26.5 percent of the deposits of the commercial 
banks are under the control of the central bank. 
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Table 3 . 1  Current account, capital account balances, the change of foreign reserves and their 
percentages of GDP 
Year Current Account Percentage Capital Account Percentage Change in Percentage 
surplus (million of GDP surplus (million of GDP Foreign reserves of GDP 
US$) US$) (million US$) 
1 997 36.963 3 .75% 57.573 5 .85% 34.86 1 3 .54% 
1 998 3 1 .472 3 . 0 1% 93 . 1 39  8 .9 1 %  5 .069 0.49% 
1 999 2 1 . 1 1 5  1 .95% 94.458 8.72% 9.7 1 6  0.90% 
2000 20.5 1 8  1 .7 1 %  93 .970 7.84% 1 0.899 0.9 1 %  
2001 1 7.40 1 1 .3 1 %  97. 1 35 7.33% 46.59 1 3 .52% 
2002 35 .422 2.44% 1 08.958 7.49% 74.242 5 . 1 1 % 
2003 45.875 2.80% 1 32.629 8.08% 1 1 6.844 7. 1 2% 
2004 68.659 3 .55% 1 45 .488 7.53% 206.68 1 1 0.70% 
2005 1 60.8 1 8  7.26% 1 72.529 7.79% 208.940 9.44% 
2006 253 .268 9.56% 1 66.952 6.30% 247.468 9.34% 
2007 3 7 1 .833 1 1 .0 1 %  245 . 1 83 7.26% 461 .9 1 0  1 3 .67% 
2008 426. 1 07 9.72% 320.68 1 7.32% 4 1 7.780 9.53% 
Source: IMF data 
Sterilisation operations also create several distortions at the same time as the positive parts. 
Firstly, the undervalued domestic currency leads the over expansion of exports, which delays 
the inflation, therefore, restricting the development of those industries which are less related 
to exports, such as real estate, health care, education, etc. Secondly, together with the real 
industries, there are also significant financial distortions. Under the requirement of high 
reserve deposit rates and the sterilisation bills, the commercial banks have to return their 
money back to the central bank rather than lending it to the firms or individuals. This implies 
restrictions to the increases of the lending and money growth and also delays or prevents the 
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upturn in inflation. Thirdly, it is the common view in the world, that the large amount of and 
increasing Chinese foreign reserves are the source and main reason for the famous global 
saving glut. The further discussion of saving glut is in Chapter 5 .  
The rise of  the RMB appreciated gradually, not only against primarily the US dollar, but also 
the major European countries currencies. China needs to seek a new way to replace the lower 
profits from the export industry. To expand the domestic market will be its main target. The 
overheating will eventually emerge and the primarily support of the high speed growth will 
transfer from export-lead growth to domestic demand growth. 
In the past, the large scale balance of payments has been a signal of the exchange rate being 
super-competitive. Therefore, after the loss of exchange rate competitiveness in the 
international market because of the RMB appreciation, the willingness of the Chinese 
government to remain the competitive and return to the equilibrium level, it had to either 
adjust the domestic price level via monetary expansion and inflation or the export sectors 
transfer from low incremental spending to high incremental spending such as technology­
intensive exportation sufficient to produce the same profit that the traditional industries used 
to produce. 
The three triggers discussed before would cause the crisis if the situation as going into a 
negative trend. The reflow of money back to the central bank would cause the temporary 
policy to terminate because of the liquidity overhang creating the emergence losses or 
domestic spending surge. The over accumulation of the foreign exchange reserves, 
particularly the US dollar primary when the RMB appreciated would cause a huge calculated 
loss in the reserves.  Third, the imbalance between US and the Asian economies with oil 
producing countries that hold a large amount of "saving" would cause a flight from the dollar 
by investors around the world bring about the desired market adjustment. For example, the 
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US has already applied the policy to slow down the imports thus trying to narrow down the 
trade deficit. 
Today, the foreign exchange rate regimes in the world can be categorised into three groups: 
floating rate systems (with internal anchors), pegged or managed exchange rate systems 
operated by the government authorities (with either internal or external anchors), and 
currency board systems (external anchors). The crucial definition differences between the 
latter two concern the monetary authorities. The monetary authorities are totally active in the 
managed or pegged system to intervene in the foreign exchange market or domestic monetary 
market via policies either introduced or changed. In currency board systems, the authorities 
only respond more passively to the public or bank demands in changing reserves. 
The exchange rate mechanism adopted by China, as mentioned before, is the managed 
floating regime, also the combination of the latter two systems. The sterilisation target 
indicates extensive sterilisation operations, such as the adjustment of the domestic monetary 
market and foreign trade policies. 
Table 3 .2 shows the foreign trade situation of China in the decade from 1 999 to 2008 
according to the import and export volumes and their volumes in percentage of GDP. There is 
a 6-fold increase in average of the export and import volume in this ten-year period. Their 
proportion of GDP also doubled during the same period. 
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Table 3 .2 Import and export flows and their percentage of GDP 
Year Export Flows Percentage of GDP Import Flows Percentage of GDP 
(Billion US$) (Billion US$) 
1 999 1 94.72 1 8 .0% 1 58.73 1 4.7% 
2000 249. 1 3  20.8% 2 1 4.66 1 7 .9% 
200 1 266.08 20. 1 %  232.06 1 7.5% 
2002 325 .65 22.4% 28 1 .48 1 9.4% 
2003 438.27 26.7% 3 93 .62 24.0% 
2004 593 .39 30.7% 534.41 27.7% 
2005 762.48 34.4% 628.30 28.4% 
2006 969.68 36.6% 75 1 .94 28.4% 
2007 1 220.00 36. 1 %  904.62 26.8% 
2008 1 434.60 32.7% 1 073 .92 24.5% 
Source: IMF data 
Table 3 .3  shows the component of Chinese exports and imports from 1 992 to 2008. In the 
early stages, the manufactured goods took a majority part in the foreign trade at more than 80 
percent. The proportion of manufactured goods in imports has decreased gradually as time 
passes by to a level below 70 percent, because China has been the main export manufacturer 
of goods in recently years. On the other side, the percentage of primary goods import has 
been doubled from 1 992 to 2008 whilst its share of exports in 2008 dropped to only a quarter 
of the proportion in 1 992. The situation of Chinese foreign trade is that the main component 
was labour intensive with medium technology. The imports were capital intensive products 
mainly. Transferring from the medium technology and labour-intensive to high tech product 
area has been the main trend of principles and policies of the authorities in recent years. 
36 
Table 3 .3 Main component of Chinese foreign trade 
Year Percentage of import Percentage of Percentage of export Percentage of 
manufactured goods import primary manufactured goods export primary 
goods goods 
1 992 83 .6% 1 6.4% 80.0% 20.0% 
1 993 86.3% 1 3 .7% 8 1 .8% 1 8 .2% 
1 994 85 .7% 1 4.3% 83.7% 1 6.3% 
1 995 8 1 . 5% 1 8 .5% 85.6% 1 4.4% 
1 996 8 1 .7% 1 8 .3% 85.5% 1 4.5% 
1 997 79.9% 20. 1 %  86.9% 1 3 . 1 %  
1 998 83 .6% 1 6.4% 88.8% 1 1 .2% 
1 999 83 .8% 1 6.2% 89.8% 1 0.2% 
2000 79.2% 20.8% 89.8% 1 0.2% 
200 1 8 1 .2% 1 8 .8% 90. 1 %  9.9% 
2002 83.3% 1 6.7% 9 1 .2% 8.8% 
2003 82.4% 1 7.6% 92. 1 %  7.9% 
2004 79. 1 %  20.9% 93 .2% 6.8% 
2005 77.6% 22.4% 93.6% 6.4% 
2006 76.4% 23 .6% 94.5% 5.5% 
2007 74.6% 25 .4% 94.9% 5 . 1 %  
2008 68 .0% 32.0% 94.6% 5.4% 
Source: IMF data 
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3.2.2 Relations of changes in the export profit margin and the RMB price 
Froeign trade, especially for the domestic goods exported can be influenced directly by the 
currency price changes. The Chinese situation in recent years is that the rise of raw material 
costs, labour costs, falling overseas demand and the biggest pressure from the appreciation of 
domestic currency RMB together brought the Chinese exports into a more difficult time than 
they had been used to experiencing. Therefore, boosting domestic demand become the main 
policy trend of China and this was scheduled into the 5-year plan of the Chinese central 
government. 
Figure 3 . 1  demonstrates to what extent the export profit margin had been squeezed by the 
domestic currency prices rises. Where the vertical axis P d '  denotes the export goods cost 
prices under the domestic price level and the horizontal axis S stands for the nominal 
exchange rates. 
Pd'  cl P d' 
c2 
Pd2 ' 
Pd 1 ' 
82 8 1  8 82 81  8 
Figure 3 . 1  Export profit margin change with the currency price 
When the selling price of export goods P d estimated by the domestic currency estimated by 
the foreign currency of its export target country, there is as Eq. (3 . 1 )  shows: 
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And the profit margin M for this certain export goods is shown on Eq. (3.2): 
M = SPr - P� (3 .2) 
In Figure 3 . 1 ,  slope of the oblique line is defined as the selling price of export goods quoted 
by the certain foreign currency. Therefore, according to Eq. (3 .2), the shadow area in the 
graphic shows the amount of export profit. 
If there happened to be a the situation such as the raw material price increase, higher labour 
costs, then the cost price of export goods will rise from P dl to P d2. If the domestic currency 
prices rise against foreign currencies, the exchange rates move from S1 to S2 on horizontal 
aXIS. 
The real story for the Chinese exporters in 2008 and early 2009 can be demonstrated by the 
left graphic of Figure 3 . 1 .  At the moment, the internal price level rise (inflation) increased the 
product costs. Meanwhile, the rise of RMB prices occurred. Therefore, the export profit 
margin can be reduced from the original volume as area a1b1c1 represents to the a2b2c2 area. 
There is one way to maintain the profit volume which is as the right graphic of Figure 3 . 1  
shows: changing the selling price of the export product in overseas markets. The steeper line 
means a higher selling price which is able to maintain the profit abc area. However, it also 
means the export product should lose the competitive advantage in price in overseas markets. 
In some point, Figure 3 . 1  explains the reason that why the small and medium size export 
companies were facing a tough time during 2008 and 2009. The data in this period shows the 
export company numbers and their trading amounts were reduced sharply. 
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3.3 Modelling Chinese foreign trade balances, investments, GDP and 
exchange prices 
3.3.1 Methodology 
In this section, the model to formulate export and import levels in China is based on the 
Ferguson and Schularick (2007) neoclassical model1 • The main exogenous variable to affect 
export is the labour cost. For the import, there are two main exogenous variables, labour costs 
and the domestic demands. Therefore, the export equation is written as Eq. (3 .3). 
XGC :::: XGC(-1) * ULC/ULC(-1) (3 .3) 
Where the XGC is the nominal export goods and services; ULC is the unit labour cost. ( - 1 )  
indicates the previous term. 
The import equation can be express as Eq. (3 .4) 
M cc = Me cc  -1) * [o .s * uLc(-l)] + [o.s * noMD(-1)] (3 .4) ULC DOMD 
Where the MGC is the nominal import goods and services. Therefore, the net export is the 
difference of export and import is shown as Eq. (3 .5) 
NETX = NETX( - 1) + {(XGC - MGC) - [XGC( -1) - MGC( -1)]} (3 .5) 
Where the NETXn is the net export. 
The GDP is written in Eq. (3 .6), the sum of net export and domestic demands. 
1 
GDP = DOMD + NETX (3 .6) 
More details about this model will be given on Chapter 5, section 5.2.2. 
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As has been shown previously, the foreign direct investment is determined by the exchange 
prices and the GDP, here the function can be written as Eq. (3 .7) 
dlog (FDI) = {30 + {31 * dlog(GDP) + {32 * {log[FD/( - 1) - log(GDP(- 1)]} + {33 * 
log (ERICPI) (3 .7) 
The model to formulate the foreign direct investment, net export, GDP and the domestic 
demand is the combine of previous five formulas, from Eq. (3 .3) to Eq. (3 .7). The model is 
written as below: ldlog(FDI) = /]0 + /]1 * dlog(GDP) + /]2 * {Iog[FDI(- 1) - Iog(GDP(- l)l} + /]3 * log (ERICPI) 
XGC = XGC(-1) * ULC/ULC(-1) [ ULC(-1)] [ DOMD (-1)] MGC = MGC(-1) * 0.5 * ULC + 0.5 * DOMD 
NETX = NETX(-1) + {(XGC - MGC) - [XGC(-1) - MGC(-1)]} 
GDP = DOMD + NETX 
The method to solve this model, here the Broyden' s  method has been applied. Broyden's 
method is an advanced method of Newton's method, an iterative method. Each iteration is 
taken a linear approximation to the model. The linear system is solved to find a root of the 
model. 
Newton' s  method for solving a system of equations consists of repeatedly solving a local 
linear approximation to the system. The system of equations is written as Eq. (3 .8) 
F(x, z) = 0 (3.8) 
Where F is the equations group, x is the vector of endogenous variables and z is the vector of 
exogenous variables. Newton's method, we take a linear approximation to the system around 
some values as shows in Eq. (3 .9) 
F(x, z) = F(x', z ') + BF(x�·:')llx = 0 (3 .9) 
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Then use this approximation to construct an iterative procedure for updating the current guess 
for Eq. (3 .9) there is Eq. (3 . 1 0). 
(3 . 1 0) 
The power in Eq. (3 . 1 0) of - 1  is raising, denotes matrix inversion. The procedure is repeated 
until the changes in between periods are smaller than a specified tolerance. 
Broyden's method is based on Newton' s  method with decreased steps. It requires more 
iterations to converge to a solution. At each iteration, Broyden's method takes a step of Eq. 
(3. 1 1 ) .  
(3 . 1 1 ) 
Where Dt is the current approximation to the matrix of derivatives of the equation system. 
As well as updating the value of x at each iteration, Broyden's method also updates the 
existing Jacobian approximation, at each iteration based on the difference between the 
observed change in the residuals of the equation system and the change in the residuals 
predicted by a linear approximation to the equation system based on the current Jacobian 
approximation. The way Broyden's  method to update Dt is on Eq. (3 . 1 2). 
(3 . 1 2) 
Broyden's method shares many of the properties of Newton's method but take less time to 
perform each iteration. However, more iterations may need to be taken to converge to a 
solution. In most cases Broyden's method will take less overall time to solve a system than 
Newton's method, but the relative performance will depend on the structure of the derivatives 
of the equation system. 
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3.3.2 Data 
The data used in this section is all time series data. The data frequency is annual data over the 
sample period from 1 992 to 20 1 0. In this section, the data involves is gross domestic product 
(GDP), foreign direct investment (FDI), CPI based real effective exchange rates (ERICPI), 
nominal exports of goods and services (XGC), nominal imports of goods and services (MGC), 
unit labour cost (ULC) and domestic demand (DOMD). Except ERICPI, all the data is 
calculated in billion Chinese Yuan. The real effective exchange rate is CPI based which sets 
year 1 996 as the base level. All data collected from the National Bureau of Statistics of China 
is shown on Table 3 .4 .  
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Table 3 .4 
G ross Domestic Foreig n d i rect Real effective Nominal Exports of Nominal I m ports of 
Series P roduct investment(Bi l .  exchange rate Goods and Services Goods and Services Net Exports U nit labour Domestic 
Name ( Bii .Yu an) dollar) (CPI-based) ( Bi i .Yuan) (Bi i .Yuan) (Bi i .Yuan) cost Demand 
I D  GDP FDI ERIC PI  XGC MGC N ETX U LC DOMD 
1 992 2693.73 1 1 .008 74.6 1 5  468.41 58 444.394 24.02 1 89 405.498 2728 . 960 
1 993 3526.00 27.5 1 5  77. 377 528.61 55 599.003 -70. 3876 446 . 9 1 7 376 1 . 760 
1 994 48 1 0 .85 33.767 1 1 4. 809 1 042 . 92 996.448 46.4723 537 . 1 49 4958 . 330 
1 995 5981 .05 37.52 1 1 1 2 . 979 1 242. 553 1 1 03. 1 22 1 39.43 1 1 592. 1 79 622 1 .830 
1 996 7014.25 4 1 . 726 1 00. 000 1 255.843 1 1 54.292 1 0 1 . 5502 61 5.688 7270 .440 
1 997 7806.09 45.257 95.2 1 7  1 5 1 5.307 1 1 80. 232 335 . 0751 594. 399 78 1 0 . 860 
1 998 8302 .43 45.463 97.328 1 520.943 1 1 6 1 . 022 359.92 1 2  644 . 659 8290.240 
1 999 8847.92 40. 3 1 9  9 1 . 995 1 6 1 3 .663 1 37 1 .684 241 . 9791  675. 556 8858 . 840 
2000 9800. 05 40.7 1 5  98.787 2062 . 998 1 863 . 4 1 4  1 99.5843 706 . 387 9635 .880 
2001 1 0806 . 82 46 . 878 98. 709 2202. 546 20 1 5 . 929 1 86. 6 1 7  766 .451 1 0670.330 
2002 1 1 909.57 52. 743 95.285 2694.95 2443. 1 22 25 1 . 8277 8 1 0 . 76 1  1 1 738 . 1 50 
2003 1 35 1 7.40 53. 505 1 00.236 3627.221 34 1 6 .4 1 5  2 1 0. 8069 840 . 724 1 3364 . 850 
2004 1 5958.68 60.63 1 09 .745 49 1 0 . 959 4645.284 265.6751 880. 657 1 5672. 1 00 
2005 1 836 1 . 85 60.325 1 1 2 . 1 8 1  6243. 887 5408.040 835 . 8475 92 1 . 232 1 7690. 820 
2006 2 1 588.39 63.02 1 1 1 2 . 732 7725.642 631 0 . 582 1 41 5 . 059 955. 763 20558 .600 
2007 2664 1 . 1 0  74. 768 1 1 4.629 9266 . 1 96 7271 .663 1 994.533 996. 766 24245.340 
2008 31 527.47 92 . 395 1 20.265 1 0408.55 833 1 .391 2077 . 1 63 1 064.466 29067 . 1 90 
2009 34 1 40. 1 5  90. 033 1 02 . 0 1 0 1 2324.24 9962 . 7 1 2 236 1 .527 1 1 33 . 1 70 32999 .030 
201 0 40326 1 05 . 735 1 1 4. 348 1 4436.57 1 1 924. 1 7  251 2.407 1 204 . 1 55 37859.6 1 0  -
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3.3.3 Data analysis 
The least square regression is used to estimate the coefficient values of FDI function. The 
regression result is shown on Table 3 .5 :  
Table 3 .5  
Coefficient Std . Error t-Statistic Pro b .  
�0 5.652538 0. 759352 7.443897 0 
�1 3.285859 0.28977 1 1 .33953 0 
�2 -0. 1 3252 0 . 046 1 7 1  -2 .870 1 7  0 .01 1 7  
[33 -1 .39266 0. 1 53222 -9 .089 1 6  0 
R-squared 0.943332 Mean dependent var 0 . 1 80395 
Adjusted R-squared 0.931 998 S . D .  dependent var 0 .31 0498 
S . E .  of regression 0. 080969 Log l ikeli hood 23. 04596 
F-statistic 83.23288 Prob(F -statistic) 0 
The regression result shows that all the independent variables are significant under individual 
t-test. The goodness of fit reaches 94% which is a very high level. The F-test for the whole 
equation is also in a very high significant level. The FDI expected value function is: 
dlog (FDI) = 5.65 + 3 .29 * dlog (GDP) - 0 .13 * {log[FD/( -1) - log(GDP( - 1)]} - 1.39 
* log (ERICPI) 
Therefore, the model as group functions is written as: 
dlog(FDI) = 5.7 + 3.3 * dlog(GDP) - 0.1 * {Iog[FDI ( - 1) - Iog(GDP( - 1)]} - 1.4 * log (ERICPI) 
XGC = XGC(-1) * ULC/ULC(-1) [ ULC( - 1)] [ DOMD ( - 1)] 
MGC = MGC(-1) * 0.5 * ULC 
+ 0 . 5 * DOMD 
NETX = NETX( -1) + {(XGC - MGC) - [XGC( - 1) - MGC( - 1)]} 
GDP = DOMD + NETX 
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The Broyden's method is used to solve this model. The solving period is from 1 992 to 201 6. 
The forecast data trend of this model is shown on Figure 3 .2 .  
The forecast of GDP shows that it will retain its growth speed. In 20 1 6  i t  will reach 85 trillion 
Yuan. The real effective exchange rate at CPI level will rise. In the 5-year period of 20 1 1 -
20 1 6, the increase will be more than 25 percent. On the domestic demand side, the forecast 
data shows it will increase dramatically, almost double fold from 201 1 to 20 1 6, which is 83 .6  
trillion Yuan. In contrast to the GDP, exchange rates and domestic demand, the forecast data 
of net export and foreign direct investments shows they all drop. Foreign direct investment, 
drops from 1 07 billion Yuan in 201 1  to 74.6 billion Yuan in 201 6, shrinks about one third. 
The net export decreases from 2490.6 billion Yuan to 702.8 billion Yuan. The forecasting 
data values from 201 1 to 201 6  are listed in Table 3 .6 .  
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Figure 3.2 Model solve output trend 
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Table 3 .6  Model forecast value from 201 1 to 20 1 6  
GDP FDI  ERICPI  XGC MGC N ETX U LC DOMD 
201 1 45 1 1 5.2 1 07.3 1 1 3. 5  1 6 1 33.9 1 3643 . 3  2490 . 6  1 279. 7 44 1 45 . 7  
2 0 1 2  5 1 230.3 1 04 .6  1 2 1 . 5  1 8 1 57 . 9  1 5886 .4 2271 . 5  1 363. 8  50 1 97. 1 
201 3 5855 1 . 0 99.6 1 29.2 1 9840. 1 1 7753.6 2086 . 5  1 464 . 1 5744 1 . 7  
2 0 1 4  66590.2 9 1 .6 1 35.4 2 1 724 . 6  20006 . 6  1 7 1 8. 0  1 572 . 2  65399.0 
20 1 5  75262 .9 83.0 1 39. 1 24048.6 22834.6 1 2 1 4 . 0  1 670 . 5  73997.2 
2 0 1 6  84972. 1 74.6 1 44.0  26392. 8  25690. 1 702 . 8  1 777.4 83625.3 
3.4 Summary 
In this chapter, the relationship of international trade, exchange rates and foreign 
investment is illustrated. In section 3 .2, the relationships are demonstrated qualitatively. 
When domestic currency prices rise, the export profit margin will be pushed down. 
Accordingly, exports will be affected in a negative way. The decreased exports and 
increased imports will drive the trade surplus into deficit. When domestic currency 
appreciates against foreign currencies, foreign investors will tend to use foreign 
currencies to buy domestic assets. 
The same scenario has been proved in section 3 .3 quantitatively. Using the econometric 
model to formulate and forecast the foreign direct investment, net export, GDP and 
exchange rates, the same result has been found under the fact that RMB has been 
appreciating since 2005. 
The Chinese exchange rate and price system is quasi-flexible although it is still under the 
control of the authorities. The major foreign exchange market regime is so called 
"managed floating" (dirty floating). The only route for RMB to leave the country is 
payment for an export to China who can return in exchange for an import from China. 
The offshore path has been controlled but started opening its door since 20 1 0. 
Therefore, for those (especially speculators) who need to deal with RMB to flow capital 
beyond the authority control boundary, the best choice is collecting in deposits in Hong 
Kong. This offshore pool has become deeper and more liquid. The RMB deposits in 
Hong Kong reached 300 billion by the end of 201 0. Once the capital is offshore, it can be 
bought, sold, borrowed, lent, swapped and even hedged in Hong Kong's  free markets. 
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Chinese authorities have scheduled to make the RMB into a global currency, however, as 
President Hu Jingtao said in Novernrnent 20 1 1  there still "will be a fairely long process". 
Government encourage foreign companies investing in China to use RMB as a settled 
currency. By the end of 20 1 1 ,  there was more than 400 billion Yuan ($60 billion) of trade 
which had been settled in RMB. As a result, a steady stream of RMB has flowed beyond 
China' s  borders, most of it collecting in deposits in Hong Kong, the first RMB offshore 
centre. This is the main source of so-called "dim sum" bonds with a growing list of 
issuers, from McDonald' s  to the World Bank. In Hong Kong, RMB deposits probably 
reached 300 billion by the end of 201 0. According to the comments in the UK Financial 
Times (February 20 1 2), companies who use RMB as a settled currency in China can save 
3 to 8 percent of the total payment cost. 
From the previous analysis, the decreased foreign direct investment can be explained by 
most of the investment from overseas will be financed in RMB rather than in foreign 
currencies. The maintained growth of RMB prices will rise as more foreign companies to 
invest or trade in RMB. 
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Chapter 4 Chinese RMB today and the Deutschmark in 1969 
4.1 Introduction 
In history, there is a period that shares many common features with the international 
economic situation of today. It took place at the end of the 1 960s and the beginning of the 
1 970s with the breaking down of the Bretton-Woods system. The Bretton-Woods System 
founded in the middle 1 940s built a fixed exchange rate based on the world economic 
structure. In this system, the US was the central country, whilst Europe and Japan were 
the emerging periphery countries. During the Bretton-Woods era the periphery countries 
applied conservative development strategies such as undervalued currencies, control on 
capital flows and accumulated trade reserves, etc. Under this system during the 1 950s and 
most of the 1 960s, the major industrial countries experienced rapid growth with low 
inflation. The central banks of these countries were limited in the pursuit of independent 
monetary policies. What they could do was to intervene in the foreign exchange market 
only, adjusting reserves and money supply to maintain exchange rate parities equilibrium. 
Later, came the global collapse of socialism and the re-construction of emerging markets 
in the 1 970s. The economic background of this period shares much in common with 
today in that the whole world experienced an economic recession whilst the emerging 
market crisis started from 2008. Both eras faced the collapse of the old world structure 
and system revolution. Therefore, it can be predicted that some similar issues happening 
today as they did 40 years ago will change the international economic system. 
In the global system today, China has become more and more powerful. The strategies 
China has applied and the policies implemented can influence the whole international 
financial market, and then transmit to the internal economic system of other countries, 
even affecting political stability. Therefore, it is worth while predicting the future of 
China. The forecast for the future must be based on history. Political reasons such as the 
"Great Culture Revolution" in China delayed its development. Chinese economic growth 
stopped until the 1 979 economic reforms. Although the delay made China lag behind 
other main industrial countries, China' s developing pace on openness, marketisation, 
capitalisation, and joining the global emerging market are still similar, or even exactly the 
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same as the history experienced by other developed countries, particularly so when 
comparing with the case of Germany. 
Oberpriller, Sauer and Sell (2008) point out that what the Chinese RMB is experiencing 
today is "necessary, inevitable, and desirable just as much as it happened to be with the 
Deutschmark in 1 969". As one of the most profitable countries for speculation, China's 
economic environment is similar to the former Federal Republic of Germany at the end of 
the 1 960s, the period of the Bretton-Woods system collapse. 
China has become stronger with massive amounts of national account surplus, a large 
increasing GDP, and geometric scaled booming foreign reserves.  This has encouraged a 
wide range of criticism about its policies such as the "undervalued" currency, Chinese 
financial market and the currency exchange rate of the RMB which have all been hot 
topics. This study is a pioneer in the Chinese currency researches to compare the Chinese 
Yuan with the German Deutschmark. The study will focus on comparing the Chinese 
economic background including the foreign exchange market and its currency the RMB, 
with the German economy and Deutschmark historically and according to the German 
experience will give rise to discussions about the German experience and the policy 
implications for the future of China. 
In the following section, the external international backgrounds of the 1 960s- 1 970s and 
more recent years similarities will be identified, together with a comparison of similarities 
between 40 years ago of the German internal economic situation with China today. In part 
three, common steps experiences to both Germany during the ending of the Bretton­
Woods system and China in the past few years will be summarised. In part four, 
according to German history and experiences, further predictions and policy implications 
about the future of China will be discussed. A brief summary about the China, Germany 
comparison will be given in the last part to close the study. 
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4.2 Background similarities between the ending era of the Bretton­
Woods system and the international system of today 
The collapse of the Bretton-Woods system brought a whole world structure change at the 
end of the 1 960s. Compared with what happened 40 years ago, there are many similarities 
with the international system today. These background similarities include both global 
economic and political system similarities and domestic economic and political 
similarities. Because of the combination of external and internal effects, Germany and 
China are able to share common elements in the development process. 
4.2.1 International financial background (external similarities) 
If we measure the background of the post-Bretton-Woods system which has become a 
"no-system at all" period around 1 969, there are many common factors that the financial 
market shares with today. The asset over liquidity in the global financial market together 
with the inflation in early 2007 just before the 2008 crisis replayed the scenario of the late 
1 960s. At the same period, the Iraqi war, which led by the US and in which most of the 
western countries were involved, pushed oil prices into a new peak. In the global 
economic recession which started in 2008, the US and its dollar, as the central country of 
the international economy, had suffered the worst damaged of the economic storm, and 
could barely stand up to continue its dominant world position. The global financial 
system faced structural change afterwards. 
At this "changing system" moment with the maturing of the Euro, another eastern country, 
China, is now following a similar course as the US did 40 years ago. In the international 
economy and financial system, China plays a role that is as equally and substantially 
important as the US. China is not only the first country to recover from the 2008 global 
economic crisis and recession, but also the one many other economies have to rely on to 
pass through this tough period. The dispute about Chinese currency exchange rate has 
even been subjected to a motion introduced to the US congress. 
4.2.1.1 System revolution period 
Entering the 1 970s, after the ending of the Bretton-Woods system and the collapse of the 
fixed rate system, the conservative development strategies of most main industrial 
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countries turned towards free market strategies. Starting from G-7 countries 1, the fixed 
exchange rate system adopted by most countries had been replaced by the floating rate 
regime. Dooley et. al (2003) believe that at the beginning of the 1 970s, the Bretton­
Woods system effects evaporated gradually and the world was transformed into a new 
"no-system at all" era. 
An amazingly similar scenario repeated itself 40 years after the break down of Bretton­
Woods. The credit crunch started in 2008 from the US led a recession that spread all over 
the world. This is the worst recession in half a century and it has influenced the whole 
international financial system, especially major industrial countries such as the US and 
European countries. The effects of the financial crisis and the recession have changed the 
old financial market regulations and structures .  All countries in the recession, particularly 
those who have been seriously stricken, are seeking for a financial system revolution. 
They are looking for a new system to regulate the financial market, for instance, to 
monitor the banking system. 
In international finance, the US was the central country and the USD was the mqjor 
currency. After the crisis, the US is hardly in a position to continue its status as the central 
country and currency because of the difficulty in financing the large amount of deficit 
hence the US is no longer ranking as top in the world anymore. Other principal economic 
zones with better performance have exceeded the US performance and are now on the 
same level or have even replaced the US in certain areas, such as East Asia and Europe. 
The dollar central system is gradually changing as well. The Euro has appreciated in 
international trade transactions and is now widely accepted as the foreign reserve 
currency, or in some countries, as one of the main currencies in the pegging basket. In the 
global range, the Euro held as official reserves are increased from 1 8  percent of the world 
reserves at the end of 1 990s to 27 percent in 2008, meanwhile, the US dollar dropt to 64 
percent from 7 1  percent during the same period. Not only the Euro but the Chinese RMB 
have also been widely focused. China, with a fast developing speed is currently becoming 
more and more important a fact which no one can ignore anymore. 
The loss of the US central position marks an international structure change today. In 
comparison with the period 40 years ago, both periods experienced the collapse of old 
1 At that moment, the G-7 countries included Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States. 
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systems and the opening of new eras. Therefore, it is appropriate to refer to either "system 
revolution" or "changing system" period. 
4.2.1.2 Asset over liquidity & inflation 
A substantial inflation rise in the US in the late 1 960s was soon transmitted to other G-7 
countries through the fixed rate system. Therefore, the terminal stages of the Bretton 
Woods system together with frequent exchange market interventions was followed by a 
worldwide liquidity expansion and an inflation rise in all the major industrial countries. 
Figure 4. 1 shows the inflation rate of G-7 countries from January 1 967 to January 1 97 1 .  
The four European members had a significant increase after 1 968 .  
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Figure 4. 1 Inflation rates of G-7 countries at the end of the Bretton-Woods system period 
(0 1 1 1 967-0 1 1 1 97 1 )  
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In 2007, a remarkable story unfolded in the international financial market, the so called 
"over-liquidity" phenomena. There was a geometric scaled expansion on the global asset 
market. The excess liquidity of capital in the markets meant over-flowed assets seeking 
higher profit. Many countries had a high inflation rate in this year. The high inflation rate 
and asset over-liquidity signified an overheated economy. As previously mentioned, the 
international system change gave speculators more opportunities to obtain yields in the 
market. On the one hand, because of the enormous market fluctuation at the end of a 
system collapse, on the other hand, because of the lack of systematic regulation at the 
beginning of a new system. 
Table 4. 1 shows the inflation rates of G-20 countries, where more than half the countries 
had over 3 percent inflation rate in the four years 2006 - 2009. Those countries such as 
Argentina, India, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, and Turkey had enormously high 
inflation rates around 1 0  percent or over. Even some major developed industrial countries, 
for instance, Australia, Russia, UK and US could not control their inflation below 3 
percent. This fact re-confirms that an overheating economy leads to asset over-liquidity 
and also brings out a high inflation rate. 
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Table 4. 1 Inflation rates of G-20 countries (IMF data) 1 
2006 2007 2008 2009 
Argentina 9.8 8 .5 7.2 5 . 0  
Australia 3 .3 3 .0 3 .7 1 .6 
Brazil 3 . 1  4.5 5.9 4.2 
Canada 1 .4 2 .5  1 .9 0 .2 
China 2.0 6 .6 2.8 0 .8 
France 1 .9 1 .6 3 .2 0.3 
Germany 1 .4 3 . 1  1 . 1  0 .0 
India 6.7 5.5 9.7 8 .9  
Indonesia 6.6 5 .4 1 1 . 1  4.0 
Italy 2 . 1  2 .8 2.4 0 .6 
Japan 0.3 0.7 0.4 - 1 . 5  
Mexico 2 . 1  3 .6 4. 1 2 .0 
Russia 4. 1 3 . 8  6.5 4.3 
Saudi Arabia 9.0 1 1 .9 1 3 .3 1 1 .0 
South Africa 2.9 6.5 7 .8 3 .7 
South Korea 5 .8  9.0 9.5 6.8 
Turkey 9.7 8.4 1 0. 1  5 . 8  
United Kingdom 2.8 2 .0 3 .9 1 .2 
United States 2.2 4. 1 0.7 1 .6 
4.2.1.3 Wars in the Middle East and the oil price 
One other main reason causing unstable systems and price fluctuations is war. The most 
direct link is between the oil price and the wars in the Middle Eastern countries. Oil price 
is one of the key economic indexes which influences the financial market. Because of the 
geographic attributes, the Middle East is the main region of oil production. This region is 
also one of the most unstable areas in the world, where in the past half century, wars have 
been frequent. 
1 The 20th member is the European Union, which is represented by the rotating Council presidency and the 
European Central Bank. 
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Figure 4.2 shows the connection between the wars and oil price fluctuations. In the past 
40 years, oil prices and wars have peaked together. The first war was at the end of the 
1 970s and the second one was in 2008. It is not a coincidence that the major oil price 
peaks happened during Middle Eastern wars, the real case proved that there are causality 
links between them. Figure 4.2 tells a story that started from 2003 the Iraqi War when the 
oil price climbed dramatically and increased almost fivefold in a 5-year period. A historic 
peak appeared in early 2008 before the global crisis. 
As one of the most important economic indices, the oil price is a determinant to many 
related industries and economic areas, therefore, considering this fivefold price increase 
many bubbles were caused in the global financial market through such as manufacturing 
industries, real estate, etc., as increased inflation rates and assets over liquidity were 
transferred· from these bubbles. The over heated global financial market before the 2008 
crisis can be explained from this perspective. 
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4.2.2 Germany and China (internal similarities) 
There are many international financial background similarities between 40 years ago and 
today. During the phase from the end of the 1 960s to the middle of the 1 970s, among the 
Bretton-Woods system G-7 countries, Germany was the one that shared the most 
common features with China today. In fact, the similar background started from the 
Bretton-Woods period during the 1 950s. At that time, the US was the central dominant 
country and Europe and Japan, deeply harmed by the war, played the roles of periphery 
countries. Those periphery countries, such as Germany applied a development strategy, 
including undervalued currencies, capital flow controls, intervention on international 
trade, and reserve accumulations. So did China. After the ending of the Great Cultural 
Revolution, China started its economic reforms and adopted a series of similar 
development strategies as Germany. Therefore, the adoption of similar development 
strategies created a similar internal background between Germany 40 years ago and more 
recently China. 
4.2.2.1 National Account 
The national account balance components include the current account balance, capital 
account balance, and the national foreign reserves. The currency market is mainly 
concerned with domestic currency prices fluctuations and authority policies. 
• Current account balance continuous surplus 
Figure 4.3 shows the five year period current account balances of Germany and China. 
Both countries had a continuous surplus of current account balances. From 1 968 to 1 972, 
Germany had increased current account balances. The Chinese current account surplus 
had grown from about $ 1 50 billion USD in 2005 and doubled in the following year, then 
climbed over $450 billion by 2009. It is worth mentioning that during the same period, 
the US had current account continuous deficits. 
Although different from Germany in its commitment to following the Bretton-Woods 
system in 1 969, China also had both current and capital account surpluses, as well as 
foreign reserves, which had the effect of depreciating the RMB. If the central bank were 
to raise the interest rate to restrict inflation, it may have resulted in more speculative 
capital inflows. 
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• Foreign exchange reserves 
Comparing the Chinese situation after 2002 with Germany at post Bretton Woods, it is 
easy to see another obvious common element: the expansion of the foreign exchange 
reserves, especially the US dollar. China did not change its mainly US dollar foreign 
reserves to a multilateral currency basket until 2006. The second common factor is the 
condition of foreign exchange reserves in both China and Germany where both had a 
higher correlation with the capital account balance than the current account balance. 
Germany is the principal country in Europe where a large proportion of GDP comes from 
foreign trade. The expansion of foreign trade during the 1 970s brought a large amount of 
income for Germany, leading to foreign reserve accumulations. Undervalued currency 
strategies stimulated the expected increases. Exports of relatively cheap goods to foreign 
countries were rewarded by the expansion of foreign reserves from trade surpluses. 
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In that era, under the fixed exchange rates international monetary system, gold and 
foreign currencies were the two main components of the foreign reserves and the flow of 
foreign reserves affected the nation's money stock growth. An open economy equips the 
ability of either its monetary authorities to offset the impact of an inflow or to control the 
outflow of foreign reserves of money stock. Equally the current exchange rate system 
constrains the domestic monetary policy of these economies. Making a choice between 
these two has been experienced by some western European countries in the late 1 960s 
which have accumulated a large proportion of US dollar reserves combined with 
substantial dollar flows. 
Figure 4.4 displays the foreign exchange reserves of Germany and China during a five­
year-period. The graph reveals the fact that both countries have significant and stable 
increases in the national foreign exchange reserves. The main source of accumulated 
reserves of both countries is the foreign trade surplus. The only difference is in the 
German graph where there are some fluctuations when compared with the smooth annual 
increases of China. 
These fluctuations reflect the changes of German foreign exchange reserves which were 
principally caused by international capital movements. They are influenced mainly by 
monetary policy actions. At the beginning of the 1 960s, the German interest rates were 
higher than the US. The Bundesbank, the central bank of Genmany, fixed the forward 
exchange rate against the dollar, including trade in the forward markets. In the last two 
years of the 1 960s, the US interest rate exceeded that of Germany; the central bank 
offered a discount on the forward exchange rate with the dollar to lower the Deutschmark 
in the free forward market. This was another reason causing more fluctuations at the end 
ofthe 1 960s. 
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• The money stock & the money supply 
Although the changes to German foreign exchange reserves had fluctuated rather than 
increased gradually, the German authorities has still succeeded in keeping its money 
supply at a steady level over the past 4 decades because of the stability of base money and 
the foreign reserves. Authorities controlled the components of the money supply through 
the required reserve policy and the government deposit or anti-cyclical deposit changes in 
the central bank. 
The base money in Germany, defined by the Stabilization Law of 1 967, includes the net 
monetary liabilities of the central bank and the federal government issued to the private 
sector. To influence these two components, the Government deposits are the main reason 
which decide the growth of the base money. The government deposits involve three items: 
regular deposits, special anti-cyclical deposits of the federal and state government and 
deposits related to the anti-cyclical surtax on income. 
As an open economy, the German authorities successfully controlled the balance of 
payments through the money supply. Under the Bretton woods system, the relationship 
between the balance of payments and the money stock is measured by the classical gold 
standard mechanism. Willms ( 1 97 1 )  points out how the balance of payments and the 
money supply correlated step by step. In Germany, the manipulation of the money stock 
influenced the decision on creating the money base. The money base has a deep 
correlation with the foreign reserve stock. The balance of payment can be influenced 
directly by the foreign reserve stock. 
Empirical studies confirm the fact that the Bundesbank controlled the components of the 
monetary base. At one side, the central bank manipulated discount borrowings and net 
short-term foreign borrowing of commercial banks and the net short-run foreign 
borrowing of the nonbank public were totally controlled. At another side, control over the 
money supply was enacted in the period from 1 96 1 - 1 972. At the end of the 1 960s and the 
beginning of the 1 970s, Germany experienced expansion of its foreign exchange reserves, 
particularly US dollars. The inflows were paid for by the loss in goods and services and 
influenced the money supply process in the short-run. To prevent the impact of the flow, 
economists suggested that the authorities either adopt a more flexible exchange rate 
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regime or control the money supply to neutralise the impact of foreign reserves changes 
whilst maintaining the fixed exchange rate system. 
From the historic data, the German base money increased steadily from 1 960 to 1 980. 
Among all the components of the monetary base, the foreign reserves contributed the 
largest proportion, almost 84 percent on average, even exceeding the monetary base in 
1 960 and 1 96 1 .  Therefore, the major fluctuations of the monetary base are related to the 
changes in the foreign reserve position. Both the money base and its distribution between 
currency and reserves determined the money supply. 
Today, the money stock of most countries has been altered from gold standard to the 
stock of central bank foreign reserves. The interrelationship between the balance of 
payments and the foreign reserves can be categorized into three groups. In the first group 
the current account includes the import and export of goods and services. The second 
group consists of two capital account items: changes of foreign assets and foreign 
liabilities which reflect the direct investment in real assets and investment in long-run and 
short-run financial assets. The third group involves changes in foreign currencies, the 
currency basket held in the foreign reserve position. 
4.2.2.2 Money system turned from fiXed pegging with US dollar to soft pegging 
mechanism 
Under the Bretton-Woods system of fixed exchange rates, the Deutschmark was fixed 
pegged with the US dollar which was related to the gold price. At the end of the 1 960s, 
this fixed dollar pegging system caused inflation to spread from the US to other countries 
that had pegged their currencies to the dollar. The addition of the fixed dollar pegging 
mechanism and a large proportion of dollars in foreign reserves resulted in a fragile 
system. In these circumstances, the domestic economy can be influenced directly and 
harmed if there is any shock to the US economy or the dollar prices. 
Both the high inflation and over-liquidity at the end of the 1 960s or the credit crunch in 
2008 confirm this fact. Therefore, both countries changed fixed pegging into a soft 
pegging mechanism. When soft pegged with the dollar, the domestic currency was 
permitted to fluctuate in a certain band according to the market movement. 
Germany, after the break down of the Bretton-Woods system, shifted its peggmg 
mechanism from fixed pegging to soft pegging with the dollar. China made the same 
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decision, and according to the related policies implemented from 2006, the Chinese 
currency regime has moved from fixed pegging with the dollar to a "managed floating" 
regime. Under this mechanism, every trading day there is a 3 percent up and down 
allowance around the middle price against the dollar, which is the closing price of the 
previous trading day. 
4.2.2.3 Currency revaluation debate 
Towards the end of the Bretton Woods system era, increasing inflation from the fixed 
pegging mechanism spread through the G-7 countries from the US to the whole world. 
The system had turned into a soft peg mechanism to fit the manipulations of individual 
countries. This included two revaluations of the Deutschmark exchange rates in Germany. 
The Bundesbank adjusted the Deutschmark price against the US dollar twice in 1 969 and 
1 970. 
In Germany, there was a serious debate about the necessity of a currency revaluation. 
Karl Schiller, the minister of economic policy was one of the strong supporters of the 
Deutschmark revaluation. On the opposition camp, Franz Josef Strauss, who was the 
Minister of Public Finance, advocated maintaining the central parity against the US dollar. 
The massive level of the short-term speculative capital inflows shocked the domestic 
capital market. Supporters of the revaluation believed it would benefit the overheated 
German economy in the short-term whilst the opposition thought a revaluation might 
influence the producers and exporters in a negative way. Keeping central parity constant 
could help the German economy stability in the medium term. 
Eventually on 27 October 1 969 by winning increased support the Deutschmark was re­
valued by 9.3% as a new peg against the USD. Following the adjustment there were three 
additional policy applications; firstly, there was less insecurity in the foreign exchange 
market; secondly, the current account surplus was reduced and more spent in developing 
the domestic economy; thirdly, there was further stabilisation of the increasing inflation 
on the domestic market in control of both excess demand and price. From a variety of 
view points, the Deutschmark revaluation was a successful action in controlling the over­
inflow of foreign assets. Only three months after the revaluation (till December 1 969), the 
outflow of foreign exchange in deutschmarks reached 23 billion, which exceeded the total 
20 billion capital inflows in the previous period of this year between February and 
September. 
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In China, a similar story as the German experience was occuring. There was a common 
view that the Chinese currency had been maintained at an undervalued level. Highly 
increased exportation made Chinese trade partners put on pressure for a RMB 
appreciation. Starting from 2005, the debate about whether China should revalue its 
currency has never stopped. In fact, China raised its currency by 2 . 1 %  in 2005 . 
Nevertheless, one side of the debate maintained that RMB undervaluation was the main 
reason for the large amount of US trade deficits. Supporters on this side of the debate 
came mainly from the political area rather than the economic or academic faced. The 
other side of the debate is represented by Nobel Prize winners, Robert Mundell and 
Joseph Stiglitz. Stiglitz in his article in the Wall Street Journal 2006 comments "The 
problem of our trade deficit is not going to be solved by the Chinese exchange rate". 
The fact is that pressures from the US or other western countries were limited in their 
effect. China always understood clearly what the best decision was. Currency revaluation 
would help to slow down an overheated Chinese economy, and enhance the buying power 
of Chinese domestic consumers. This is the root reason rather than pressures from 
foreigners that gradually pushed the price of the RMB rate against the dollar from 8 .2765 
Yuan per Dollar in 2005 to a peak of 6 .7899 Yuan per Dollar in 2008, rose by more than 
20 percent. This revaluation can be seen as a eo-active result of both the overheated 
economy and the adjustment of the international trade market. 
The 20 percent shifting of the RMB price did not satisfy Chinese foreign trade partners. 
After 2008, the RMB-USD prices stayed at around 6.6-6.7 Yuan per Dollar. In this Year, 
the US still suffered from a large deficit. Therefore, western countries required a further 
rise and asked for another revaluation. US president Barack Obama, when he first visited 
China in 2009 met with Chinese President Hu Jintao, urged China to allow the RMB to 
rise further. Jean-Claude Trichet, the president of the European Central Bank, and 
Dominique Strauss-Kahn, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) managing director also 
supported Obama by saying the Yuan should be further appreciated. China chose to 
ignore the request. Like Germany, the revaluation of the RMB was successful. Through 
this 2-year adjustment period, the Chinese economy, especially the foreign trade had been 
maintained in a stable developing trend. The increase of Chinese consumer buying power 
helped to pull up the domestic expansion demand. The domestic market development, 
because of the RMB appreciation, not only filled the gap made by the loss in the 
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international trade market, but also helped China reduce the negative influences from the 
global recession which started at the end of 2008. 
These background similarities combined together, including both the external 
international financial market and the internal domestic economic background, gave 
Germany and China a similar development environment. Germany in the post-Bretton­
Woods system era and China in the past decade share many common features on their 
development rate. If there were to be a similar step of financial market development, it 
may be possible to use the German experiences to predict what future situations China 
would face and the actions China should take. The fact is, China had already experienced 
many similar steps as Germany after the breakdown of Bretton-Woods and applied 
similar actions in the financial market as Germany did. 
4.3 Common steps between German history and China today 
After the breakdown of Bretton-Woods, the orientation of monetary policy in the G-7 
countries changed significantly in the 1 970s. Monetary authorities gained more freedom 
to pursue independent policies, such as lifting flexible exchange rate regimes, or raising 
internal controls to combat inflation. Germany in the late 1 960s was a country whose 
economy had been highly dependent on foreign trade and was well integrated into the 
international financial markets. 
China was not in any economic system until entering the WTO (World Trade 
Organization) in 2002. However, it always applied conservative economic policies in 
order to keep its domestic financial market stable. The foreign exchange regime used to 
be fixed pegged to the US dollar, the same as Germany under Bretton-Woods. The main 
component of foreign exchange reserves was the US dollar. After being a member of the 
WTO, China scheduled the release of a series of openness policies to create a more 
flexible market. Under a similar background to Germany in 1 969, China experienced the 
same process also. 
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4.3.1 Choice between the changing of pegging basket and the domestic currency 
appreciation by market force 
Under the Bretton Woods System, the Bundesbank fixed the forward exchange rate 
against the US dollar, as well as the interest rate differentials between the domestic and 
foreign markets. The forward exchange rate policy was to maintain short-term capital 
exports from its commercial banks. The desired stock of foreign assets and foreign 
liabilities of Germany was determined by the domestic interest rate, the foreign interest 
rates, the uncovered interest rate differential, the covered interest rate differential in the 
free and controlled forward market and speculation to the exchange rate. 
Expected changes to the exchange rate affect the stocks of foreign assets and liabilities, 
for instance a revaluation reduces the desired stock of foreign assets and increases the 
desired stock of foreign liabilities. Another reason which influences the foreign asset and 
liabilities are the monetary authorities. The German central bank, until September 1 969, 
controlled the inflows of short-run foreign capital by verifying the forward exchange rate 
with, and the US dollars altering its forward contracts with commercial banks. 
Both Germany in 1 969 and China in 2007 faced a choice between the changing of the peg 
basket and the domestic currency appreciation. Considering that a sudden price 
appreciation will harm exports and shrink the profits in the international trade market and 
foreign investment from abroad, both countries decided to change the pegging basket of 
domestic currency from a single USD fixed peg to a multilateral peg system, which 
generated a slower speed of currency appreciation. 
The fixed peg with the USD and the large proportion of foreign reserves in Dollars means 
more potential crises for other countries. If the US and its dollar has a shock, the direct 
influence will link to affected countries. The fluctuation could be aroused by either US 
increased inflation in post Bretton-Woods era, or also the international crisis which 
started from the US CDO market in 2008. Therefore, it is necessary to develop a single 
peg system, and to transfer into a multilateral peg system, in order to avoid or reduce the 
loss when crises occur. Starting from July 2005, the Chinese authority re-set the basket of 
currencies from a single USD peg to evaluate the RMB price. This was the signal of the 
beginning of the multilateral peg system in China. 
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4.3.2 Currency appreciation effects on external competitiveness and foreign direct 
investment (FDI) 
The most direct influences on the market from the exchange rate price change are on 
foreign trade and FDI. Theoretically, domestic currency appreciation will have a negative 
effect on exports and encourage more FDI from abroad. After the revaluation of the 
Deutschmark on 2ih October, 1 969, the emphasis of the new government had been 
transferred from foreign trade to stimulate the domestic goods market. 
Somewhat different from the German case, the Chinese RMB revaluation was a gradual 
progress rather than a sudden change. The currency appreciation and its effects to export 
and FDI can be seen from the graph in Figure 4.5 which shows the movement of RMB 
prices against the USD together with the changes to China' s goods exports and FDI in the 
past decade. 
The graphic shows that the domestic currency revaluation started from mid-2005 . The 
price of Chinese currency RMB against US Dollar increased gradually from 8 .2765 Yuan 
per Dollar on July 2005 toward 6.8 Yuan per Dollar on September 2008. During this 
period, in the first half phase from 2005 to 2007, both the changes to goods exports and 
the change of foreign direct investment showed a significant increase. On the latter half 
phase after 2007, the strongly increased speed had slowed down and turned back. Figure 
4.5 reveals that in China, the currency appreciation did not have a direct influence on 
foreign direct investment from abroad. In the export area, the RMB price rise did put on 
more pressure on exports in post-2007. From this year, because the foreign trade had 
shrunk, China put more effort to increase its domestic demands, especially on the less 
well developed areas in the west. 
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4.3.3 Successfully control the economy in the crisis 
The monetary policies Germany adopted guaranteed that its economy would maintain 
stability over the next 4 decades even in 1 990 when the unification of East and West 
Germany took place. Not only the M3 remained stable, but also the long-run stable 
relationship between the money stock, incomes and price levels. Compared with other 
major industrial countries, Germany advanced domestic financial liberalisation which 
was well established by 1 970. The foreign exchange controls were removed in the 1 950s, 
and the interest rate controls were abolished in 1 967. The early removal of these controls 
came together with a relatively low inflation rate which can be a positive indicator case 
for developing countries such as China. 
The Germany federal reserves adopted monetary targets m 1 970s to fit the pace of 
monetary expansion, and intended to use them to gradually reduce inflation. The Federal 
Open Market Committee (FOMC) set targets for M 1  and M2 growth. Their objectives 
were initially used to guide internal policy discussions and were not released publicly. At 
the beginning of the 1 970s, inflation spread through the fixed exchange rate system all 
over the world, and the authorities called on all the economic tools available to try to stem 
the tide of rising prices. One of the most efficient tools Germany used was to control the 
money supply in order to prevent total spending increases. 
A similar story happened in 2007, first, the asset over-liquidity brought massive amounts 
of asset flows. For China, it meant more speculation in the financial markets. The Chinese 
market was not totally opened and is still under the control of the authorities. The inflow 
of assets joining with speculations on the Chinese stock market or real estate industry 
brought the government additional problems. In 2008, China had also been threatened by 
the global economic recession started from the US. Because of the worsening external 
economic environment, which reduced deals with its trading partners, China had to seek 
other means to develop. At this moment, China made what has turned out to be the right 
decision, to expand its domestic market. 
The Chinese government applied a series of policies to speed up the development of the 
domestic market. The increase of transportation facilities opened the gate toward Western 
China and created more opportunities for the less well developed areas. This helped 
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China to maintain its GDP increase above 7 percent in 2009 during the world wide 
recessiOn. 
4.3.4 Domestic financial market openness 
After World War II, the G-7 countries applied policies which focused on two main targets: 
economic growth and price stability. Under the Bretton-Woods system, the central banks 
of major industrial countries had been limited in the pursuit of independent monetary 
policies. The termination of Bretton-Woods gave these countries greater latitude to 
pursue independent policies. The central bank of Germany, the Bundesbank, was the first 
bank to announce a monetary target in December 1 974. Financial liberalisation was 
released even earlier in Germany. The German controlled financial centre in Luxembourg, 
provided an investment outlet for German assets, and offered a full array of financial 
instruments as well. Before the break down of Bretton-Woods, German authorities had 
removed foreign exchange controls in the 1 950s, then later in 1 967, interest rate controls 
were also abolished. Therefore, financial liberalisation together with a continuous low 
inflation rate guaranteed that Germany had less necessity for financial market innovations. 
The situation in China was different from Germany. China did not have systematic 
financial market regulations. After becoming a member of the World Trade Organisation, 
China, in order to create a stronger financial system for total openness, implemented an 
open financial market reform. This opening progressed in a gentle rhythm, in case the 
shock brought unstable chaos to an immature market. In fact, the establishment of two 
stock exchange centres in Shanghai and Shenzhen in the middle of the 1 990s was a 
remarkable symbol of Chinese financial market reform. The financial market openness in 
China included four main business areas: banking, securities, fund management and 
insurance. To fulfil its commitments before joining the WTO, China had implemented 
related policies in all these areas. 
In banking, the government made a commitment of permitting foreign banks to provide 
RMB services to Chinese individuals within five years, therefore the restriction of foreign 
banks on conducting local currency business had been gradually phased out. Lately, the 
restrictions on all current non-prudential measures regarding the ownership, operation and 
establishment of foreign banks, as well as opening branches and additional restrictions on 
issuing licenses will be eliminated. 
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In the securities market, foreign security companies can now make direct investment to 
Chinese B shares. The authorities allowed foreign investment banks to engage in 
underwriting domestic shares (A shares), foreign currency denominated securities (B and 
H shares) with less than 33% ownership. This is proof of the openness of the securities 
market to foreign securities companies. 
In the same way as the securities market, foreign companies will be permitted to j oin in 
venture fund management projects and to engage in domestic fund management 
businesses with less than a 33% share. Following the start up percentage, the share 
allowance will increase to not more than 49% within 3 years, as at 2009. 
Insurance has also been affected. China has promised to release all geographical 
restrictions, including health insurance, group insurance, pension insurance and annuity 
products in the three year period after becoming a WTO member. Foreign life insurers 
will be restricted to less than 50% ownership in joint ventures, and in non-life insurance 
businesses, the foreign ownership share should not exceed 5 1 %. 
4.3.5 Current account and capital account full convertibility permission 
The financial market openness can be seen as a preparation for a national account full 
convertibility. To be an open economy, full convertibility permission of both current and 
capital accounts is necessary. Germany, as one of the major industrial countries, had freed 
its financial market early in the 1 950s. Its current account and capital account were 
allowed full convertibility. Compared with Germany, China has not yet completed its 
financial market openness (see Section 4.3 .4). After its entry into the WTO in 200 1 ,  
China permitted full free convertibility of current accounts and promised capital account 
convertibility within three years, but till 201 0, it still has only freed its current account 
convertibility. 
From the comparison above, it can be seen that there are five steps in common between 
Germany and China: firstly, the decision of pegging basket and domestic currency 
appreciation; secondly, negative effects on exports and FDI from the currency 
appreciation; thirdly, applied successful economic policies in a financial crisis; fourthly, 
opening of financial markets; fifthly, both current account and capital account 
convertibility. China has completed the first three and the remaining two are still in 
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progress. Because of the similar background and common development steps, Germany 
has been well able to maintain its low inflation performance rate. In the next section a 
brief summary of the German experience will be given thus allowing a comparison with 
the Chinese case to give some idea of the policy implications. 
4.4 German experiences and the policy implication 
Chinese RMB and related financial openness reforms in recent years has surprisingly 
similar progress as that experienced by Germany in the 1 970s, although the international 
economic environment was different 40 years ago from today. Germany has a full open 
capitalist economy and is very different from the socialist country of China, nevertheless 
there are still many experiences and strategies in German history which can be good 
examples for China or can even predict changes still to come in China. The discussion 
will focus on how to balance the economic development with inflation and how to 
maintain market stability. 
In both Germany and China, during the same period that their economies had rapid 
development, it coincided with the problem of inflation 1 .  Economic theory2 and real life 
evidence3 suggests that it is more beneficial for economy stability to apply interest rate 
targets if the nonfinancial side economy is stable, and to apply the money stock targeting 
when the financial economy side is stable. It is therefore necessary in order to control 
inflation to find out to what extent money stock targets can influence currency prices. 
4.4.1 Experiences of Germany in the inflation control 
Germany, at the end of the Bretton-Woods system, faced an inflation threat from the US. 
However, because of the successful monetary target set by the Deutsche Bundesbank, the 
German inflation rate, since the middle of the 1 950s has, by targeting the money 
aggregate M3, maintained a German inflation rate of 2 percent annual increase or below. 
1 Germany met the inflation problem during the 1 960s and 1970s. China had a similar problem with the rapid economic 
development in the 1 990s. 2 
The theory of applying simple monetary target towards inflation control by adjusting the interest rate is the Taylor rule 
introduced by John B. Taylor ( 1993). 
3 In the 1 980s, many countries including the US adopted a monetary aggregate approach including the increase in the 
money supply under the agreement of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors. 
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Not only Germany, but for most of the industrial countries in the early era, the ideal and 
more directly financial control was to operate targets by formulating intermediate target 
variables. Also, the operating target variable the central bank chose to follow was the 
intermediate target adopted. For example, if the central bank was targeting a certain level 
of three month or one year interest rate, it would focus on such as a short-term federal 
fund rate as its operating variable. On the other hand, if the central bank had already 
chosen an intermediate target, it would more likely adopt a related operating target. The 
choice of the variables depends strictly on their relationship to ultimate monetary policy 
target aims. 
In order to maintain the domestic economy stable, in a fixed exchange rate open economy 
like Germany, using money supply control to manage price levels, there are two possible 
approaches suggested by the economists. The first view is that it is not possible to use 
money supply interventions to control inflation. The main reason is that the interest rate 
differential between countries can lead to an inflow or outflow of foreign reserves. The 
international capital flow is highly elastic to interest rates. The economists 1 on this group 
believe a country with a continuous balance of payment surplus, such as Germany in the 
late 1 960s and China today, cannot control inflation through the money supply without 
adjusting the exchange rate. Due to the impact of interest rates, monetary policy has a 
particularly limited effectiveness in a fixed exchange rate system. Fiscal policies only 
have a short-run effect in restricting domestic demand with a surplus balance of payments. 
The domestic inflation rate is affected directly by the international market due to it being 
well integrated with world markets. Therefore, they suggest a more flexible exchange rate 
system to connect the external balance of payments to the internal employment and price 
level objectives. 
After the adjustment of the base money by the central bank, the money stock expansion 
exerts an increase demand on the internal price levels. If a country adopts a restrictive 
monetary policy in the short-run, then the domestic interest rate will rise relatively over 
other countries. This will stimulate the international capital flow into the country. 
However, this argument has been criticized by suggesting that the capital flows are highly 
sensitive in response to the international interest rate differential. 
1 Economists taking this view are represented by Lutz and Sohmen ( 1 965, 1 967), Mckenzie ( 1969), Johnson ( 1 969) and 
Giersch ( 1 970). 
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The view of the second campi is that the money stock can be controlled by the authorities 
in a fixed exchange rate open economy. The amount of foreign reserves attracted by a rise 
in domestic interest rates caused by monetary contraction is smaller than the reduction of 
the base money. Differing from the first group of economists, they point out that the 
transaction fee and risks restrict the mobility of international capital flows which follow 
the international interest rate differential. Short-run international capital movements will 
have less elasticity to the observed interest rate differential between countries but rather 
towards the interest rate adjusted for the forward exchange rate. 
The history of Germany and empirical studies have proved that when the interest rate 
elasticity is sufficiently low, inflation can in the short-run be controlled through money 
supply without adjusting the exchange rate. In the long-run, the inflation impact from the 
inflow of national reserves means the loss to Germany of domestic trade investment and 
sufficient consumption goods. They also prove that under a fixed rate system, the 
implementations of policies for maintaining low inflation are possible. However, welfare 
losses will result. According to the "open economy trilemma" theory, under weak or non­
existing international environment capital controls, it is difficult to keep both the 
exchange rate and price levels constant at the same time. 
4.4.2 China case and policy implications 
After the economic reform started from 1 979, China has experienced high inflation three 
times in its history, occurring in 1 989, 1 994, 2004 to 2007. The traditional theory by 
Friedman ( 1 987) links the inflation with the excess liquidity. Take the 2007 global asset 
boom and increased inflation as an example, many empirical studies proved this link. 
Belke and Orth (2007) and Giese and Tuxen (2008) believe that the global excess 
liquidity has a direct impact on the housing price, through which it leads the consumer 
price increase. Zhang and Pang (2008) found the evidence that over liquidity brought 
dramatic capital inflows and influenced Chinese inflation in the decade during 1 998-2007. 
Influenced by the global recession in 2009, China has a declined CPl. However, in this 
year, there was the extraordinary increase in housing prices (on average about 1 /3 
increase). This may have become the main reason of increased inflation after the 
I On this camp, except Furth ( 1969), the German Bundersbank and German Government tended to have this view on 
the Annual Report of the German Council of Economic Experts by the German Federal Government. 
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economy recovery 20 1 0. Therefore, if under a similar background of facing the inflation 
problems as experienced in 2007 (See Table 4. 1 ), Chinese authorities should monitor and 
intervene the asset market, in order to control liquidity. China can either apply tight 
policies to constrict money supply, or adjust its currency prices. Considering its unique 
socialist marketing characteristics, it was easier to use the former political leverage rather 
than the latter economic adjustment. 
4.5 Summary 
In this section, the similar background and development progression between Germany 
and China has been summarised. The external background as the Bretton-Woods system 
terminated shares many common features with the international financial market of today. 
In addition, the internal economic situations of Germany and China have many 
similarities. Both external and internal background similarities created similar 
development progress of these two countries. This study has summarised five common 
steps in the German and Chinese economic developments. 
These five common steps confirm on one hand that the two countries have similar 
circumstances although in different periods. On the other hand they prove the hypothesis 
that the German policy application experiences can be referenced for the future 
development of China, particularly the experience of controlling inflation. There is debate 
about whether it is possible to use the money supply to control inflation, but the German 
experience proves in both the short and long term that it is possible to maintain a low 
inflation rate through interventions to the money stock. The only difference between the 
short and long term is whether it is necessary or not to adjust the domestic currency 
exchange rate. 
The German economic development progress and its varied experiences can also be 
applied to other hypotheses that have been proposed about the future market. For example, 
will other currencies such as the Euro, or the Chinese RMB, which showed their strength 
in the economic recession, replace the Dollar in the same way that the Dollar replaced 
Sterling to become the main currencies? Secondly, in a further step, how do those new 
emerging market countries like China reform their domestic financial markets through 
capital control? Thirdly, to what extent can they benefit the central country as a result of 
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geo-political power? To find more answers to these questions in depth it is necessary to 
make yet more searching reference to the economic histories of these countries. 
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Chapter 5 The global imbalances and the RMB exchange rates 
5.1 Introduction 
The global recession which started in 2008, revealed the potential financial weaknesses of 
the western world. In order to save the national economy, alleviate the recession, and 
relieve the financial crisis, those countries most affected by the economic recession spent 
massive amounts of capital (on a trillion dollar scale) to try to fill the massive gap. The 
world economic and financial structure is changing because of the power of this 
international economic rescue. In the international capital markets, there is a well-known 
saying "When Washington sneezes, the whole world catches a cold". Today, an enormous 
far eastern country, China, has been growing up sometimes quietly but always very 
rapidly and has together with the USA, become the focus point of the whole world. 
Many developed countries in Europe, North America, or Australia found that their 
economies were increasingly connected to China, especially the United States. Not only 
their durable and nondurable goods, but also the money moving round the financial 
markets and even their people's daily spend was originating in China. Chinese investment 
abroad in 2008 doubled from $25 billion to $50 billion. In the first half of 2009, the total 
value of non-financial foreign direct investment reached $ 12.4 billion. A large proportion 
of this investment flowed towards the US. From the published data of the US Ministry of 
Finance, it is evident that by August 2009, China was holding $800.5 billion US 
government bonds. After the $24.2 billion purchases in July 2009, China replaced Japan 
to become the largest creditor country of the US . Meanwhile, although the $3 1 8  billion 
foreign investment in 2008 kept the US as top capital outflow country, the US 
government was still suffering from a massive current account deficit. This meant that in 
order to rescue the economy, it had to borrow from abroad to fill the money shortage in 
the financial markets. China was and still is a major option. This, therefore, represented a 
situation requiring a "diplomatic and genuinely cooperative and comprehensive 
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relationship"1 • The US absorbs a large volume of capital from the Chinese investment, 
and China benefits from this investment also. Apart from this, the two countries have also 
cooperated in a wide range of additional areas. Ferguson and Schularick (2007) have even 
created the term "Chimerica"2 to describe the symbiotic relationship between China and 
America. These two countries will play the most important global role in the future as 
some leading economists, such as Robert Mundell  predict. 
In order to trace the linkage between China and the US, the two major economies, in 
connection with the world financial crisis in 2008, this section will focus on the global 
asset markets and the national accounts of China and the US. In according to the 
discussion of the global asset price boom in 2008, a series of questions has been put 
forward. What caused the 2007 global asset boom, the oversupply of money or the 
shortage of assets? What are the fundamental reasons behind global imbalances? To what 
extent do Chinese foreign exchange policies influence imbalances through the Chimerica 
linkages? This study will discuss and attempt to give explanations and make logical 
connections between these questions and the economic phenomena. 
This section will start by discussing the principle factors which have created the current 
economic situation. In the following part, it will analyse the significant reasons for the 
global asset price boom pre-2008, which can be seen as the prelude to the 2008 global 
financial crisis. In the third part it will give a further analysis on the global imbalances. 
The saving glut and shortage will be given as a reasoned explanation of the world 
imbalance including a discussion of the saving and investment scenario, and links 
between the US and Chinese current accounts, the role Chinese RMB play. A further 
summary about the global imbalance and Chinese RMB prices will be identified in part 
four. By analysing these primary and principle reasons of today's China-America 
symbiosis, it will then be possible to summarise the explanations for these phenomena 
and to assess their implications for the future. 
1
United States President Barack Obama, on 22 September 2009 when he and the Chinese President Hu Jintao met in 
New York, said "the US and China are working together to build a positive, cooperative and comprehensive relationship 
for the 21st century". 
2 The "Chimeric a" concept was first coined by historian Niall Ferguson, and economist Moritz Schularick in 2006. 
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5.2 Global asset price boom and the 2008 crisis 
In the past decade, the global asset market has experienced a geometric scaled boom. The 
international capital market enjoyed a synchronised surge in the pre-2008 period. 
Suddenly, the bankruptcy of Lehrnan brothers in September 2008, the largest bankruptcy 
in US history with over $600 billion debt recorded, opened the curtain to the whole world 
financial crisis which was followed by the international economic recession. Essentially, 
the crisis and the recession started from excess capital liquidity. A common view is that 
"excess liquidity" marks a booming asset market. Not only economists such as Fels 
(2005), Rliffer and Stracca (2006) say this, but also reports from several major banks and 
mainstream media I concurred. 
"Excess liquidity" describes a situation m the market where the assets are easy to 
exchange with no loss of value or even with an increased value. The assets in the market 
will tend to flow towards those projects offering a higher return for the investment. 
Excess asset liquidity will stimulate overheated investments and bring instability factors 
into the financial market, meanwhile, creating a potential crisis of higher inflation to the 
asset inflow countries. 
5.2.1 Oversupply or shortage of assets (money) 
As early as 2005, excess liquidity had already been cited as a source of asset price 
instability by Ferguson (2005). However, because the problem of defining "liquidity" and 
quantifying "excess", the correlation with the real asset price is not easy to confirm. 
Liquidity can be measured either narrowly by money in circulation, or broadly by 
multiplier effects of financial system components, or as Ferguson (2005) pointed out, 
even the level of policy interest rates. Similarly to "liquidity", excess can only be 
measured approximately by a circular approach when asset prices have a significant 
swing. 
Because excess liquidity raises concerns about assets in the capital market, there is a 
debate about the reasons which cause this situation. According to economic theory, 
I Mervyn King, the Governor of the Bank of England, mentioned in a speech in January 2006 that "rapid growth of 
money . . .  has helped to push up asset prices as investors search for yield". A Morgan Stanley (2005) report described 
"global excess l iquidity is alive and kicking". The Economist on l 11h August 2005 commented "global liquidity has 
expanded at its fastest pace for three decades". 
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excess liquidity comes about because of the oversupply of assets which far exceed 
demand if there is an excess of assets in the capital market. Another view held by 
economists such as Caballero (2006) believe that excess liquidity results from a shortage 
of financial assets who also indicates that the emerging markets contribute towards a 
global asset market shortage. The gap between high return from risky investment and low 
obtained from safer assets causes over-investment because of speculative activities. To 
satisfy the requirements of meeting the needs of economic development, massive 
amounts of capital are required. The question is whether the oversupply of assets in the 
money stock causes the excess liquidity, or conversely, whether the shortage of assets 
hypothesis, which force the capital to flow faster, in order to make up the lack of assets in 
the market. Whatever the reason, the monetary aggregate is an index to measure the 
money stock and is worth discussing. 
The monetary aggregate, as Rliffer and Stracca (2006) indicate, includes the price level, 
the interest rate development and the yields of the financial and real assets. The money 
aggregate is an important reference to inflation levels. If there is too high a money supply 
which exceeds market needs, then the currency (money) would decrease in value, and 
relatively, the price level would become higher. This is inflation. According to economic 
theory, if the money circulating increases speed and exceeds the social asset accumulation, 
then the currency will lose its endowed value. 
To estimate whether money in circulation and economic development maintain 
equilibrium, it is necessary to compare the ratio of money aggregate increased speed 
against GDP increased speed. "Marshallian k", the ratio of the monetary base to the 
nominal GDP can be applied to measure the money market demand and supply situation 
by comparing money growth and economic growth. According to Fels (2005), 
Marshallian k can also be defined as the inverse of the "velocity of money". Therefore, 
the level of liquidity can be measured by the ratio of monetary aggregate to the nominal 
GDP. 
In this section, the demand-deposits M l  and time-deposits M2 based Mashallian k ratios 
of four main economies, the US, European aggregate, China and Japan will be compared. 
Although some countries define the M system (MO, M l ,  and M2) a little differently, most 
84 
of them are categorised by liquidity ability. In comparison, MO has the highest liquidity 
ability, M l  has less liquidity and M2 least of all. 
Figures 5 . 1  and 5 .2 show the Mashallian k indexes of the US, Europe, China and Japan. 
The ratios of the four economies stay at a relatively stable level, only the Japanese M l  
based figure jumps from 0.6 to 0.9 in 2003 then maintains the same trend as the other 
three economies. There is an interesting situation in between all these four economies that 
the US has the substantially lowest Mashallian k ratio. In the past decade, compared with 
the western countries, the Asian countries have higher ratios in both M l  and M2 indices. 
The China and Japan M l  Mashallian k ratio stays above the 0.5 benchmark while the US 
and European countries ratios fluctuate below the 0.5 level. In Figure 5 .2, both eastern 
countries figures remain above unity and the US and Europe stay below unity. 
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On the surface from the graphic analysis, the stable Marshallian k shows that these 
economies should have successfully controlled their foreign exchange inflows, keeping 
the growth of monetary aggregates increase at the same level as the GDP growth. 
However, the hypothesis of whether there is plenty of overspill money in the market is 
not totally convincing by the Mashallian k ratios. 
The definitions of M l  and M2 are almost identical in all these economies. M l  is based on 
the currency in circulation (MO), including demand deposits. M2 equals M l  plus saving 
deposits 1 •  Both M l  and M2 describe the monetary aggregate where M2 is a broader 
money classification than M l .  The money classifications belonging to M l  represents 
retail and terminal market activities. The components of M2 reflect investments and the 
intermediate market. 
The reason for the large differences of the resulting data is because there are still many 
economic differences between the M value explanations used by different countries. For 
example, comparing M l  between the US and China, if both countries have the same 
amount of M l ,  the actual currency in circulation in the US will be more than in China. 
The reason is that in China, cheques or other checkable deposits (OCDs) are not 
convertible into cash. In M2 items, the high savings rate in China takes a large proportion 
of M2 and these savings have less circulation potential. M2 in the US with lower saving 
deposits includes more currency circulating within the economy. Thus M2 is most often 
used to measure the money supply in the US and the authorities tend to use M2 as a 
monetary leverage to adjust the amounts of currency issues. M2 is also a key economic 
indicator used to forecast inflation. In summary, if under the same level of M l  and M2, 
then China has a shortage of money compared to the US . In the M system, both M l  and 
M2 in the US have more liquidity than similar indexes in China. 
Authorities can use the M system not only to quantifY the money levels in circulation, but 
also to monitor different economic conditions. If M2 increases faster than M l ,  investment 
1 MO, the monetary base, or narrow money, includes notes and coins (currency) in circulation and in bank vaults. 
M l  includes funds that are readily accessible for spending. It consists of: ( I )  currency outside Federal Reserve Banks, 
and the vaults of depository institutions; (2) traveller's cheques of nonbank issuers; (3) demand deposits; and ( 4) other 
checkable deposits (OCDs), which consist primarily of negotiable order of withdrawal (NOW) accounts at depository 
institutions and credit union share draft accounts. 
M2 equals M l  plus savings deposits, time deposits less than $100,000 and money market deposit accounts for 
individuals. 
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overheats and less market demand may create a state of crisis. On the other hand, an M l  
increase over M2 indicates that investments cannot satisfY market demand. 
It is obviously not enough to measure the capital market only using the normal 
Mashallian k index. For more information about the investment and saving situations in 
the market, a ratio of year by year changes in the monetary aggregate against the 
increased GDP is used. Figure 5 .3 and 5 .4 shows the annual change of and M2 over the 
change of GDP (�Ml /�GDP and �M2/�GDP) in economies same as Figure 5 . 1  and 5 .2 .  
Figure 5 .3 and 5 .4 shows that with the exception of Japan, the other three economies have 
�Ml /  �GDP ratios remain approximately stable most of the time in the past decade while 
the �M2/ �GDP ratios have more fluctuations, especially at the end of 2007 on the eve of 
the crisis. In all these four economies, there are significant money aggregate increases 
which reflect the overall world money market situation during the crisis. As discussed 
before, M l  shows the retail market activity, and M2 changes reveal the investment 
market movements. Therefore, taking these two figures combined with the real crisis 
scenario, the unstable of money stock was derived from the investment market impacts 
rather than the retail market. 
Both ratios of the US had a sudden jump in 2007 which indicates higher volume of 
money supply for the market which in a market perspective reveals that assets are needed 
in both retail and investment markets. Therefore in the US economy, the consequence is 
that more money has been rushed into both terminal (retail) and intermediate (investment) 
markets, and resulting in the overheated capital market movements. 
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Figure 5.3 �Ml /�GDP of four main economies (Derived from IMF data, Main Economic 
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Figure 5.4 �M2/�GDP of four main economies (Derived from IMF data, Main Economic 
Indicators from OECD data) 
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The stability of both ratios of European countries and China show the determination of 
the authorities when dealing with an overheated economy before and during the 2008 
crisis. The application of related policies kept the economic development under control. 
The �M2/ �GDP ratio had a higher increase than the �Ml l  �GDP ratio post-2007, which 
reflects the fact that the investment and intermediate markets asset growth was faster than 
the retail market. The �Ml l  �GDP ratios moved in different directions between China and 
the other three economies during 2009. The Chinese ratios increased whilst the other 
three economies declined. This means that when terminal markets of these developed 
economies were still undergoing revival from the harm done by the 2008 crisis, China 
had already recovered and continued its market expansion. In Figure 5 .4, the European 
�M2/ �GDP ratios fell whilst the US, China and Japan figures climbed, which reflects the 
fact that the European investment market was the one still struggling with the recession 
and the last one return to normal. 
From the graphic analysis we can confirm that during the crisis period there was much 
more circulated money than before. However, there are concerns about the way of 
computing market capitalisation and so the real value of the market capital needs to be 
considered. Increased "money" indicates not the real assets but the government issued 
currency. The shortage of assets makes the authorities issue more currency to fill the asset 
gap. This is why the money aggregate shows an increase, yet the market still requires 
more assets. The deeper reasons which cause this situation will be discussed later (in para 
5 .2.3). Before that we need to find out why there was a money boom in the investment 
market at the beginning of 2007. 
5.2.2 Global returns on capital and the real interest rate 
In the past decade, it has become the common dictum that domestic agents investing in 
the market will reap more benefit than those who store their assets within their own 
environment. The root reason for this is that the global return on capital is higher than 
ever before. First, it starts with the massive increase on the global labour market. The 
integration of the Asian and Eastern European economies signified two main inputs into 
the global market, capital and labour. According to IMF data, in 2007, the labour pool 
doubled after the two economic systems integrated. The global capital also increased by 
about 20 percent. At the same time, the labour market expansion as well as the capital 
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market increase made changes to the global market structure and the global returns on 
capital. 
Ferguson and Schularick (2007) formulated a neoclassical model to estimate the global 
returns on capital before and after the merging of Asian and Eastern Europe economies. 
This model is set under perfect competition conditions without external assumptions and 
follows the constant returns to scale technology. The producer manufactures a 
homogeneous final output Y dependent on labour (L) and capital (K) inputs as Eq. (5. 1 ) :  
Y1 = KfLi-a (O<a< l) (5 . 1 )  
The rate of return on capital r comes from marginal the output Y b y  the capital K l  is 
shown as Eq. (5.2): 
(5 .2) 
Where k1 indicates the capital intensity. This function shows the pre-integration of Asian 
and Eastern European economies. After their integration, the new return on capital r is: 
K + K _ 
( 1 Z)a-1 _ k a-1 r2 - a - a 2 L1 + Lz 
Therefore, the proportional rate of change of the new returns on capital can be calculated 
by Eq. (5.3) as : 
f = (a - 1) (k2 - 1) (5.3) kl 
Computing roughly by substituting Freeman's (2006) figures into this neoclassical model, 
Ferguson and Schularick (2007) set a as 0.35 .  As mentioned earlier, the global capital 
stock increased by around 20 percent and the capital production intensity fell by 50 
percent, thus it is  able to assume returns on capital rate as : 
f = (0.35 - 1) X -0.4 = -0.26  
This figure shows that a 40  percent reduction of  the capital intensity creates 
approximately 26 percent gap on the returns on capital. According to economic theory, 
the returns on capital shall be equal to the cost of capital, and the 26 percent gap means 
9 1  
that in the past decade, the real increase in the return on capital is higher than the cost of 
the capital. This is the main reason for the boom in investments. 
Apart from the labour market expansion, another reason which causes a higher capital 
return is the real interest rate influence on capital cost. The real interest rate is a key index 
to measure the global cost of capital. Ferguson and Schularick (2007) use a long-term real 
interest rate to calculate the change of capital costs in the last decade, which is a ratio of 
the long-term nominal interest rate to consumer price inflation. 
In this study, we compare the long-term real interest rates of China, US and the European 
Union. The CPI data of both countries used here takes the year 2005 as the base 
(2005= 1 00% ). The long term loan rates of China as well the US long term bank prime 
loan rates are applied here as interest rates, whilst, the EU interest rate was the central 
bank rates for main financing operations. The Chinese financial market still has not 
opened fully to international capital 1 , this index is only meaningful for the Chinese 
domestic capital. The US and European Union real interest rate indices can be applied 
accurately, and the Chinese data analysis can become a reference point. 
From the comparisons on Figures 5 .5 ,  the long-term real interest rate in the past decade, 
the US rate reached a peak in 200 1 ,  as does the EU, with a significant decline afterwards 
until 2005 . Both the US and the EU real interest rate dropped nearly 50 percent of their 
values in 200 1 in 3-4 years. The US real interest rates fell from around 9 .5  to less than 4 
(3 .7 in March 2004) while the EU real exchange rates shrank from 5.6 in November 2000 
to 2 in March 2004. Then the rates were pushed upwards during 2004 to 2007 the 
financial crisis eve. Meanwhile, the Chinese indices remained stable and had only slightly 
fluctuations between 2000 and 2008. When the global finance crisis occurred in 2008, 
real interest rate indices in all three economies had a sharp drop. 
1 China, with a less mature financial system of totally openness, is still making progress in its fmancial 
market reform. This opening process has progressed in a gentle rhythm, in case the shock brought unstable 
chaos to an immature market. Authorities also implemented related policies to restrict speculative 
international capital flows. 
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Figure 5.5 China, US and the European Union ( 1 2  countries) real interest rates 
Derived from data of National Bureau of Statistics China (Chinese CPI), People' s  Bank 
of China (Chinese Major Loan Rate), IMF (US CPI and Bank Prime Loan Rate), EURO 
STAT data (European Union CPI and central bank main financing operation rates) 
The long-run real interest rate can be seen as a signal indicating a reduction of global 
asset shortages. Caballero (2006) points out that the real interest rate is pushed down by 
the market-mechanisms for filling the gap of assets shortage in emerging markets by 
compensating for lost assets after a crash. As discussed previously, a global asset shortage 
can, not only raise local asset values, but also lead to a reduction in the cost of capital. 
In summary, the higher returns on capital results in an increased "money" flow into the 
market encouraging more investment. For example, before most financial crises, for 
instance the 1 997 Asian economic crisis and the 2008 global credit crunch, assets tended 
to flow into real estate. Investment in this business thus becomes a focus for most 
bellwether companies. That is why housing prices will always be a barometer of the 
economy. Apart from real estate, other investment which can bring a high return is 
speculation in the capital market. After the speculative boom of chasing high revenue, 
there is an overspread money liquidity problem, the trend of assets always flowing 
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towards places of high return. International over-liquidity reveals the fact that some 
industries with higher rates of profit attract these assets. Therefore the source and 
direction of the capital flows of specific regions and countries merit investigation. 
5.2.3 The 2008 financial crisis- collapses bubbles 
As was pointed out earlier in 5 .2 . 1 and 5 .2.2, on the one hand global returns on capital 
increased, yet on the other hand, the cost of capital fell. The outstanding gap between the 
investment cost and the returns on the capital enable investors to earn more than ever 
before. If investors can borrow money to buy earning assets, it is easy to taste the 
sweetness of rapid increases. For this reason, investors are eager to absorb financial assets. 
Massive amounts of asset requirements in the market directly cause the explosion of 
international mortgage loan and derivative investments. The essential business of both the 
mortgage and derivative markets is the aggregating of assets being sold to down-stream 
businesses. Usually, investors find it easier to collect capital from them. 
However, the truth is that the correlation between the ability of capital to produce output 
and the ability to generate assets is ambiguous. In today's financial market, the capital 
being sold depends on people's estimation of the potential rise in its value. Hence, the 
capital can be sold at a higher price in advance. Through a series of related financial 
institutions across the world, the capital price increases step by step. Through this 
borrow-buy-sell chain and financial innovation the emerging market creates large 
amounts of increased GDP. Leaving the derivative market and looking at the S&P 
(Standard and Poor's) 500 index, it is found that the equity valuations remain at a stable 
level. The assets nominal value goes up with every transaction, but the financial 
derivatives trades including CDO (Collateralized Debt Obligations) do not create real 
financial values. For example, hedge funds, as a key financial development product, had a 
dramatic increase since 2000. They occupied 58  percent of the US credit derivatives 
market and took 45 percent of the bond in US emerging markets in 2005. They were 
responsible for 40 percent of the volume in the New York stock exchange and half in 
London stock exchange transactions during 2008 on the eve of the crisis. At the same 
time, financial bubbles were created, and this may be a good explanation as to why the 
crisis in 2008 started from the derivative market and mortgage market crashes. 
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A survey data was referenced by Summers (2008) in the Financial Times saying that the 
43 percent value-added in the US companies flew into the financial sector. They created 
"a housing bubble, a mortgage bubble, an equity bubble, a bond bubble, a credit bubble, a 
commodity bubble, a private equity bubble, and a hedge fund bubble" and the crisis 
occurred when they "all burst simultaneously" (Roubini, 2008). 
Combined with previous discussions the conclusion to be arrived at is that financial assets 
"increases" by either government issues of more money (currency) or the financial 
derivative trade are only financial alchemy created by a "shadow banking system". 
(Roubini, 2008) Meanwhile, asset shortages still exist. As a result, financial markets are 
looking for those economies which have the ability to supply financial assets. If, in 
general, regions are limited by their inability to supply financial assets and generate profit, 
then only specific regions can supply realistic assets. China is one of the main sources of 
global financial assets but it has also been criticized by the US and some European 
leading industrial countries as "causing global imbalances". 
5.3 Global imbalances 
Global asset imbalance is an over-liquidity explanation which has been widely agreed 
(Cooper, 2005, 2006; Engel and Rogers, 2006; Rogoff, 2007; Caballero et al. ,  2006, 2008; 
Aizenman and Sun, 2008). It is an essential reason which defines this economic 
phenomenon with the unavoidable consequence of overdevelopment and structure flaws. 
Global imbalance indicates that some countries and regions have plenty of assets seeking 
further investment, while other countries and regions face the equally awkward 
predicament of asset shortages. The essential reason for the global imbalances, as 
Caballero (2006) explains, is the over development of several specific markets in Anglo­
Saxon economies and particularly in the US economy. Firstly, these economies sell larger 
volumes of capital to global savers and investors under good growth conditions. However, 
the real ability to generate assets of this capital, mismatches its price. Secondly, at a 
higher increased level, emerging markets and oil-producing economies are unable to 
generate adequate good quality assets to fill the development gap. Thirdly, other 
economies have been hampered by lagging behind the Anglo-Saxon and US economies. 
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Also, structure adjustments are unable to keep up with the speed of the growth. Thus, 
continental Europe and Japan have little ability to generate financial assets. 
5.3.1 Current account imbalances and the "saving glut" 
Behind the global imbalance there is a huge gap between savings and investments. In 
other words, savings are unable to support investment capital requirements. As mentioned 
earlier, large amounts of assets are required in the global financial markets but only 
specific countries can supply such assets. It all depends on the total amount of the 
country' s  capital. Current account balances, as one of the two primary components of the 
balance of payments, provide a useful effective indicator of the national wealth and 
foreign trade situation in any country. That is why current account balances are compared 
in an international prospective on Figures 5 .6 and 5 .7. 
Figure 5.6 indicates that there is a large global current account imbalance between the 
east and west. During the past decade, the gap was growing. East Asia and the oil export 
countries had current surplus expansion. The East Asian countries had the highest 
surpluses in the world. The oil countries surpluses also had steady growth. However, the 
2008 crisis derived the collapses of financial bubbles e.g. the Dubai real estate bubble 
collapse. Some countries assets value shrunk and affected directly on the 2009 current 
account balance. On the other side of the Pacific, North America had the largest amount 
of current account deficit. The value of European Union countries aggregation moved 
slightly above or below the zero benchmark. The 2008 crisis impact also brought large 
deficits. Fortunately, the recovery relieved the losses and the deficits became smaller in 
2009. 
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Figure 5.6 Current Account Balances (% World PPP level GDP) 
Data source: IMF data, Economist Intelligence Unit, authors' calculations. EU is the aggregate of European Union countries, Oil Countries 
are oil export countries including Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Iran, Venezuela and Iraq. Asia is the aggregate of mainly East 
Asia countries including China, Japan, South Korea, Singapore, India, Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia. North America is the sum of 
America and Canada. 
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Figure 5 .7 Current Account Balances (% World GDP) 
Data source: IMF data, Economist Intelligence Unit, authors' calculations. 
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Figure 5.7 tells the same story as the global imbalances. This graphic shows that East 
Asia has more power and influence on global economic events compared to a decade ago. 
Except Japan, China also has become one of the key countries influencing the world 
economy. In 2008 Japan and China rank in the top four economies in the world with a 
current account surplus together with Germany and Saudi Arabia. On the negative axis, 
when compared with Figure 5 .6, it can be concluded that the North American deficits are 
mainly created by the US. 
IMF statistics of current account balances covering countries across the world reveal that 
China has the highest current account surplus and that America has the highest current 
account deficit. These two countries are compared together on Figure 5 . 8, which shows 
the current account balance data of these two countries over the past decade. The left axis 
represents the positive increases of the Chinese current account balance, while the 
negative right axis displays the disappointing American performance. As can now be seen 
from both Figure 5 .6 and Table 5 . 1 ,  the Chinese current account has a steady 
geometrically increased volume from $ 1 5 .69 billion in 1 999 to an excess of $500 billion 
in 2009. Because of the affects of the 2008 economic recession, the increase slowed down 
and equalled less than 1 0% of GDP in that year. The quick recovery in the following year 
pushed the figure back and reached a new peak. Whilst China enjoys a rapidly growing 
surplus, America is suffering from a highly increased deficit on the current account, 
which is moving in the opposite way to China. The US deficit climbed from $300 billion 
in 1 999 reaching a peak of $788 billion in 2006, which equalled about 6 percent of the 
GDP of the whole fiscal year. The situation has been mitigated in recent years as the 
deficit dropped below $400 billion. However, it is still a massive gap. 
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Figure 5 . 8  Current Account Balance in Billion US Dollars (China and the US) 
Derived from IMF data 
Table 5 . 1  Current Account Balance in Percentage of Domestic GDP 
Year China United States 
1 999 1 .4 -3.2 
2000 1 .7 -4.3 
2001 1 .3 -3 .8 
2002 2.4 -4.4 
2003 2 .8  -4.8  
2004 3 .6 -5 .3 
2005 7.2 -5.9 
2006 9.5 -6.0 
2007 1 1 .0 -5.3 
2008 1 0.0  -4.7 
2009 10.3 -2. 8  
Source: IMF data 
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The US deficit related data in Figure 5 .4 and Table 5 . 1  demonstrates that, carrying a 
heavy deficit over a long period, the US has a lack of ability to supply large amounts of 
assets. At the same time, the US has the most mature financial system and is the most 
highly developed economy in the world. Like feeding fuel to an engine, running this 
financial system and to ensure its stable progress requires large amounts of assets. 
America has the most developed intermediate or terminal market processing capital. 
Clarida (2005) hold the view that the US equity markets were absorbing excess savings 
all around the world which caused a higher current account deficit. From the analysis 
above, there is no doubt that China is one of the main sources of these flows. A report of 
Mckinsey (2009) indicates that the US current account deficit will be financed by the 
surpluses in China, Japan and Germany. Not only because these countries have the ability 
to "earn" but also because they are able to "save". 
Figure 5 .9  compares gross national savings of different countries m an international 
perspective. It is obvious that the Asian countries have a higher saving rate than the 
western countries. The two countries holding the largest ratios of national gross savings 
as percentage of GDP in the Asian countries are China and Singapore 1 •  Both these 
countries had over half of the GDP volume gross national saving in 2007 and 2008, 
which is about four times higher than the least saving country, the US. In comparison, 
most of the European countries have less national savings, even including Germany, the 
big current account surplus country. German gross national savings took about a quarter 
of the total GDP amount. 
1 In Singapore, as most people are originally from Chinese immigrations, they have a very similar "saving" culture as 
China. 
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Figure 5 .9 Gross National Savings (% Domestic GDP) 
Derived from IMF, United Nation data, and OECD database. 
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China and the US the top and bottom on the saving list will be highlighted and compared 
later not only because they are the representatives of both Asia and developed countries, 
but also because there are deep connections and importance to the international 
econom1cs. 
5.3.2 Saving and investment gap of the U.S.A 
Greenspan (2005), Ferguson (2004) and some others believe that in the internal prospect 
the expansionary fiscal policy has small impact on the current account balance. There are 
two more important reasons causing the US asset shortage, the international trade deficit 
and the gap between national saving and investment (Bernanke, 2007). In the 
international trade area, the US export deficit increases every year. In the past decade, the 
data of the current account deficits demonstrate this fact. Between these two explanations, 
most economists suggest that the saving-investment factor is more important than 
international trade in affecting the US current account deficit. Chinn and Ito (2005) 
examined a group of variables including macro variables and institutional factors, these 
indicated that the US current account imbalances were mainly caused by the saving­
investment gap. This gap is considerably affected by "saving drought" rather than 
"investment boom". Here we will focus on the gap between national savings and 
investments. 
The national gross saving rate dropped from 1 8 .28 percent of GDP 1 998 to 1 2 .79 percent 
in 2008, and the investment rate rose from 35 percent to almost 45 percent of GDP in the 
past five years. Comparing the annual change of the gross savings to investment, as 
Figure 5 . 1  0 shows, there is a massive gap between them as the statistics show. Except 
during the three years from 2004 to 2006, for the rest of the past decade, the increased 
speed of saving cannot match the investment rate. Further more, the negative growth 
happens in half of the period. In the most recent years 2007 and 2008, the gap has grown 
to a new peak. The graphic reflects to what extent the asset gap has occurred. 
The result of the massive and increased gap between savings and investments is that the 
US national savings are unable to fund domestic investment. Such a configuration means 
that the US government, corporate organisations, and also households must borrow 
money from abroad in the international market. That is why some economists such as 
Bemanke (2007) believe the deficit is principally made by the US itself. The current 
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account deficit can also be linked with the US federal budget deficit. Accepting this 
"twin-deficit" hypothesis is that there is a positive correlation between a current account 
deficit and a federal budget deficit of the major countries then in addition to the US and 
Germany, Japan also can be included. 
Although the saving rate keeps dropping, the US national and private consumption still 
keeps increasing. The saving volume is far from adequate to support increased 
consumption. Thus the requirement for more assets stimulates the development of 
mortgage and credit card agencies. The credit market boom on the eve of the crisis 
revealed the shortage of asset in the US. Meanwhile, on the other side of the pacific, 
China, had an opposite scenario. 
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Figure 5 . 1 0  Gap between savings and the investments, U .S .  
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5.3.3 The "saving glut" in China 
It needs to be understood how Chinese "glut" savings have accumulated. China is well 
known throughout the world as having a saving culture. This is a widespread view as 
illustrated by Cooper (2007). Not only in comparison with the developed industrial 
countries but also with its Asian neighbours. This is already shown on Figure 5 .9 
previously. 
There are three main components of the savings in China: government, corporate and 
household savings . The sum of their volume reaches more than half of the total GDP 
volume. Figure 5 . 1 1  illustrates to what extent the proportion of these three components 
changed during the past decade. On Figure 5 . 1 1 it can be seen that the corporate and 
household savings fluctuated slightly but maintained at the same scale about 20  percent of 
GDP volume. The government savings were much smaller than the other two sections, 
which were only about 3 to 5 percent of GDP volume during late 1 990s and early 2000s. 
Its ' increases continued after 2004 and exceeded 10 percent of GDP amount in 2007 and 
2008. 
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Figure 5 . 1 1  China national saving (% of GDP) 
Derived from China National Bureau of Statistics data 
Cooper (2007) concludes that there are two reasons to explain why in China during the 
past decade so much capital had been successfully saved. Firstly, both fiscal revenue and 
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personal incomes were growing rapidly, but consumption had failed to match the speed of 
growth. Secondly, credit market imperfections caused precautionary saving. A similar 
view was mentioned on some empirical studies as well. Dooley et al. (2004) and Chinn 
and Ito (2005) believe that the booming volume of reserves in China was as a resulted of 
its mechanisms. They conclude that the "saving glut" as a eo-effect result of an immature 
financial system, capital control retention and the RMB tight linkage with the USD. 
The first reason given by Cooper (2007) is that income growth, which determined by the 
condition of the current Chinese economic development. The Chinese economic reforms 1 
30 years ago stimulated the whole social and economic development and as a result, 
people have had a higher income and a better standard of living. Fabre (2009) indicates 
that in some major cities, the living standard is as similar as on the other side of the 
Pacific. However, compared with the long period of experience of well developed 
industrial countries, China is still exploring the most suitable structure for its long term 
development. The immature investment market is another persuasive reason to explain 
the difference between incomes and investment. 
Household personal saving in China has increased steadily over the last three decades. To 
discuss more hidden details behind the increase, different data must be used. Figure 5 . 1 2  
shows the annual changes of household saving and illustrates the increased prosperity of 
the Chinese people. The enormous increase after 2008 can be explained by both the 
significant rise of personal income and the prudence of individuals against the potential 
risks of an overheated economy. To determine which explanation is more likely, a 
comparison of the income and expenditure within householders needs to be undertaken. 
Urban family per capita data in Figure 5 . 1 3  shows that both family income and 
expenditure have steady increases. The gap between personal income and expenditure 
becomes the main source of household saving, which therefore results in increased saving. 
1 The Chinese Economic Reform started from the end of 1 970s led by former president Mr.Deng Xiaoping. 
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Figure 5 . 1 2  Change in household saving (in Trillions Chinese Yuan) 
Derived from People's Bank of China data 
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Figure 5 . 1 3  Urban family income and expenditure situation (in Chinese Yuan per capita) 
Derived data from National Bureau of Statistics, China 
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The essential lesson is therefore that the Chinese savmg culture and the burgeoning 
economic prosperity must always be considered together. Precautionary savings can be 
considered as a national psychological culture and result principally from private savings. 
Figure 5 . 1 3  shows that household saving in China has a very high ratio against income, 
from 20% to a quarter, not only when comparing with western countries, but also in the 
Asian area, for instance in comparison with its neighbours such as Japan or South Korea. 
There are two reasons as to why Chinese households tend to save their money. Firstly 
immature financial markets limit personal investment. However, it needs to be mentioned 
that in the past decade the stock market in China has been developed as a main focus for 
absorbing private assets. It has become the top private investment option positioned just 
below bank savings. Febre (2009) indicates that the stock market shock during 2007 and 
2008 evaporated 2/3 the volume of total market price, which linked directly with the 
reduction of 60 million middle class family household savings. Secondly, there is no 
systematic social insurance. As a consequence, people have become used to saving 
money for medical care, pensions or even the education of their children. 
Apart from the household savings, Figure 5 . 1 1 also tells that corporate savings are the 
other main component and which accounts for a high proportion of the national savings. 
Corporate savings are mainly from the firm earnings. The high rate of corporate saving in 
China can be explained by both capital stock expansion in China since 1 990s (Bai et al. ,  
2006) and the high net retained earnings. Because of the immature financial system, poor 
cooperate governance (ADB, 2009; IMF, 2009) and the low dividend payment rate in 
China (Ma and Wang, 20 1 0), Chinese firms are able to keep most of the earnings. 
Apart from private and corporate saving, government saving is the third main component 
of national savings. Chinese government saving deposits increased from 1 2.5 billion CN 
Yuan 1 998 to more than 1 00 billion 2009 which the lighter columns (left) in Figure 5 . 1 4  
show, the stable climb of government revenue which supports the increase of the saving 
deposits. The total saving deposits accumulate year by year. Therefore, the annual 
increase of the saving deposits can be linked to the current year government revenue. The 
percentage of the annual saving increase against the government revenue (as the line 
shows in the graphic) has seen massive fluctuation in the past decade. There are two 
valley bottoms, one is in 2000 and the other in 2007. The relevant economic evidence of 
these two years shows that there was economic overheating. When the percentage of 
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increased savmg deposits reached its peak in 2004 at about 95 percent of total 
government revenue, the Chinese authorities adopted economic restraint policies. 
Connecting these ratios with the economic circumstances, it can be found that if the ratio 
is at a high level, the economy is stable; otherwise, if the ratio is low, the financial market 
become unstable because of over liquidity. 
Data from Figures 5 . 12,  5 . 1 3  and 5 . 1 4  prove the fact that in the past decade China has 
accumulated enormous assets, both national and individual. The increased fiscal revenue 
and personal income constantly push savings into new and higher levels. These saving 
have built a foundation for China to become the top asset outflow country. Most of the 
investments using these assets have gravitated towards the US. F ebre (2009) describe the 
over saving in China and over consumption on the other side of the pacific as "the two 
faces of the same coin". According to the estimates by Pettis (2008), any 5 percent of 
GDP volume of declined consumption in the US requires 1 7  percent of GDP volume of 
increased consumption in China to make up. 
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Figure 5 . 1 4  Chinese government Revenue and the annual changes of saving deposit (in mil lions CN Yuan) 
Derived data from National Bureau of Statistics, China 
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5.3.4 "Chimerica" linkage and the China-America symbiosis 
In recent years, a new word "Chimerica" is suggestive of the tight connection between 
China and America. This connection is described as "one half did the saving and the other 
half did the spending" (Schularick, 2008) and "one used its saving to finance the other 
half s deficit" (Fabre, 2009) . Worldwide, China has the fastest growing and America has 
the most advanced economy. The Chimerica linkage is not simply displayed through the 
current account balances, but there are also deeper reasons to link these two big 
economies. There is no doubt that trade balances between them are the most obvious 
connection. It can be seen through Table 5 .2, the US trade balance with China, and the 
percentage take of the total US current account balance. This proportion of trading deficit 
with China continued increase and has nearly doubled in the last decade. In 2009, a new 
peak was reached, nearly 60% of the deficit came from the trade imbalance with China. It 
illustrates two factors: firstly, US is an import surplus country when considering the US­
China foreign trade; secondly, the US imports from China are increasing rapidly every 
year and have become an enormous consideration. 
Of course, the US government is trying to resolve the imbalance. The US deficit growth 
may become a potential fault causing a financial crisis, because a large current account 
deficit can be a debilitating factor resulting in pressure on the ability of a country to 
sustain its foreign credit commitment and even to infect its financial reputation. In such 
an event it would be more difficult to raise funds, which means increased interest rates 
and depreciation of the domestic currency. 
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Table 5 .2 US trade balance with China 
Year US trade balance with China % of total current 
(Billion USD) account balance 
1 999 -68.68 22.9 1% 
2000 -83 .83 20.08% 
2001 -83 . 1 0  2 1 .60% 
2002 - 103 .06 22.34% 
2003 - 124.07 23 .70% 
2004 - 1 62.25 25 .96% 
2005 -202.28 27.75% 
2006 -234. 1 0  29.70% 
2007 -258 .5 1 35 .35% 
2008 -268.04 39. 8 1 %  
2009 -226.88 59.69% 
Source: IMF data 
There is a consensus 1 view that the undervalued Chinese currency is the main reason 
behind the US trade deficit. Therefore, pressure has been put on China that it should 
revaluate its currency or if not Congress would impose a higher tariff on Chinese goods 
entering to level the price competitiveness. However, as a member of the World Trade 
Organisation, the US cannot change tariffs without specific reasons. Thus, even more 
pressure is placed on China to adjust its currency exchange rate. This raises another issue 
and there is a serious debate as to whether Chinese Yuan appreciation would solve the US 
current account imbalance. 
Since 2005, China has already raised its RMB nominal exchange price several times 
against the US dollar. From Figure 5 . 1 5, we can see a continuous increase of the price of 
the RMB over a 3-year period from 2005 to 2008. The nominal rate moved from 8 .28 
1 In the political area, represented by the US, Gerthner, the Treasury secretary of the US, in 2009, believed China is 
manipulating its currency. Some European government including Germany showed a similar view. So do some world 
financial organisations like the IMF and the World Bank. In the academic sphere, there is also a common belief about 
the connections of the undervalued Chinese Yuan with global imbalance, e.g. Goldstein and Lardy (2008), Frankel 
(2006), Cheung, Chinn and Fujii  (2007), Cline (2007) quantified the Yuan prices against USD and indicate that the 
RMB is from 3 0%-69% undervalued. 
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Yuan per dollar where it had stayed for more than seven years before Jun 2005 and has 
gradually grown by more than 20% to reach a price of 6.79 in September 2008. 
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Figure 5 . 1 5  Nominal CNYIUSD Exchange Rates 
Source: People' s  Bank of China 
If currency price changes can solve trade imbalances, a Chinese Yuan appreciation or US 
dollar depreciation should theoretically have the same effect. So to what generalised 
extent can dollar depreciation relieve the trade deficit? After measurements, Cheung et al. 
(2008) gave a number saying that the RMB price was at least 20 percent undervalued. 
Therefore, a drop of dollar's value at the same amount value might work equally to the 
same effect. However, all the facts listed above shows that even a 20 percent of raise 
could not result in a complete elimination of the US current account deficit. 
Because there is less possibility of a big adjustment in the price of the Dollar, there is 
greater pressure on the Chinese Yuan to raise its price further. Many critics have argued 
that with the Chinese RMB pegged to the US dollar at an undervalued level, it has given 
the Chinese an unfair competitive advantage in foreign trade with US since 2003 and they 
urge China to release the fixed peg of Yuan with Dollar. Although in the 1 997 Asian 
crisis, China was widely praised by maintaining the exchange rate to US dollar, which it 
was considered had made a large positive effect on the situation, they also pointed out 
that Chinese goods imported to US were at an advantage while US goods exported were 
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at a disadvantage. This is the main reason which has caused the US significant trade 
deficit with China. However, China has chosen not to respond to foreign pressures in 
2009 and did not implement any relevant policy, until in June 20 1 0, Chinese central bank 
announced that it would allow a more flexible Yuan, though it had low impact to the 
nominal exchange rate over two months. 
Most foreigners ignore the cost China will have to pay on the Yuan appreciation or 
unpegging the Yuan to the Dollar. China has a historic record of boosting inflation and 
currency depreciation. Then in 1 994, the Yuan was pegged to the dollar to pull the 
economy back to stability and remained pegged for more than a decade. If abandoning the 
pegging too early and there was continuing appreciation of Yuan at the same time, there 
is no doubt unsustainable capital injection would ensue from speculators. This capital 
would drive the currency price down and result in money growth, real output, and 
employment, but would also cause inflation. This would recreate the situation of the 
Asian crisis of 1 997. In that case, it would cost the authorities even more to resolve the 
crisis. A similar scenario happened at Japan in the late 1 980s. The Yen prices rose under 
pressure from western countries. Afterwards, an extraordinary high inflation rate hit 
Japan, together with greater liquidity and stifled asset prices. 
According to the Mundell-Fleming framework, as an exogenous variable, money does not 
reflect spill-over liquidity directly. However, a monetary authority can still maintain 
foreign output by injecting more money, through the domestic money and foreign money 
correlation system. In the M-F framework, the effect may overturn and expand monetary 
policy to affect increases in output both at home and abroad. The home currency 
depreciates because the monetary expansion leads to an increased demand for foreign 
goods. The short term effect can work not only on internal interest rates but also on 
external foreign assets. Because in the current period goods become cheaper in terms of 
the future market, the inter-temporal switching effect tends to push both the domestic and 
foreign goods demand towards the present. In addition, by the concept of the New Open 
Economy Model (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1 995), the shock effect of domestic monetary 
policy to foreign output is ambiguous. Foreign monetary policy focuses on exchange rate 
developments and can affect foreign consumer prices, which may remove the expenditure 
switching effects and influence the correlation between domestic policy shocks and 
foreign output. Drawing from other literatures, foreign expansionary monetary shock is 
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another channel which can push higher domestic inflation levels in the long-run. The 
financial development and openness today gives a faster speed in asset synchronization 
across countries. Therefore, any market shock in one country can infect the others 
immediately, and then spread worldwide in next to no time. 
Another aspect is that an opening market allows capital to flow freely. This may cause a 
large flight of capital away from China for purchasing higher yield rate. Currently, there 
are highly restricted regulations on the private investor in China. The benefits of financial 
assets have been limited to regular yields from bank deposits, rather than other riskier and 
higher return investments. According to the predictions by Tatom (2007), the opening of 
the financial market would bring a rush of capital to "foreign bank accounts, mutual funds, 
foreign stocks or bonds". Implementing the floating rate regime and opening up the 
capital market too early at an inappropriate time could create turmoil among the trading 
partners of China. A movement which tries to appreciate the Yuan would cause deflation 
in China, and also damage the bilateral trade balance. It would cost more and increase the 
difficulty of management, therefore, it is impossible to ask one country to pay for another 
one 's  deficit, and ultimately there is no necessity to do so as a country's  trade must 
constantly be in balance. 
5.4 Summary 
In early 2007 the global asset price boom and excess liquidity brought remarkable capital 
flows to the international financial markets creating an overheated economic period. 
Lasting only about 12  months, a global credit and financial crisis occurred. This was 
followed at the end of 2008, by a global recession. The greatest reason for the excess 
liquidity was global imbalance between the economies of eastern and western countries. 
On one hand, sophisticated markets in western countries, represented principally by the 
US, had asset shortages, whilst, on the other hand, eastern countries such as China, had 
the capability to supply large amounts of money. In addition, due to the fact that global 
returns on capital today are much higher than ever before assets tend to flow more readily 
towards higher profit markets. These reasons combined to create the global asset levels 
and over liquidity which led to the 2008 crisis. 
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FitzGerald (20 1 0), Summers (2008) and Roubini (2008) indicates the 2008 crisis was the 
consequence of asset bubble collapses in the US and European countries, worsened by 
"market and policy failures". Global imbalance was one of the most important elements 
boosting the financial crisis. On one side of the world, countries such as China, gained 
large amounts of yield through foreign trade, the yield was saved and consequently, assets 
accumulated. On the other side of the world, the US spends more than it earns creating a 
large fiscal gap in deficit years. It is obvious that there are tight linkages between these 
two countries in foreign trade which can be proven by the current account balances. Large 
proportions of the US trade deficits come from trade with China. Therefore, critics focus 
on the nominal exchange rates of the Chinese currency, saying, the undervalued currency 
prices give China an unfair advantage in foreign trade. Since 2007, western countries 
have never ceased urging China to raise currency prices or to free the exchange market. 
In fact, in a three year period from 2005 to 2008 he Chinese Yuan price has been raised 
against the US dollar by more than 20%. However, this did not improve the US trade 
deficit situation. The reason as FitzGerald (201 0) summarised is the failure of monetary 
policy control and asset bubbles in the crisis which were caused by exchange rate target 
mistakes and volatile private capital flows. He suggested a defensive model to crisis 
which should focus on "indirect" currency and asset controls. These controls can be 
adopted through stricter bank regulation, shift portfolio flows away towards foreign direct 
investment and accumulate reserves. If unpegging the Yuan with the dollar too fast or 
freeing the foreign exchange market at an unsuitable time, before the total market was 
prepared, on one side China might have to pay heavily to keep its economy stable, on the 
other side, US may meet a negative impact from market shocks. 
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Chapter 6 E mpirical researches on the real exchange 
rate 
6.1 Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) and the Law of One Price (LOOP) 
The Purchasing Power Parity concept postulates that exchange rates between two 
currencies should be equal to the ratio of their national price levels and will maintain 
equilibrium in the long-run usually being linked to nominal exchange rates .  The first 
mention of this theory can be traced back to the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. The 
basic original concept of PPP was set by classical economists in the 1 9th century such as 
David Ricardo. The theory of 'purchasing power parity' was popularized by a Swedish 
economist Gustav Cassel in 1 9 1 8 when World War I had just ended and the world faced 
the necessary recovery of the collapsed financial system. It was then that Gustav Cassel 
applied the PPP theory into the gold standard parity and first treated PPP as a practical 
theory restoring the pre-war mint parity between the US dollar and the British sterling. 
During the 1 920s, the purchasing power of currencies in some European countries such as 
Germany, Hungary and the Soviet Union sharply declined and depreciated against the 
common currency the U.S dollar. Research on PPP became popular and a large volume of 
academic and case study literature is focussed on it. 
The definition of the real exchange rate is closely connected to the Purchasing Power 
Parity (PPP) theory. This theory states that the law of one price in a standard commodity 
basket and the purchasing power parity of the exchange rate between two currencies 
would equate to relevant national price levels. If the PPP stays at an equilibrium level, it 
is held. "When PPP holds, the real exchange rate is a constant so that movements to the 
real exchange rate represent deviations from PPP." (Samo and Taylor, 2002, pp.5 1 )  
Movements i n  the real exchange rate represent deviations from the PPP. Most of the 
measurements of the real exchange rate have been closely related to PPP literature. Hence, 
analysis of PPP is, in some sense, equivalent to analysis of real exchange rates. 
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6.1 . 1  The Law of One Price 
The PPP theory is based on the law of one price (LOOP). LOOP is a condition to PPP 
indicating that if the national price level of a common currency is equal, even if in 
different locations, say, between two countries then the purchasing power through the 
official nominal exchange rate should equate to the two relevant national price levels. 
However, the price of equivalent commodities may not be the same across different 
geographical locations because of transaction and transportation costs or other 
impediments to trade e.g. tariff and non-tariff barriers. 
Strong evidence exists to show that deviations from LOOP are persistent and are highly 
correlated with exchange rate movements (Isard, 1 977; and Richardson, 1 978). As early 
as 1 985,  Michael A Jenkins found that location and distance make the price differential 
of similar goods more volatile and more persistent. Engel and Rogers ( 1 996) use CPI of 
the U.S. and Canada to estimate the stochastic properties of deviation from the LOOP and 
provides evidence that the distance between cities is highly related to the price differential 
in the same country. They also find the price differential is larger between cities in 
different countries than in the same country and express this as "border effect" which 
occurs when the distance is between 2500 and 3000 miles. Similar evidence has also been 
found by Rogers and Jenkins ( 1 995). 
The fact is that identical goods are traded at different prices in different locations. The 
price differentials create opportunities for profitable arbitrage. Arbitrage will only stop 
when the profit return is equal to or less than the arbitrage cost, including transport and 
other costs. These costs restrict a transactions cost band for foreign exchange trade. If 
exchange rates stay within the threshold, theoretically there would be no arbitrage. 
However, in the real market, the exchange rate most of the time moves away from the 
threshold. The fact that in the long-run exchange rates vary in many countries from their 
fundamental values has been considered as the exchange rate misalignment. The 
exchange rate misalignment show higher time length than the theoretical models suggest. 
(Dufrenot et al. ,  2008;  Bereau et al, 201 0) 
Many studies show that thresholds should be interpreted in a broader way rather than just 
simply a reflection of shipping costs, trade barriers, sunk costs of international arbitrage 
and the tendency for traders to wait for sufficiently large arbitrage opportunities to open 
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up before entering the market (Dumas, 1 992; also Dixit, 1 989; Krugman, 1 989). The 
other factor which can cause the deviation of LOOP is the type of goods calculated in the 
price indices, say a differential of a standardised basket of goods for the CPI (Consumer 
Price Index), e.g. the LOOP holds very well for some highly traded commodities, but has 
apparent violations for non-traded components. As Rogoff ( 1 996) reports, LOOP may 
still hold when computing wholesale price indices (WPI) including smaller non-traded 
components. Alberto Giovanini ( 1 988) finds sharp price differentials in both sophisticated 
manufacturing goods and commodity manufactures. As Samo and Taylor (2002) indicate, 
using a broad range of goods in the price index basket results in the rejection of LOOP. 
6.1.1.1 Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson effect 
The Harrod ( 1 933) - Balassa ( 1964) - Samuelson ( 1 964) model is the first model for 
testing the long-run deviation of PPP and the equilibrium real exchange rate. According 
to this model, they found that contrasting with the original standard LOOP theory, when 
all countries price levels are standardised against the dollar through the nominal exchange 
rate, the price levels of rich countries tend to be higher than poor countries. This is also 
explained as the 'pricing to market' (PTM) theory by Krugman ( 1 989) and Dombusch 
( 1 987) to reject the LOOP. 
The reason behind the Harrod- Balassa- Samuelson effect is because of higher absolute 
productivity levels, and also because oligopolistic firms can make the same goods at 
different prices in different countries. If the price levels of all countries are translated to 
dollars at the prevailing nominal exchange rate, rich countries tend to have higher price 
levels than poor countries because rich countries are relatively more productive in the 
traded goods sector, as non-traded goods tend to be more service intensive. The rise in 
productivity will not affect prices in the traded goods sector, because the domestic price 
level is tied down by world price levels and exchange rates. Kravis and Lipsey ( 1 983) and 
Bhagwati ( 1 984) reported that rich counties will have higher exchange rate adjusted price 
levels than poor countries by the assumption of capital-labour ratios. The most pertinent 
way through the effect of productivity differentials is that countries ought to dispose of 
their productive resources through the international division of labour (Harrod, 1 933).  In 
most industrial countries, the technological progress of non-traded goods has been slower 
than in the manufactured traded goods section. Therefore, rich countries will be richer by 
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promoting their products in the traded goods sectors and hence will have appreciated 
currencies. (Taylor, 2002; Froot and Rogoff, 1 995;  Rogoff, 1 996) 
The Balassa- Samuelson effect works efficiently in the Yen-Dollar system especially so 
in Japan (some empirical studies found it also works in Germany) or, say, PTM is more 
important for German and Japanese firms rather than for US firms: the Japanese 
production industry can be a good example because of its fast growth. Substantial 
empirical evidence confirms that the Balassa- Samuelson effect appears significant in 
comparisons between very poor and very rich countries. However, the effect is weaker 
than it has been believed when making comparisons across industrialised countries. 
(Froot and Rogoff, 1 995) 
6.1.2 Early stage and traditional models 
6.1.2.1 Traditional real exchange rate model 
According to economic definition, the way to measure the real exchange rate is to relate 
the price indexes to the nominal exchange rate. In the early stage of the PPP study, 
following the LOOP theory, the equation of PPP is put in the Eq. (6 . 1 ) form: 
(6. 1 )  
where e1 is the logarithm o f  the nominal exchange rate of these two currencies at time t; Pt 
represents the logarithm of the domestic price level at time t; * denotes the foreign 
economy, and OJ1 is the disturbance term. For absolute PPP, the symmetry condition is 
that f3 and p* are equal but with opposite signs, thus j]=-p* is set as the restriction for PPP 
to hold. The proportionality condition is to test whether they are equal to unity or minus 
unity respectively. The real exchange rate q under the PPP violation is defined as Eq. 
(6.2) : 
(6.2) 
In LOOP theory, several factors affect the estimated result. On the one hand, when the 
real exchange rate q1 series is not stationary this means that shocks may be permanent and 
then the PPP hypothesis can be rejected. On the other hand, when using instrumental 
variables to estimate this equation, although the f3 and p* are closer in absolute value than 
using only the OLS (ordinary least squares) model, the PPP is still rejected (Frenkel, 
1 2 1  
1 98 1  ) .  Therefore, the next stage is to test as whether the real exchange rate series is 
stationary or follows a unit-root process. 
6.1.2.2 Unit Root test for the real exchange rate 
The empirical studies on testing the stationarity for the real exchange rate series can be 
traced back to the mid 1 980s. In time series analysis, when a series is non-stationary 
means it has a "unit root process". The most common approach for testing the stationarity 
is the Dickey Fuller (DF) test (Dickey and Fuller, 1 979) and then the more sophisticated 
Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test (Dickey and Fuller, 1 979; Said and Dickey, 1 984) 
which are both hypothesis tests to establish whether previous values have a non-declining 
effect on the current value as time progress. The Dickey Fuller (DF) test is based on the 
Eq. (6.3) :  
(6.3) 
This test is to examine the null hypothesis that the parameter W = 1 for the real exchange 
rate series q1• The null represents that the series contains a unit root while the alternative 
hypothesis for <!> t 1 indicates the series is stationary. This is a basic autoregressive (AR) 
model. The series value q depends only upon the values of its previous periods and an 
error term. In practice, the first difference of q is taken and the equation transfers from Eq. 
(6.3) to Eq. (6.4) as : 
(6.4) 
where f3 = <l>-1 ,  then the null is [J=O while the alternative is fJ # 0. 
The DF test statistics follow a non-standard t-distribution and the DF critical value is 
much larger in absolute value. The null hypothesis of a unit root is easily rejected. 
Compared with the DF test, the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test for .dqt adds 
augmented terms to solve the autocorrelation in the disturbance term of the regression 
which may cause the null hypothesis to be rejected incorrectly at a higher level than 
normal. The general form of ADF test expresses as Eq. (6.5): 
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As with the DF test, the null of the ADF test is fJ=O and the alternative is fJ!-0. The u1 
denotes an error term. With the additional lagged differences,Lf=1 Yif1qt-i where i means 
a lag of i periods to ensure serial independence in the disturbances, critical values of 
which are used for joint tests of the significance for lagged q. In the ADF model, it is very 
important to use an optimal number of lags of the dependent variable in the test 
regression. If the equation includes too few lags, it cannot remove all of the 
autocorrelation while using too many lags will increase the coefficient standard errors and 
more parameters will use up degree of freedom. The lag length p usually determined by 
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) or Schwards Bayesian Criterion (SBC) in the 
empirical study. 
6.1.2.3 Cointegrating test for the PPP 
A cointegration approach was first suggested by Engle and Granger ( 1 987) based on a 
two-step residual test. They defined cointegration as: if there are K vectors of variables 
and all follow !(d), at least two variables the linear combination follows the order of !(d­
e), then these two series are cointegrated. Cointegration indicates that the linear 
combination of any two nonstationary series processes with the same order has a lower 
order process, like the Eq. (6.6). 
St + Kqt = Zt (6.6) 
In the PPP test if all the vectors of K follows I (1), then z1 is mean-reverting. If there is a 
long-run cointegrating relationship established between any two variables, the nominal 
exchange rate s1 and the relative price q1 (=p1-p/) are stationary. Although the 
cointegrating relationship may be seen in the short run, it is more appropriate in 
describing the long-run relationship. This situation with the shared stochastic trend 
follows the conditions set by Stock and Watson ( 1 988) as the stable long-run linear 
relationship. 
There are some problems when applying this model for estimating the cointegration 
relationship. Firstly, the low power problem 1 in the unit root test may carry forward to the 
second step cointegration test. Secondly, there is simultaneous equations bias when the 
causality runs in both directions between the variables .  Thirdly, it is impossible to test 
1 
More details about the low power problem in standard unit root test are discussed in the next section PPP puzzles. 
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any hypothesis about the cointegrating relationship at the first of the 2 steps. Fourthly, in 
the Engle-Granger test, the symmetry and proportionality conditions are easily rejected 
and the PPP estimated values are far away from the theoretical value1 • 
A more sophisticated approach testing for cointegration was introduced by Johansen 
( 1 988, 1 990) which applies a maximum likelihood estimator based on the Error 
Correction Mechanism (ECM) in the context of Vector Autoregressions (VARs). In 
comparison with the Engle and Granger approach, Johansen cointegration tests consider 
the error structure of the data processes and interact the relevant economic variables in the 
determination which will test the symmetry and proportionality conditions. 
Johansen cointegration is based on a vector error correction (VECM) model. In such a 
model, a matrix n can be interpreted as the long run coefficient matrix. A V AR with k 
lags can be written as shown in Eq. (6.7). Where, E1 is an N x 1  vector variable process at 
time t. ilk is an NxN parameters matrix. Jl is an NxJ vector of constants and w, is an Nx 1 
vector of white noise terms. 
The Johansen cointegration test examines the eigenvalues of the ll matrix to confirm the 
cointegration relationships. The cointegration rank number in the system is equal to the 
number of eigenvalues that the matrix ll has. A significant eigenvalue indicates a 
significant cointegrating vector, i.e. cointegrating relationship. The matrix ll can be zero 
rank which would mean that there are no cointegrating relationships in the system. 
Alternatively, ll can be of full rank, which means that the original series are stationary. 
(Johansen, 1 988;  Johansen and Juselius, 1 990). 
There are two test statistics for cointegration under the Johansen approach, which 
considers the Atrace and Amax statistics. With Atrace we have a joint test for which the null 
hypothesis is that the number of cointegrating vectors is less than or equal to the rank of 
the matrix D. The alternative hypothesis is that there are more than r cointegrating vectors. 
The other test is based on Amax, the maximum eigenvalue statistic. It starts from testing the 
null hypothesis that at most r (r begins at 0) cointegration rank exist, and is conducted 
1 The difficulty of testing the symmetry and proportionality conditions (K= l )  when the bias in standard errors is the 
difference between testing for PPP and for the non-stationarity of the real exchange rate. 
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according to the sequence of a previous test until the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. 
The hypotheses for Amax are: 
Ho: r = 0 versus HI: 0 < r $g 
Ho: r = 1 versus HI: 1 < r $g 
H0: r = 2 versus H1: 2 < r $g 
Ho: r = g - 1 versus HI: r = g 
If the first test for the null hypothesis of no cointegrating vectors (corresponding to TI 
having zero rank) cannot be rejected, it would be concluded that there are no 
cointegrating vectors and the testing would be complete. Otherwise, if the H0: r = 0 has 
been rejected, the second null of there being at most one cointegrating vector would be 
tested and so on. The number of the cointegration rank r is continuously increased until 
the null is no longer rejected. 
In the cointegration model, there is a problem in that first difference has no long-run 
solution when the PPP maintain equilibrium, i .e. in the long-run, all lags are equal in 
value, and hence values of the first difference series turns to be zero. The Error 
Correction Mechanism (ECM) incorporates both first difference terms, as well as an error 
correction term which is the lagged levels of cointegrated variables. Thus, it is possible to 
capture both short-run and long-run relationships. If s and z are cointegrated, then the 
ECM model can be expressed by Eq. (6.8) as : 
Where fh describes the short-run relationship between two series s and z. /h represents the 
speed of adjustment back to equilibrium. f32 also measures the proportion of last period's  
equilibrium error that needs to be corrected. The error correction term (z1_J-ys1_J) should be 
stationary if s and z are cointegrated. y is the cointegrating coefficient, which describes 
the long-run relationship between s and z. 
One disadvantage of a single ECM is that it is not possible to perform any hypothesis 
tests about the actual cointegrating relationship. When estimating ECM using the Engle­
Granger 2-step method, at step 1 ,  although the coefficient estimates are achieved, since 
all variables are non-stationary, hence it is invalid to perform statistical inference on 
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coefficient estimates. The Johansen approach allows the hypotheses tests on the 
equilibrium relationships between the variables by viewing the hypothesis as a restriction 
on the IT matrix, which is functionally equivalent to the error correction term in single 
ECM. The Vector error mechanism (VECM) is more advantageous than the single ECM 
because on the one hand, it can estimate two or more cointegrating relationships between 
more than two variables at once; on the other hand, all variables are treated symmetrically 
since all variables are endogenous in V AR, upon which VECM is based so simultaneous 
equation bias can be avoided. 
6.2 PPP puzzles 
The persistence problem of the real exchange rate puzzles is summarised into two parts 
by Nikolaou (2008). First is whether the PPP could persist holding a long-run anchor for 
the real exchange rate equilibrium value. The second puzzle by Rogoff ( 1 996) is about 
the volatile nature of the real exchange rate and the slow return from shocks. 
6.2.1 Long-run and Short-run 
From the beginning of the 1 990s, empirical studies give a view that PPP was of little use 
in exchange rate behaviour. Many studies of real exchange rates among industrialized 
countries in the post-Bretton Woods period (after 1 973) find PPP is difficult to hold. (Roll, 
1 979; Frenkel, 1 98 1 ;  Adler and Lehman, 1 983;  Darby, 198 1 ;  and Mishkin, 1984) One of 
the reasons for the failure of proving PPP hold is because of the floating exchange rate 
data length used for tests from 1 970s to 1 980s, i .e. less than twenty years is too short. 
This is what Rogoff ( 1 996) put as one of the PPP puzzles. He points out that the speed of 
real exchange rates back towards their mean value can be extremely slow: the half-lives 
of shocks can be three to five years. The early empirical cointegration studies mentioned 
the absence of significant mean-reversion in the real exchange rate towards PPP (Taylor, 
1 988;  and Mark, 1 990). Mean reversion is a necessary condition for long-run PPP to hold 
(Lothian and Taylor, 1996). The half-lives of three to five years are too long to be 
explained by nominal rigidities. 
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Empirical studies by Taylor, Peel and Sarno, (2001 )  made the hypothesis that the slow 
mean reversion is caused by factors such as transaction costs in international good 
arbitrage and the large deviations from equilibrium are made quickly while small 
deviations can be much more persistent. That is, the PPP as an equilibrium condition in 
the long run remains a useful first approximation. The nature of the deviation from PPP 
suggests the existence of persistent and slow mean-reverting influences. PPP does not 
hold in the short run and the convergence to PPP is extremely slow. This raises a puzzle 
by Rogoff ( 1 996) that the nature of the shocks driving real exchange rate changes. The 
persistence of PPP deviations will emerge from multivariate V AR models but these 
models suggest a very slow convergence. 
Early stage studies ignored the different effects of short-run and long-run. Thus, the 
dynamics were not in the estimated equation. As Dombusch ( 1976) indicates, the theory 
of exchange rate overshooting should be one of the reasons of the failure of PPP in the 
short-run because it is retained as a long-run equilibrium while allowing for significant 
short-run deviations. The overshooting model of the nominal and real exchange rate by 
Dombush ( 1 976) reveals that the failure of PPP in the short-run can be attributed to 
stickiness in nominal prices, as financial and monetary shocks buffet the nominal 
exchange rate, and the real exchange rate itself. This model also implies the volatility of 
real exchange rates can also change in the short-run. However, few empirically literate 
economists take PPP series as a short term proposition like one-month conditional 
volatility of real exchange rates. The reason is because the shocks of the real exchange 
rates short term volatility appear to damp out at an extremely slow rate. PPP under the 
refinement of the Mundell-Fleming model should hold only on average and over long 
periods of time. Frankel ( 1978) suggested that the PPP hypothesis can only be used in the 
long-run exchange rate model. Froot and Rogoff ( 1995) also point out that the PPP is not 
a short-run relationship and the real exchange rate is not a random walk. The adjustment 
speed of the real exchange rate return from shock is slow as the rate of damp out is 
roughly 1 5% per year (Rogoff, 1 996). 
The solution for this PPP puzzle is to increase data length by using long horizon data or 
taking panel data analysis from multi-countries. From the early 1 990s, studies of long-run 
PPP hypothesis became popular, and tended to use extremely long data lengths, even two 
or three centuries such as Frankel ( 1 986, 1 990). The evidence of these studies can support 
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PPP to at least keep equilibrium in a long-run relationship. Others like Oh ( 1 996) take the 
multi-countries panel analysis from as many as 23 OECD countries and 8 8  other 
countries. Some studies apply both systems for solving this PPP puzzle when testing the 
equilibrium of real exchange rates. 
For the first long span data approach, because the real exchange rate volatility under 
floating rate regimes is greater than fixed rates, they are mixed together in the same test. 
This will cause the fixed data to affect the floating rates data. For the second multi­
countries panel approach, because each country has its own economic characteristics, 
although some have a close relationship, as many as twenty economic variants cannot 
have significant relationships with each other. 
6.2.2 The low power problem 
It has been mentioned in the last section that following many studies on the real exchange 
rate in the 1 980s and 1 990s, the judgement was that less than a 20 years period (usually 
starting from 1 973) is not long enough to be able to detect slow mean reversion towards 
PPP. The empirical literature implies that the time series deviation from PPP is due to the 
nonstationary (more particularly unit-root) behaviour of exchange rates and focuses on 
this (Froot and Rogoff, 1 995 ; Rogoff, 1 996). Many studies during this period have to face 
the problem that the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis that the real exchange rate 
follows random walk is very low. Sarno and Taylor (2002) apply a simple Monte Carlo 
experiment, and then compute the probability of rejecting the null of a unit root which 
would only be between about 5 and 7.5 percent if the data range is 1 5  years or less. The 
probability of never being able to reject the null would be as high as 92 percent with the 
same data length. Even if the data available were extended to 50 years, the probability of 
rejecting the null is still extremely low with a less than 30 percent chance. Rogoff ( 1996) 
suggest it as another PPP puzzle, the low power problem. 
Noted by Frankel ( 1 986, 1 990) and also other early papers, (Taylor, 1 988;  Frankel and 
Rose, 1 996; Froot and Rogoff, 1 995; Baxter and Stockman, 1 989; Hegwood and Papell, 
1998; and Taylor and Sarno, 1 998) the standard unit root tests are considered to have low 
power when examining whether the real exchange rate series follows a random walk. 
Nelson et al. (2001 )  specified the standard unit root test as the Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
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Test which has the power problem of rejecting the null hypothesis when the real 
exchange rate series is instable. 
This low power problem, as Shiller and Perron ( 1 985) and Lothian and Taylor ( 1 996, 
1 997) found from the Monte Carlo evidence, cannot be circumvented by changing the 
frequency of the same data length to increase the sample size, say, changing between the 
monthly, quarterly or annual data. Therefore, to improve the low power problem in 
rej ecting the null of unit root, researchers note it is either advisable to generate a long­
span of data sets in terms of years (Die bold et al. ,  1 99 1 ;  Cheung and Lai, 1 993 ), 
alternatively, under data length restriction to test the unit root jointly using a panel of real 
exchange rates of numbers of currencies, or considering the non-normal behaviour of the 
real exchange rate, the distribution of which could lower the power of the standard unit 
root test (Perron, 1 990; Kim, et al., 1 998; Mclachlan and Peel, 2000). 
The method of increasing the data length to solve the low power problem is difficult. 
Because even the half century data is not long enough, when using long span data to 
understand the information content of the pre-floating data for the recent floating-rate 
period, the long-run properties of real exchange rates have been studied over 200 years 
and there are significant shocks to the real exchange rate. When applying a long span data 
set, although the statistic power is increased, it is still hard to reach definite conclusions 
unless the sample period covers a long number of years. Nevertheless, the long-run PPP 
might indeed hold. 
The long horizon data has a problem as Frankel and Rose ( 1 996) and others noted, the 
long samples required to generate a reasonable level of statistical power with standard 
stationarity tests which would be unavailable for many currencies and inappropriate 
because of regime changes. Lothian and Taylor ( 1 996) argued that reliable inferences can 
be drawn by extending the data across exchange rate regimes. Some other researchers 
(Baxter and Stockman, 1 989; Hegwood and Papell, 1 998) argued that the real exchange 
rate statistical properties appear to vary strongly across nominal exchange rate regimes. 
Froot and Rogoff ( 1 996) indicate that the long span data also has the problem of 
generating a reasonable level of statistical power with standard univariate unit root test. 
Especially under floating rate regimes, the real exchange rate volatility is considered 
greater than under the fixed rate regimes. 
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The results of studies by Taylor ( 1 988) and Mark ( 1 988) indicate that the null hypothesis 
of no cointegration can easily be rejected when the exchange rates system is fixed rather 
than floating. The symmetry and proportionality restrictions can be tested but not 
imposed in cointegration approach, however the validity is still questioned in unit root 
tests for long-run PPP using real exchange rates. The imposition of Taylor ( 1 988) and 
Taylor & McMahon ( 1 988) can bias PPP tests on real exchange rates towards finding no 
mean reversion if the two restrictions are not consistent with the dates. Because the linear 
combination of non-stationary series is non-stationary without the correct cointegrating 
coefficients, the failure of finding reversion towards PPP can be due to violations of the 
two restrictions imposed a priori on the exchange rate and price data. (Cheung and Lai, 
1 993) The test provides evidence to high frequency data (monthly) of long-run PPP 
during the post-Bretton Woods period by using cointegration approach. 
Rogoff ( 1 996) mentioned that "the speed of real exchange rate adjustment that does not 
account for this shifting equilibrium will be severely biased towards zero."  A later paper 
by Coakley, Flood, Fuertes and Taylor (2005) also indicates "it makes no sense to speak 
speed of adjustment to equilibrium in the cointegration sense because the equilibrium is 
not constant but a moving function of unobserved I( l )" and in the same paper, they also 
suggest it as being a "fruitful" task to analyse and identify the shifting equilibrium. 
These puzzles are considered in many papers (Frankel and Rose, 1 996; Froot and Rogoff, 
1 995; Baxter and Stockman, 1 989; Hegwood and Papell, 1 998; and Taylor and Samo, 
1 998), most of which applied the standard unit root test which causes the PPP to be 
rejected (Samo and Taylor, 2002). Evidence from research shows that the standard unit 
root tests have low power problem in rejecting the null of unit root without considering 
the non-normal behaviour of the real exchange rate, the distribution of which could lower 
the power of standard unit root test. (Perron, 1 990; Kim, et al., 1 998; Mclachlan and Peel, 
2000) 
6.2.3 Structural breaks in the unit root test 
The ADF test has been widely used in early empirical studies to test the stationarity, not 
only the low power problem mentioned previously, but also when catching the long span 
data series which has structural breaks, it has a low ability to reject the unit root null 
hypothesis. 
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This structural problem has been indicated by Perron ( 1 989) who proposed an exogenous 
structural break in the ADF test. According to the different types of structural breaks, 
Perron ( 1 989) suggested three modified DF tests : the "crash" model including a series 
break in the level with added level change dummy in the original Dickey Fuller equation, 
the "changing growth" model including a break in the slope or the rate of growth with the 
slope dummy representing a change in the trend function slope and the model which 
allows both breaks occur simultaneously. 
Approaches by Perron ( 1 989) were criticised by the later studies for invalidating the 
underlying conventional tests. Therefore, Christiano ( 1 992), Zivot and Andrews ( 1 992) 
introduced endogenous determinants and used different critical values from Perron ( 1 989) .  
Later, Perron and Vogelsang ( 1 992) and Perron ( 1 997) proposed two models which allow 
two different types of structural breaks, the Additive Outlier (AO) and Innovational 
Outlier (IO) model. The former allows a sudden change and the latter allows more 
gradual changes. These models are based on criticising the sum value of t-statistics of 
auto-regressive coefficients over all breakpoints. Perron ( 1 997) believed they can 
improve the low rejecting problem in the unit root test. This test can identifY the 
structural break when it occurs, therefore, the related economic factors concerning the 
structural break are able to be associated. 
These approaches above are only suitable for single break or the most significant break in 
a series. For testing more than one structural break, Lumsdaine and Papell ( 1 997) 
proposed an approach which allows two or more breaks, which is more powerful than the 
previous single break testing models. The approach by Ohara ( 1 999) which allows more 
breaks with unknown dates provided more evidence on the necessity of unit root tests 
with multiple breaks. 
These tests motioned above for single or multiple endogenous breaks do not allow break 
or breaks under the null but alternative hypothesis1 which may cause the test be less of 
power from the deriving critical values bias to reject the series is stationary when it is 
non-stationary with break or breaks. These "spurious rejections" bias problems can be 
avoided by using the minimum Lagrange Multiplier (LM) unit root test suggested by Lee 
1 Except Parron ( 1989) approach allows both null and alternative hypothesis. 
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and Strazicich (2003) .  Their model also allows two endogenous breaks under both null 
and alternative hypothesis. 
There is a great amount of empirical study on the unit root test of series with structural 
breaks, however only limited literature focuses on incorporating series with breaks which 
occur at different times into cointegration framework. Gregory and Hansen ( 1 996) and 
Llitkepohl et al. (2004) proposed tests which focus on integration incorporating breaks at 
unknown time. 
In the model by Liitkepohl et al. (2004), series are estimated by two estimators, the one is 
a set of dummies from rewriting the data generation process in levels V AR form, the 
other is based on an unspecified model. When small sample properties are estimated by a 
Monte Carlo simulation approach, they indicate that the latter estimator which ignores the 
impulse dummy set is more useful in locating the break time, when the condition of V AR 
order is greater than one. 
6.3 The panel data analysis 
The panel unit root test joins a number of real exchange rate series by using multi-country 
data. In this method, some hypotheses are still rejected for a group of real exchange rates 
(Abuaf and Jorion, 1 990; Frankel and Rose, 1 996; Wu, 1 996) . Panel data has one 
problem that all the series are generated by unit-root processes when just one under 
consideration is  a realization of a stationary process, the joint null will to be rejected 
easily. 
Taylor and Sarno ( 1 998) combined the empirical studies using panel unit root tests by 
calculating the finite sample empirical distribution of a multivariate augmented Dickey­
Fuller (MADF) statistic and relaxing the assumption that the sum of the autoregressive 
coefficients are identical across the panel under the alternative hypothesis. The null 
hypothesis will be violated even if only one of the real exchange rate series in the panel is 
in fact stationary. Hence, if there is a single stationary process among a system of unit 
root processes, the joint null hypothesis of non-stationary has a very high probability of 
being rejected. The third null hypothesis of the empirical studies by Monte Carlo is that at 
least one of the series in the panel is a realisation of a unit root process. This is only 
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violated if all of the series are in fact realisations of stationary processes. This can be 
tested by the Johansen cointegrating vectors approach, which finds that panel unit root 
tests are quite powerful. The fewer the exchange rate series under investigation being 
generated by a stationary process using null hypothesis then fewer will be interpreted. 
Therefore, they build a hypothesis which will only be violated if all of the series in 
question are realisations of stationary processes. They found strong evidence of mean 
reversion in real exchange rates constructed using CPI over the floating rate period. The 
most important of this research is that the low confidence of long-run PPP hold in many 
years has been prostrated under the evidence. 
From the survey by Banerjee ( 1 999) and Baltagi and Kao (2000) the panel data approach 
has been popular in estimating real exchange rate dynamics. Fleissig and Strauss (2000) 
compared the four panel unit root tests of empirical studies of Levin and Lin ( 1 993) by 
using GLS test, procedure by Abauf and Jorian ( 1 990), IPS approach by Im, Pesaran and 
Shin ( 1 997) and Maddala and Wu ( 1 997) test for evaluating whether the real exchange 
rate follow stationary over the floating period. All these four approaches are based on 
Levin and Lin ( 1 993) test as Eq. (6.9): 
Where the null hypothesis H0: Pi=O represents the real exchange rate having a unit root 
and the acceptance of the alternative H1 :  Pi<O indicating that the real exchange rate series 
in the panel are stationary. The Eq.(9) can be normalised by standard errors of the 
regression <Ji when setting Zit = qit! � and written as Eq.( 6. 1 0). The rejection power of 
null p=O indicating that all economies follow a mean reverting process is criticised by 
Monte Carlo simulation. 
The early GLS procedure estimates the null of pi=O in the Eq. (6. 1 1 ) with the same 
explanation as the Levin and Lin approach. The GLS extended by O'Connell ( 1 998) to 
assume the vector of disturbance terms Et by a restricted V AR process. 
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Similar to the previous two approaches, the IPS test follows the Levin and Lin approach 
\vith the similar null H0: Pi=O when the panel real exchange rate series have unit roots and 
alternative H 1 :  Pi<O for the series being stationary. The Maddala and Wu test which 
follows the IPS test based on P�-. estimates different first-order autoregressive coefficients 
and has the same null and alternative hypotheses. They compared the differences between 
the traded and non-traded components affecting price indices. The real exchange rate for 
OECD countries deflated by most price indices follows a stationary process. The 
stationarity result and the half-lives can be due to both contemporaneous and serial 
correlation. The correction of cross correlations in the errors can support PPP for the price 
indices used. 
Fleissig and Strauss (2000) summarise these four tests for testing the real exchange rates 
of OECD countries for PPP and the speed on mean reversion over the floating period. 
They find real exchange rates stationary on the traded goods price indices which support 
PPP but less evidence of stationarity shows on the non-traded and service price indices. 
The panel unit root approach has a slower rate of mean reversion to impose homogenous 
series than heterogeneous series. They remove series which cause different autoregressive 
processes from full panel and the reduced panel has faster speed of adjustment and 
shorter half life. 
6.4 Non-linear Dynamic analysis 
The empirical studies find that the PPP deviation follows a nonlinear mean reverting 
process with the speed of mean reversion and the real exchange rate will become 
increasingly mean reverting with the size deviation from the equilibrium level. The 
research result of Taylor, Peel and Samo (2001 )  provide strong evidence that four major 
real bilateral dollar exchange rates can be characterized by nonlinearly mean reverting 
processes over the floating rate period since 1 973 . The nonlinearities in real exchange 
rate adjustment toward long-run equilibrium during the post-Bretton Woods period were 
used to solve the power problem. Lothian and Taylor (2000) employ a nonlinear approach 
to cast the PPP puzzle for shifts in the equilibrium dollar-sterling real exchange rate as 
well. A similar result appears in (Lothian, 1 99 1 )  Yen-Dollar, Yen-Sterling real exchange 
rate from 1 875 to 1 989. When the real exchange rates follow a nonlinear adjustment 
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process, the standard unit root test may have low power problem in rejecting the random 
\Yalk null hypothesis. (DeGrauwe and V ansteenkiste, 200 1 ;  Kilian and Taylor, 200 1 ;  
Michael et al . ,  1 997; Taylor, 200 1 )  
The main reason for nonlinear exchange rate adjustment may be because o f  the 
transaction costs in international arbitrage (Sercu, et al. ,  1 995; Obstfeld and Taylor, 1 997; 
Coleman, 1 995; O'Connell and Wei, 2002), heterogeneity in expectations of agents, 
given different investment horizons, risk profiles and institutional constraints (Brock and 
Holmes, 1 996; DeGranue and Grimaldi, 2002) and local-to currency pricing (LCP), the 
producers selling abroad set prices in the foreign currency rather than domestic currency 
(Feenstra and Kendall, 1 997; Haskel and Wolf, 200 1 ). 
Proportional costs create a thresholds band on the real exchange rate. Within the band the 
arbitrage marginal cost exceeds the marginal benefit. This band may move because of 
sunk costs of international arbitrage (Dixit, 1 989; Krugman, 1 989) and government 
intervention (Dutta and Leon, 2002). Models for the real exchange rate reversion with a 
band of inaction follow a regime switching process. The real exchange can reverse 
symmetry on either side of the band, which can be both smooth (Michael et al. 1 997; 
Dumas, 1 992, and Terasvirta, 1 994) and discrete (Obstfeld and Taylor, 1 997). 
The other cause may be the intervention operations of central banks (Taylor, 2004), 
which occur when the nominal and real exchange rate derived from its PPP and 
fundamental equilibrium, can influence the unit root testing results. 
The false null hypothesis of unit root behaviour can be rejected at a very low power when 
the true model is nonlinearly mean-reverting. This means the PPP deviations from 
equilibrium may be both positive and negative. The linear unit root hypothesis is rejected 
at significance levels for major real exchange rate over the recent floating rate period. The 
rejection of panel unit root tests at a higher level of power. Therefore, a symmetric 
threshold Autoregressive (TAR) model is suggested for measuring the PPP deviations and 
real exchange rate reversion by Michael, et al. (1 994). 
More sophisticated models of measuring smooth real exchange rate adjustment (against 
discrete adjustment), the Smooth Transition Autoregressive (STAR) suggested by 
Terasvirta (1 994), Dumas (1 994), Bertola and Caballero ( 1 990), Taylor et al. (2001) and 
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Kilian and Taylor (2003). Taylor, et al. (2001 ), Coakley and Fuertes (200 1 )  introduce an 
exponential threshold autoregressive (EST AR) model for modelling the both side 
deviation of PPP from equilibrium and its mean-reversion. There are some other related 
models for estimating the regime changes especially for developing countries, e.g. the 
time-varying threshold autoregressive model (TVTAR), the hi-parameter smooth 
transition regression model (BSTR) by Silverstov (2000) and the most commonly used, 
Markov Switching model (MSM). 
The regime switching models, according to their characteristics, are categorised by Leon 
and Najarian (2003) into two types: regimes are determined by observable variables and 
unobservable regime switching follows and stochastic process. The former with both 
discrete jump and smooth transition can be caught by the threshold model. The latter is 
often examined by Markov switching model. This research give evidence of the speed of 
real exchange rate misalignment. Supporting evidence has been given by Michael et al. 
( 1 997), Taylor et al. (2001 ), Kapetanios et al. (2003) to show the real exchange rate mean 
reversion also concerns the real exchange rate shocks and deviations. 
6.4.1 Threshold Auto-regression Model (TAR) in discrete time 
The TAR model, first introduced by Tong ( 1 978) and Tong and Lim ( 1 980), includes 
regime switching variables for estimating data processes. This model modifies a band 
within which deviations from PPP may follow a random walk and without the band the 
process is reverting or stationary. The TAR models estimate regimes which are 
determined by observable variables related to a threshold value. If the threshold value is a 
lagged value of the series itself, this is the self-exciting TAR model (SET AR). If the 
series value is connected with one lag delay as the AR( 1 )  model, for both regime there is 
a boundary value c as Eq.(6. 1 2) :  
Eq. (6 . 1 2) can also be written as Eq. (6. 1 3 ) :  
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where the indicator probability I[A]=1 when A occurs either qt > c or qt < c and I[A]=O 
otherwise. 
Leon and Najarian (2003a) consider the bands changing overtime because of transaction 
costs, policy interventions, market frictions etc. Studies by Can er and Hansen (200 1 )  and 
Kapetanios and Shin (2002) suggest a more advanced time varying TAR model (TVTAR). 
The TVTAR model is able to estimate PPP deviations of asymmetrical adjustment from 
forecasts in magnitudes, frequencies and durations by catching both nonlinearity and 
nonstationarity simultaneously. 
6.4.2 Smooth Threshold Auto-regression Model (STAR) 
The discrete TAR function can extend for a more gradual transition between two regimes 
by substituting a continuous logistic function St(q1_1) into Eq. (6. 1 3), which changes 
smoothly from 0 to 1 .  The smooth transition autoregressive (STAR) model logistic 
function (LSTAR) is show as Eq. (6. 14): 
Where Sc (qc_1) = (1 + exp( -y(qc_1) - c))-1 and c represents the middle point of the 
transition between two regimes while y is the speed of transition. When the y value is 
large, Sc (qc_1) approaches the indicator function I [qc > c] . A very large value y will 
transfer the smooth transition function to a discrete transition function, for example, a 
STAR model collapses to a TAR model in such case. When c is close to zero and 
St (qc_1)=1 , the function describe an expansionary regime, while St (qc_1) = 0 defines a 
contractionary regime. For y=O, St(q1_1) =0. 5, it comes a linear AR(1 )  model. When set 
n:i = t:Piz + tPil, i = 0,1, then Eq. (6. 14) can be written as Eq. (6. 1 5) :  
This function above can be estimated by the NLS regression. 
Apart from the popular logistic function, the smooth transition can be described in the 
form of exponential function as well. The exponential STAR (ESTAR) model is shown as 
Eq. (6. 1 6) :  
S(qc-1) = 1 - exp [ -y(qc-1 - c)2 ]  (6. 1 6) 
137  
In ESTAR model regimes are effectively defined by c value which concerns the distance 
from the location parameter. 
Figure 6. 1 and 6.2 show the LSTAR and ESTAR curves. In LSTAR, c is the middle point 
where the function is symmetric around qt_1 = c .  When qr_1 = c + a ,  Sc(qr_1) = A. 
there is q�_1 = c - a, St( q�_1) = 1 - A. ESTAR is symmetric against the middle point c .  
When qg-__ 1 = c + a, St(qg-__1) = A. there is  q�_1 = c - a, Se( q�_1) = A. Therefore, when 
observations locate on the right of the location parameter, the EST AR and LST AR are 
similar as Figure 6.3 shows: 
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The LST AR figure reveals several features of nonlinear exchange rate adjustment. Firstly, 
when the PPP deviation is negative, the expected prices change will be positive and vice 
versa. Secondly, there are sharper curvatures near both edges, which represents larger 
PPP deviations implying faster adjustments. Thirdly, the nonlinear function shape 
determined crucially by the speed of the transition between regimes, the parameter y. The 
smaller the parameter y is, the higher the degree of risk aversion is and the re balancing of 
physical capital becomes more desirable and implies a faster mean reversion. Meanwhile, 
the larger value y representing slower regime switching means and relative lower degree 
of risk aversion, which implies a slower mean reversion speed. 
The derivatives of LSTAR ast (qt_1)jaqt_1 has two limit points. The coefficients 
c:pi1 + rriSt Cqt_1) i = 0,1 has a corresponding symmetry thereby, which leads the 
functions of qt_1 irrespective at the same rate of whether in a recession stage of St(qc_1) 
close to zero or in a expansionary state of St (qt_1) close to unity. 
In ESTAR, the derivative of ast (qt_1)jaqt-1 is: 
When q�_1 = A  and A>0.5,  the derivative is equal to 2 (1 - A).J-yln (1 - A) . The 
derivative of q�_1 at "A will always be greater than its symmetric point qf_1 at 1 -"A. The 
change in the coefficient C/Ji1 + rriSt (qt_1) will be sharper when qt-1 moves away from c 
than towards c. 
The AR(l )  model can be extended to an order p model as Eq.(6 . 1 7) :  
Where Q1-J is the vector of lagged exogenous variables and Qt-1 = 1 ,  qt, f:.qt-v . . .  , t:.qt-p · 
F is the regime transition function and is bounded between 0 and 1 .  qf is defined as the 
transition variable vector, y is defined as before measures the transition speed from one 
regime to the next, c is the threshold for transition function. 
A multiple regime smooth transition autoregressive (MSTAR) model modelling the 
multiple regimes combined by multiple transition functions with individual threshold and 
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slope parameters, e.g. the hi-parameter smooth transition regression (BSTR) model 
(Silverstors, 2000) can be described as Eq. (6. 1 8) 
In this model, the different threshold parameter for transition function slopes guarantee 
the asymmetric speed of transition from the middle to higher-outer regime and from the 
lower-outer to middle regime. 
Many empirical studies using nonlinear TAR and STAR models to describe exchange 
rates dynamics have found evidence supporting PPP: Obstfeld and Taylor ( 1 997) and 
Samoet al. (2004) applied TAR models to capture the transaction costs effects on 
exchange rates dynamics; Michael et al. ( 1 997), Sollis et al. (2002) and Kapetanios et al. 
(2003) use STAR models to capture non mean reverting regimes. Supported by 
substantial evidence, Leon and Najarian (2003) indicate that in comparison, the smooth 
transition model is considered more appropriate than the discrete transition model in 
modelling the foreign exchange market. 
6.4.3 Markov Switching Model (MSM) 
The Markov switching model applies unobservable regime variables to generate the 
dependent variable, i .e. the probability of an exogenous unobservable Markov chain. This 
model has been widely used after being introduced by Hamilton ( 1 989) to characterise 
economic series data. When generating real exchange rates, exchange appreciations and 
depreciations are estimated as switching regimes of stochastic process. 
A two state Markov switching process for the basic trend-cycle function Yt = flt + rb 
where its trend component flt = f3 (St) + flt-1 = {30 + {31St + flt-1 is a nonstationary 
series follows random walk, having transition probabilities :  
P(St = O ISt-1 = 0) = p P(St = 1 1St-1 = 0) = 1 - p 
P(St = O ISt-1 = 1) = 1 - q P(St = 1 1St-1 = 1) = q 
If St is a two-point random variable taking only the value of 0 and 1 ,  then the probability 
q=l-q as: 
1 4 1  
[Sot] [ P 
S1t - 1 - P 
1 - q] [Sot-1] + [Eot] 
q Slt-1 Elt 
Where Eit = Sit - E (Sit) , i=O, 1 and (u=S6 (ot= 1 -(1t= 1 -S, implies the St has strictly 
stationary AR(l )  representation as Eq. (6. 1 9) 
Where Ao=1-p, AJ =p-(1-q)=p+q-1,  the innovation et has conditional probability 
distribution: 
P(ct = 1 - p !St-1 = 0) = p P (Et = -p!St-1 = O) = 1 - p 
P (Et = 1 (1 - q) !St-1  = 1) = q P(Et = q lSt-1 = 1) = 1 - q 
The trend component is ARIMA(l , l ,O) written as Eq. (6.20) 
where 8 = /30 (1 - A1) + /31 Ao and at = /31 Vt and the St is uncorrelated with lagged 
values of St. 
The variance of tl.fl = f30 + f31S is Pi (l-p)(l-�) , which follows the t-distribution ol = (2-p-q) 
At __!:_. The parameter A1 is a scale parameter for variance which switches between high n-2 
and low states. It switches variance up or down without affecting the tail thickness or 
leptokurtic shape of the conditional density. Therefore, A represents the dispersion 
parameter. The Markov chain S/ with unknown transition probabilities determines the 
Markov processes. For three state Markov process, the first order S1 * is the realisation of a 
binary variable. 
P (Slt = O IS1t-k = 0) = p1 P(S1t = 1 IS1 t-k = 1) = q1 
When the degree of freedom has been switched, the thickness of the tails of the 
conditional distribution varies are affected. The kurtosis of t-variable is related to the 
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degree of freedom 
3Cn-Z) where n, the kurtosis parameter is relied to a second binary n -4 
variable S2r. 
P (Szt = O ISzt-k = O) = Pz P (Szt = 1 1Szt-k = 1) = qz 
The conditional mean flt affects switches in the dispersion and kurtosis. The third Markov 
Switching binary variable S3 govern the expect return of flt 
f11 = flo + f11 Su + flzSzt + f13S3t  S3t E {0,1} 
P (S3t = O IS3t-k = 0) = P3 P(S3t = 1 IS3t-k = 1) = q3 
Sit, S2t and S3t the three Markov states switch independently. The expected mean of return 
takes continuous values rather than discrete. 
If either p or q is unity, the ll trend becomes linear as flt = a0 + a1 t 
When estimating the length of regime j (mt=j, j=O, 1 )  lasts, define D as the duration of 
different states : 
D=l if St=O and mt+1= 1 ,  P(D=l )=l -p 
D=2 if St= St+I =0 and mt+2= 1 ,  P(D=2)=p(l -p) 
The expected duration of regime 0 is 
E (D) = �oo iP (D = i) = (1 - p) �� i pi-l = (1 - p)-1 Lc=l L!=l 
The cycle component er follow AR(l )process 
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If !lt follows a linear trend and <D(L) has a unit root, y1 will follow I ( l ), so does <D(L), Jlr 
can be written as Eq. (6.2 1 )  
Where 11� = �0 and 11� = �0 + �1 can be interpreted as the expected growth rate of Yr in 
two regimes shown as Eq. (6.22) 
The solving backwards in time to yield on Eq. (6.23) 
Et = Et-1 + Yt - Yt-1 - f3o - fl1m = Yt - Yo - f3ot - P1 :Lf=1 mt + Eo (6.23) 
The innovations J11 can be written as Eq. (6.24) 
f.lt = cJ>(L) (Yt - Yo - f3ot) + cJ>(1)Eo - f3ocJ>(1) Lf=1 m1 + f31 Lj=1(L�=j cJ>k) mt-j+1 
(6.24) 
According to Dueker and Neely (2006), use of Markov trading rules have two marginal 
benefits. Firstly, the combination of Markov and conventional technical rules has better 
risk-adjusted performance than either individually. Secondly, Markov rules perform 
better on recent data than conventional trading rules when estimating exchange rate 
returns. The noises make it difficult to reject the hypothesis of random walk. 
Nelson et al . (2001 )  apply a Monte Carlo approach to compute the level of ADF test 
hypothesis being rejected when true process has Markov switching in the transitory 
component and find that the rejections are "fairly severe". This means either 
nonlinearities in the business cycle or "plucks" 1 in the transitory component sill have a 
large influence on the unit root testing result. 
1 "Plucks" here represents the growth between two regimes which reflected by the �1 value in Eq. (6.2 1) .  
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6.5 Other exchange rate approaches, from FEER, BEER, to ERER 
The empirical exchange rate model can be generalised into three main categories: the 
Fundamental Equilibrium Exchange Rates (FEERs), the Behavioural Equilibrium 
Exchange Rates (BEERs), and the Equilibrium Real Exchange Rates (ERERs ) . Based on 
their own economic definition, they are emphasised in different areas. The FEERs model, 
as its name suggests, uses the economic fundamental theory to measure the exchange rate, 
that the internal balance related to the current account shall equate to the external balance 
in connection with the capital account. More advanced than the FEERs model, the BEERs 
model uses a reduced form equation to catch the economic fundamentals in different 
terms (long-term, medium term, and short term), then awards either arithmetic average 
BEERs or geometric average BEERs. More complicated than the previous two models, 
the ERERs has been more commonly used in the empirical literature. The ERERs is 
concerned with the theory of the Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) in connecting not only 
with the nominal exchange rate but equally importantly, the price indexes. 
6.5.1 The Equilibrium Real Exchange Rate (ERER) 
The equilibrium real exchange rate concept was defined by Mundell ( 1 97 1 )  as the relative 
price of international to domestic goods simultaneously equilibrating in three markets :  the 
money market, the domestic goods market, and the international goods market. Unlike the 
FEER, the long-run equilibrium real exchange rate (present and future period) means only 
the current account equilibrium. This equilibrium includes the internal and external 
equilibriums. The internal equilibrium means that under a natural unemployment level the 
non-tradable goods market will be clear in the current period, and will expect to be in 
equilibrium in future periods. The external equilibrium happens when the current account 
discounted sum equals to zero. These two conditions satisfy that the current account will 
balance now and in the future. Therefore, the determinants of the ERER include factors 
such as import tariffs, export taxes, real interest rates, capital controls, etc. 
The early empirical study of the equilibrium real exchange rate (ERER) was provided by 
Edwards (1 989). The definition of the real exchange rate is closely connected with the 
Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) theory. When PPP holds, the real exchange rate series 
stays constant, and is called the real exchange rate keep equilibrium. Therefore, the 
movements in the real exchange rate represent deviations from PPP. 
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In the empirical studies, the real exchange rate is determined by the ratio of domestic 
purchasing power to the purchasing power in terms of the world price levels. Therefore, 
the equation for accessing the real exchange rate includes the domestic exchange rate and 
both the domestic and foreign price indexes. Then the real exchange rate under PPP level 
can be written as previously shown in Eq. (6.7). 
The ERER model by Edwards ( 1 987) is based on the constant returns to scale technology 
to tradable goods and non-tradable goods. The model assumes each factor uses capital, 
labour and natural resources for two periods: the present and the future. In this model, 
both nominal price indexes indicate a higher degree of competitiveness (production) of 
the tradable section to non-tradable section, and can be expressed by the geometric 
weighted averages of tradable goods pn and non-tradable goods PNTt as Eq. (6.25): 
Pt = YPn + (1 - Y)PNrt (6 .25.a) 
Pt = r*Prt + (1 - y*)PNrt (6.25 .b) 
Where y is the shares of traded goods in the economy, the real exchange rates then can be 
written as Eq. (6.26) : 
q = (e + PNrt - PNn) + Y(Prt - PNn) - y*  (Prt - PNn) (6.26) 
According to this equation, the tradable goods depend positively on the real exchange rate, 
and non-tradable goods depend negatively on the real exchange rate. 
Most of the empirical studies assume that the ERER model is based on the background of 
small country or small economy with perfect foresight. In a small economy, residents can 
borrow or lend internationally, together with a certain rate imposition of taxes on foreign 
borrowing. Imported goods are subjected to special import tariffs. If the domestic real 
interest rate exceeds the world interest rate, the country has to pay its debt at the end of 
the second period. The Government would be able to consume both tradable goods and 
non-tradable goods. Its expenditure comes from import tariffs, and is spent by foreign 
borrowing in the domestic private sector and borrowing from abroad. Therefore, the 
discounted value of government expenditure including foreign debt service should be 
equal to the discounted value of income from taxation. Non-tradable goods supply 
equates to the demands in both private and public sections in each period maintaining the 
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internal equilibrium so that the current account balances are equal to the differences of 
saving and investing. 
When the required inflation rate is too high, the price of nontradable goods grows faster 
than the international price of tradable goods. This inconsistent fiscal policy will result in 
domestic credit creation above the demand for money growth which then translates into 
an excess demand for tradable goods, non-tradable goods and financial assets. The excess 
demand for tradable goods will be reflected in a higher trade deficit or lower surplus after 
the loss of international reserves. It will then need an increase in (net) foreign borrowing 
above the long-run sustainable level. The excess demands for non-tradable goods will 
cause higher prices and generate a real exchange rate appreciate. 
6.5.2 The Fundamental Equilibrium Exchange Rates (FEERs) model 
The FEERs concept, first popularised by Williamson ( 1985) then adopted by many 
researchers 1 i s  based on simultaneous equilibrium of both the internal and external 
exchange rate equilibriums. According to the macroeconomic theory, there is 
fundamental equilibrium when the internal equates the external dimension. The internal 
balance for a country is based on two factors. First, it requires either full employment or 
maintenance employment rate in the long-term. The second condition is a low and 
sustainable domestic inflation rate. For the external balance, the requirement is the 
sustainable desired flow of net resources between countries. Therefore, the internal 
economic situation can be displayed by the national current account while the external, 
focusing on the foreign trade, can be measured by the capital account. When the internal 
and external balances reach equilibrium, the current account CA should be identically 
equal to the capital account KA as Eq. (6.27) shows: 
CA := -KA (6.27) 
The current account balance is determined by the real effective exchange rate qt, domestic 
and foreign aggregate output/ demand Yct and yr, Eq. (6.27) can therefore be extended to 
Eq.(6.28): 
1 Williamson ( 1 985, 1 994); Williamson and Miller ( 1 987); Wren-Lewis, et  al. ( 1 99 1 ); Wren-Lewis ( 1992); 
Clark, et al. ( 1 994); Isard and Faruqee ( 1 998); Wren-Lewis and Driver ( 1997). 
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\Vhere /h f32<0 and /]3>0, the bar represents the equilibrium level over the medium term. 
The FEER is expressed as Eq. (6.29): 
FEER -KA-f3o -fhYd.-!hYj (6.29) = {31 
Theoretically, the capital account balances are measured by the differences between 
saving and investing as -KA = S - I. 
The FEER approach estimates trade balance adjustment, international monetary 
elasticises and other alternative variables. FEER model is extended by Stein ( 1 994, 1 995) 
and Faruqee ( 1 994) to generate the equilibrium exchange rates based on the balance of 
payments. The Natural Real Exchange Rate (NATREX)1 approach introduced by Stein 
(1 994, 1 995) concerns both the PEER internal and external simultaneous equilibrium and 
the BEER saving and investment behaviour impact on the current account. This approach 
is based on the macroeconomic theory that the net capital flows are determined by the 
national saving and investment differential. 
In the NATREX, productivity and thrift of two basic variables can influence the current 
account through their impact and will then drive the capital account. The NATREX 
model starts with the current account balance equation in NATREX model as shown in 
Eq. (6.30): 
CA = cq + X + rF (6.30) 
Where q i s  the real exchange rate and its coefficient c should be negative, X represents 
exogenous variables, r is the real interest rate, E is the net foreign asset (debt), rF 
represents the interest income received (paid) on a country' s  net foreign asset (debt). 
The current account payment balance requires a sustained desired net capital flow, which 
equates as Eq. (6.3 1) :  
KAd = d(r - r*) + f(Fd - F) (6.3 1 )  
Where KAd i s  the desired net capital flow, r *  is the world real interest rate and F' i s  the 
desired level of net foreign assets. According to the exchange rate equilibrium theory, the 
current account balance identically equals to the capital account balance. Combine Eq. 
1 Faruqee's illustrative model ( 1 994) is similar as the NATREX model. 
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(6.30) and Eq. (6.3 1 )  and there is a short-run real exchange rate equilibrium function as 
Eq. (6.32): 
qt = ifi: + s(Ft - f';;) (6.32) 
Where ifi: represents differences between the actual and the long-run stock equilibrium 
level of net foreign assets Ft . The solution for ifi: influenced by both the capital account 
affecting variable F;; and current account affecting variable X shows on Eq. (6.33) :  
6.5.3 The Behavioural Equilibrium Exchange Rates (BEERs) 
After FEERs by Williamson, another approach for estimating the exchange rate called 
Behavioural Equilibrium Exchange Rates was produced earlier from Johansen ( 1 995) 
cointegration methods by Faruqee ( 1 995) and Clark and McDonald ( 1 998, 1 999). The 
BEER model is based on a long-run ( cointegration) equation with Vector Error 
Correction Mechanism (VECM) to derive equilibrium exchange rate values in between 
the real effective exchange rates and relevant economic fundamentals. The BEER 
approach suggests that a direct impact on exchange rates from current account balances 
rather than the indirect impact in the FEER approach. This alternative to the FEER model 
uses a reduced form equation to assess the current value in a certain period by Eq. (6.34) 
The BEER approach assumes the equilibrium real exchange rate (ERER) for developing 
countries is more common than for developed industrial countries. 
Where q1 is the actual value of the real exchange rate. Zit, Z21 and Z31 represent economic 
fundamentals vectors having effects on the real exchange rate over the long term, medium 
term, and short term. B1, B2, and B3 are reduced from coefficients vectors. c1 shows a 
random error. Evidence from the empirical studies shows that the real exchange 
misalignment can exist in both long term and medium term because of the interference of 
instantaneous adjustments from monetary and financial sectors and rigidities. The current 
misalignment is the difference between the actual values of real exchange rates and the 
current equilibrium rate qf which is determined by the long-run and medium-run 
variables. The current misalignment therefore can be written as Eq. (6 .35) :  
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The total misalignment when connected with sustainable economic fundamentals Zu and 
ZZt is generated by Eq. (6.36): 
tmt = qt - B1Zu - B2Zzt = erne + [B1 (Zu - Zu) + B2 (Zzt - Zzt)J (6.36) 
A more advanced model of the Behaviour Equilibrium Exchange rate (BEER) adopting 
Markov Switching (MS) functions suggested by Engel and Hamilton ( 1 990), Lebaron 
(1 992), Engel ( 1 994), Dueker and Neely (2005), Samo and Valente (2006) attempted to 
adjust the real exchange rate distributions by testing changes in the speed of reversion, the 
real exchange rate mean and variance. Other empirical studies (Almekinders and 
Eijffinger, 1 996; Taylor, 2004; Dutta and Leon, 2002; Leon and Najarian, 2005) about the 
real exchange rate asymmetric mean reversion towards the equilibrium produced more 
evidences to support the hypothesis. They provide evidences that the Central bank 
intervention policies can have a direct influence on and alter the real exchange rate 
asymmetries. 
Apart from the most popular approaches FEER and BEER, there are some other 
alternative approaches that go beyond the standard concepts of Uncovered Interest Parity 
(UIP) or PPP, e.g. the Capital Enhanced Equilibrium Exchange Rate (CHEER) stating 
that in the medium term, the RER may deviate in a sustainable way from its PPP because 
of interest-rate differentials (MacDonald, 2000). Another approach relies on UIP 
introduced by Wadhwani ( 1 999) and is known as the Intermediate-Term Model-Based 
Equilibrium Exchange Rate (ITMEER). The long-run approaches often have two main 
components, a permanent and a temporary variable. The permanent components are the 
Permanent Equilibrium Exchange Rate (PEER) or the Atheoretical Permanent 
Equilibrium Exchange Rate (APEER) which is related to BEER. 
6.5.4 The real effective exchange rate (REER) 
The real effective exchange rate is an indicator to weight the currency value of a certain 
country by a basket of other major currencies, as adjusted for the effects of inflation. This 
index measure the value of one country's currency price in terms of other major 
currencies and weighted by relevant trade balances of the index countries. 
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The Chinese real effective exchange rate data is a CPI based index measured by a basket 
of main currencies including the U.S .  dollar, Euro, Japanese Yen, etc. The real effective 
exchange rate of China appreciated by at least 30 percent from 1 994 to early 200 1 .  
According to the empirical researches by Shu and Yip (2006), Anderson (2006) indicate 
that a 1 0 percent real effective appreciation of RMB prices will lower 1 percent of 
China's real GDP growth annually over a two to three years period. Goldstein (2007) 
believe that China was in the "non-dilemma" situation for exchange rate policy what 
James Meade ( 1 95 1 )  identified. The "non-dilemma" situation is that both internal and 
external economies maintain balance simultaneously with an exchange rate appreciation. 
There are two ways to calculate REER, the arithrnetric-average REER introduced by 
Edward ( 1 989) and geometric-average REER (GREER) introduced by Gan ( 1 994). The 
REER in these models are calculated by the weighted average of the currency exchange 
rates of index country against a basket of other major currencies, as shown by Eq. (6.37) 
and Eq. (6.38) 
Where j(j= 1 ,2,  . . .  ,n) represents trading partners of the index country. Q is the weighted 
average normally decided by the trading situation with the index country, i .e. the trading 
account balances. The model default that there is 'E'f=1 wj = 1 . 
In the next section, models and methodologies introduced in this chapter will be applied 
for data analyses and discussions. 
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Chapter 7 Data Analysis and Discussion 
7.1 Data 
The data used in this chapter is based upon monthly data over the sample period from 
January 1 980 to June 201 0  from China and the US. The official exchange rate of 
RMBIUSD is from the People's Bank of China. The black market exchange rate of 
RMBIUSD is from the China section in the World Currency Year Book1 . Data from 1 980 
to 1 996 is collected from the hard copy of the Year book in British library2. After 1 996, 
the data from 1 997 is collected from the Global Financial Data3 because there is no 
hardcopy collection in UK. The Consumer Price indices, Product Price indices, Retail 
Price indices and Real Effective Exchange rates of China are based on China National 
Bureau of Statistics Data, which set the year 2000 as 1 00. The CPI, PPI, RPI and REER 
of the US are from the International Monetary Fund data and have the same time base 
index as year 2000=1 00. The data details show on Table 7. 1 below: 
1 The World Currency Year Book has been renamed and change editor since 1 997. 
2 The collection of the World Currency Yearbook by British Library can be found from its website http://www.bl.uk/ 3 The Global Financial Data collected all the China black market data from the World Currency Year Book. 
https:/ /www.globalfinancialdata.com/index.html 
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Table 7. 1 Data details 
Data Frequency Data Range 
Black Market Exchange Rates Monthly January 1 980 -
· RMB/USD December 2002 
Consumer Price Index, China, Monthly January 1 980 -June 
Year 2000=1 00 20 1 0  
Consumer Price Index, United Monthly January 1 980 -June 
States, Year 2000= 1 00 20 1 0  
Official Exchange Rates Monthly January 1 980 -June 
RMB/USD 201 0  
Product Price Index, China, Monthly January 1 995 -
Year 2000= 1 00 June 201 0  
Product Price Index, Year Monthly January 1 995 -
2000=1 00 June 201 0  
Real Effective Exchange Rates Monthly January 1 980 -June 
based on CPI, China 201 0  
Retail Price Index, China, Year Monthly January 1 987 -
2000=1 00 June 2 0 1 0  
Retail Price Index, United Monthly January 1 987 -
States, Year 2000=1 00 June 201 0  
7.2 Parallel (Black) exchange market in China 
Source 
World Currency Year 
Book 
China National Bureau 
of Statistics 
International Monetary 
Fund data 
People's Bank of 
China 
China National Bureau 
of Statistics 
International Monetary 
Fund data 
International Monetary 
Fund data 
China National Bureau 
of Statistics 
International Monetary 
Fund data 
China has become one of the largest exporting countries in the world. Together with its 
rapid development and the large surpluses accumulated from international trade and 
investment, this has aroused intensive debates concerning the foreign exchange rate price 
of its currency, the Renminbi (RMB), because during certain periods of its history the 
RMB exchange rate has been restricted to a fixed currency price under a fixed exchange 
rate regime. Although recently more free-market policies have been applied in the foreign 
exchange market, even today it is still not a completely free market. Therefore, if the data 
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from the official market, which is the so-called official rate, is used in models designed 
under free market assumptions, test results might be misleading. 
In this situation, an exchange rate data series which mimics free market features is 
required to patch the deficiencies of the official rate. Hence, the data from the parallel 
market of foreign exchange, which eo-exits with the official market in China, has been 
considered. In fact there have been two parallel markets operating in China: the swap 
exchange market and the underground black exchange market. The first of these was also 
within a range fixed by the authorities and so does not fit the free market requirements, 
therefore, the latter which is not manipulated by the authorities directly has been selected 
to test whether or not it can be taken in place of the official rate over certain periods of 
time. The results of these investigations can inform a wide range of research questions 
and policy issues. 
For these reasons, it is necessary to find a link between the fixed official exchange market 
and the black exchange market rates and prove that the black exchange markets in China, 
comparing with the restricted official exchange markets, can reflect the demands and 
supplies, policy influences on the exchange prices on a better way. Although Ding ( 1998) 
and Xia (2007) pointed out that the black exchange markets in China may not counts as 
completed free markets, the higher fluctuation may concerned by risks of being caught by 
authorities. According to the definition of free market which is: a summary term for an 
array of exchanges that take place in society where two parties trade in a voluntary 
agreement, and the definition of free exchange market that where exchange rates are not 
pegged by government and prices rise and fall freely by demand and supply, it can be 
seen that in the Chinese black exchange market, the buyers and sellers are allowed to 
transact with voluntary agreed prices, the exchange prices fluctuated by the demand and 
supply. Therefore, after establishing the black market satisfying the requirements of a free 
market, it is able to take the black market series as a suitable indicator of the value of the 
currency. 
Therefore, firstly, the possible causal relationship between the official exchange rate and 
the black market rate must be investigated. If evidence of a causal link is found, the 
connection between the official price and a free underground market will be confirmed. 
Secondly, we investigate whether fluctuations in the black market rate are associated with 
the major social and economic events that have affected China. If the evidence suggests 
1 54 
that the series does respond appropriately we may take this as an indication that the black 
market approximates to a free market. The analysis can be developed further in a 
quantitative manner by examining the extent to which the black market premium can be 
explained by various factors including policy interventions (captured through the use of 
dummy variables). 
7.2.1 A review of the development of Chinese parallel exchange markets 
New China (the Peoples' Republic of China) led by the Communist Party was established 
in 1949. During the 1 950s, as China recovered from World War II, only small scale 
foreign exchange deals through foreign trade, or private money transfers took place. In 
that period Yinyuan (Silver coin) still played the role as the hard currency and most of the 
private foreign exchanges used the silver price rather than the new Chinese Renminbi 
(RMB) Yuan. When China entered the 1 960s, the 1 0-year's Great Proletarian Cultural 
Revolution occurred, during which any private foreign exchange action was defined as 
espionage under the misshapen social economy. This situation lasted until the reforms of 
the 1 970s. Similar as in some other developing countries, the move to marketisation 
gradually formed the foreign exchange market. However, because the official market was 
still tightly controlled by the authorities, and better prices were offered by unofficial 
markets, most private foreign exchange transactions took place through these 
underground channels. These markets, such as the underground black market that co­
existed with the official market, were beyond authority surveillance and are often referred 
to as parallel exchange markets. 
There were in fact two parallel markets in operation. The black market, the illegal 
underground market which still exists today, and the swap exchange market which was 
established for exchange trading between some enterprises and the appointed banks by 
the authorities .  A review of the history shows that, from 1 979 to 1 994, the swap market 
appeared twice, first between 1 979 and 1 985 and then again from 1 99 1  to 1 994. The 
foundation of the swap exchange market was the foreign exchange retention policy, 
which allowed Chinese exporters to retain a certain quota of foreign exchange. The swap 
exchange rate was higher than the official one to encourage more exports (foreign 
currencies were more expensive in terms of RMB). The swap rate was partly officially 
determined and partly free, but it only existed in selected areas. For these reasons the 
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swap exchange rate will not be discussed further in this study the underground black 
market rate will be focus on. 
Lindauer ( 1 989, pp. 1 987) defines the black market as "the structure generated in response 
to government interventions that create a situation of excess supply or demand in a 
particular product or factor market."  Therefore the basic reason for a black market is the 
imbalance of supply and demand. Because of the tight foreign exchange trading 
limitations in the early period, the official supply could not satisfy market demand. These 
imbalances reflect the deviations between the official and black market rates. The 
marginal revenue from the underground transactions stimulated the growth of the black 
market. 
In China, the black market originally started in some coastal cities especially in the south. 
Under the "centralised control and unified operations" foreign exchange policy, nearly all 
the private exchange transactions and some involving enterprises (above an authority 
regulated quota) were not permitted. But there was an inflow of foreign currencies that 
people were willing to exchange for RMB and this formed the Chinese black market. 
On the supply side, Ding (1 998) indicates that one of the major sources of foreign 
currency is the Chinese living overseas. Through both remittance and visits, foreign 
currencies flow into China and take a major proportion of the supply on the black market. 
Another large part of the supply comes from the domestic enterprises that used smaller 
amounts of foreign currencies than the authority' s  quota. The final supply source is 
currency brought in by foreigners entering the country. On the demand side, the first 
element comes from the smuggling from Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan and some other 
more developed countries. Second, domestic residents may for some reasons need foreign 
currency, for example people going abroad for education or work, or people saving 
foreign currency in an attempt to maintain the value of their personal assets. Third, 
enterprises engaging in international trade need currency to facilitate the importation of 
goods and services from foreign countries. 
Based on these various sources of supply and demand, and if the black exchange market 
can be seen as a free market, the next questions to consider concern the determination of 
the prices of foreign exchange in this market. Are the fluctuations what one would expect 
under free market principles or not? When the official exchange rate remains fixed due to 
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controls by the authorities, to what extent does the black exchange rate reflect underlying 
market movements? To answer these questions, the prices of the official exchange market 
and the black exchange market need to be analysed. 
The series used to measure the official exchange rate is the price of RMB in US dollars 
(because in both the official market and the black market it is the main transaction 
currency). The US dollar is the most common and popular currency in the underground 
market. Plus in the official market RMB price is pegged to the dollar. Over a very long 
period the dollar is the key currency for international settlement. Also the U.S .  is the most 
important trading partner for China 1 •  
Figure 7. 1 shows that the official RMB/USD exchange rate did not change until January 
1 972. As mentioned before, during this period China experienced a nationwide political 
movement and nearly the whole social economy was paralysed. After 1 996, both the 
official exchange rate and black rate lines are quite steady, much smoother than the 
period before. The reason is that China had gradually reduced the foreign exchange 
restrictions through a series of regulations and rules after 1 996. The market has permitted 
conditional foreign exchange for international payments and transfers for current account 
transaction from 1 996. On 1 st January 1 996, the implementation of "Regulations of the 
People's Republic of China on the Management of Foreign Exchanges" eliminated the 
restriction on non-trade exchanges on the current account. Later on 1 3th May, the state 
administration of foreign exchange used the "Residents within the Borders Foreign 
Exchange for Private Purpose Use Methods" to release the restriction on personal foreign 
exchange acts. Then on 201h June, the Chinese central bank: the People's Bank of China, 
enacted the "Provisions for Management of Foreign Exchange Settlements, Sales, and 
Payments", announcing the lifting of restrictions on small quantities of foreign exchange 
on the current account. Therefore, from the end of the year 1 996, the RMB was fully 
convertible on the current account, and the demands on the black market were reduced. 
Consequently the black market shrank to a low level after 1 996, reaching a trough in 
2002. 
1 The United States is the third largest trading partner with China, plus the foreign trade via Hong Kong, which ranks 
the second, should have the highest proportion in Chinese foreign trade. 
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Figure 7. 1 The Official Market rate and the Black market rate USD/CNY ( 1 957M 1  � 
2002M1 2) 
The research in this study is an attempt to quantify the relationship between the official 
rate and the black rate. Therefore, it does not make sense to use the data before 1 972 
because no matter how the black exchange rate changed, the official rate was always 
fixed on 2 .461 8Yuan per Dollar by the authority, and this lasted for more than 25 years. 
In the analysis a lagged variable will be used in the model, so the data range must start 
one year earlier, in January 1 97 1 .  By 2002 most of the black market foreign exchange had 
disappeared. Therefore, the comparison covers the period from 1 972 to 2002, and 
analyses the difference between the black market price and the official market price. This 
is the so-called "black market premium". (Figure 7.2) 
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Figure 7.2 the Black Market Premium in Different Periods 
Based on the comments of Yin and Stoever ( 1994), further more specific explanations are 
given about each noticeable fluctuation in the black market premium over this period as 
Figure 7.2 shows, linked to specific events as listed below: 
A. From the fifth month of 1 975, the negative influences on the economy by the 
political movement the "Cultural Revolution" had been reversed by Mr. Deng 
Xiaoping, who was the de facto leader1 of the Communist Party at that time. The 
difference between the official price and black market price fell sharply from the 
peak. 
B. After the end of the "Cultural Revolution", in 1 979, the essential focus of the 
party was in developing the economy. After the stimulation provided by the 
related policies, the black market had a certain level of development. 
1 Deng was selected as one of the vice-presidents on gth Jan, 1 975 in the second session of the Tenth Central Committee 
of the Party. Because of the poor health of the president Mao Zedong and the Premier Zhou Enlai, Deng became the 
effective leader of the party. After Mao and Zhou both died in 1 976, Deng was selected as the president in 1 978. 
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C. In January 1 984, the Committee of Economic Trade for Foreign Countries I 
provisioned the restricted importation of 28 categories of merchandise and freed 
other categories. In March that year, the government decided to open up 1 1  
coastal cities, and a further 1 5  coastal cities were added in May. In addition the 
central government adopted a report about the reform of the foreign trade system 
in September 1 984, removing the state power centralisation and nationalised 
foreign trade company monopolisation, and allowed province-level organisations 
to undertake foreign trade transactions. The freeing of restrictions on the imports 
and the opening of the ports helped to increased demand for foreign currency to 
facilitate foreign trade and pushed up the black market premium value during this 
period. 
D. From 1 985 the unification of the swap exchange rate and the official exchange 
rate also reduced the black market premium. 
E. The foreign currency supplied by the government could not satisfY market 
demand. The increased requirements by the development of large scale foreign 
trade pushed the growth of the underground market and induced higher price 
differences against the official exchange prices. 
F. The first Foreign Exchange Adjustment Centre (FEAC) was established in 
November 1 985 at Shenzhen, a coastal city near Hong Kong. This kind of 
adjustment centre was used for enterprises to undertake foreign exchange 
transactions and the adjustment centre managed the exchange price through the 
supply and demand pressures. Because in 1 986 there was an expansion of such 
adjustment centres all over the country, which cut the demand source of the black 
market from the enterprises, hence at the end of 1 986 and the beginning of 1 987 
the black market premium fell. However, large demands from the foreign trade 
companies above the quota of the adjustment centre occurred because of the 
adoption of "the Enterprise Operation Responsibility System" from March 1987. 
This policy allowing enterprises to keep half of the profit but were responsible for 
losses, stimulated foreign trade. The premium increased sharply again. 
I The former Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation 
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G. The Tiananmen Square incident happened in 1 989, and the government cracked 
down on the movement of students. This had a marked adverse effect on the 
reputation of the government. There was a loss of  confidence in the RMB and as a 
result a big fall in the price of the currency in the black market. The premium 
reached an historical peak. 
H. The central government began the Strike-hard Campaign at the beginning of 1 992, 
focussing on rampant crime. As one form of criminal behaviour, black market 
activity was restrained during this period. 
I. The Chinese authorities reformed the exchange rate system on 1 st January 1 994. 
The RMB price was unofficially pegged against the US dollar. Then the official 
market was under a managed floating exchange rate system based on market 
demand and supply. This form of regulation, close to that of a free market, 
gradually reduced the difference between the official rate and the black market 
rate. 
J. In preparation for joining the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the Chinese 
government announced the acceptance of the gth item of IMF coordination on 1 st 
December 1 996. This marked the start of free convertibility for current account 
items. From then on the black market premium kept at a stable value for the 
dealers' profit in only small scale transactions. 
Because of its nature as an underground illegal market, the size of the black foreign 
exchange market has depended on the degree of control exerted by the authorities, such as 
in the "Great Cultural Revolution" period and the "Strike-hard" period, when the black 
market transactions were sharply reduced. On the other hand, when the central bank did 
not have sufficient supplies of foreign currency to meet the demand, the black market 
became more developed and highly organized. For example in the 1 990s when foreign 
trade was growing rapidly the shortage of foreign currency led to a boom on the black 
market. Similarly, when the degree of foreign demand was low on the official market, this 
only had a marginal effect on the black market. After 1 996 the opening of exchange 
movements on the current account cut the demands of the black market from both 
enterprises and private individuals. 
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As we can see from these reflections on the link between the black market premium and 
the major economic and political events of the period, it can be accepted that the black 
market did indeed have the features of a free market. To test the hypothesis more 
formally, that the black market rate can be used as a free market rate to replace the 
official market price in economic models, further econometric analysis is required. 
7.2.2 Empirical Econometric Models 
An early model of the black market model built by Boulding ( 1 94 7) and Michaely ( 1 954) 
looked at the foreign currency demand for purchasing imports or supplying them from 
illegal sources. In this way, long-run equilibrium occurs in the black market when both 
legal and illegal imports and exports are balanced. An imbalance of supply and demand 
may lead to illegal foreign import activities such as smuggling. Also, as is noted by 
Sheikh ( 1 976), and Pitt ( 1 984), the role of the black market is to balance the demand for 
smuggled imports and exports. Because the black market appears in some circumstances 
to be a way of hedging the expansion of illegal markets by the government, it can be 
ineffective in the face of excess demand or supply in the legal restriction or the official 
ceilings. Therefore, the black market plays an essential role in the foreign exchange 
market, and as Agenor ( 1 992) notes, it reacts to macroeconomic policies, or unstable 
political and social conditions. 
7.2.2.1 Causality tests 
In empirical research, the analysis of black market rates usually starts by testing for a 
causal link to the official exchange rate. The common methodologies adopted are the 
Granger-causality test and eo-integration tests. Akgiray et al. ( 1 989) conduct tests for the 
US dollar and the West German mark, and the results shows that a causal relationship 
does exist between the official rate and the black rate. Many studies of developing 
countries have also found that causality and a eo-integrating relationship exists between 
the official and black rates. Agenor and Taylor ( 1 993) test a group of 1 9  developing 
countries and find a causal relationship exists for 1 1  countries, finding that on one side, 
the official rate affects the black market rate and on the other side, the black market rate 
sometimes can react to changes of the official rate. 
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Studies of the Chinese market find similar evidence. Lu and Zhang (2000) use the model 
of Agenor and Taylor and test the relationship between the Chinese swap exchange 
market rate and the official exchange rate (from October 1 988 to December 1 992). Using 
the Granger causality test, augmented by an the Error Correction term, they find that the 
Chinese swap market rate "Granger Causes" the official rate, but not vice versa. 
Two directions of Granger causality are possible in a bivariate model. On the one hand 
the official exchange rate might Granger-cause the parallel exchange rate. This can 
happen for example when, observing key macroeconomic variables (especially in short­
run), private agents have imperfect information compared with the central authority. But 
it is also possible for the parallel rate to Granger-cause the official rate. Indeed this 
situation may be more common. When exchange rate policy is endogenous the official 
exchange rate is set to react to any inflationary trend. In this situation, the black market 
exchange rate can help to forecast the official exchange rate. The causality test used in 
this study will follow the Agenor and Taylor approach. In the bivariate model, the 
variables analysed are the Chinese official exchange rate and the underground black 
market rate. Using the Granger causality model incorporating an ECM term any causal 
relationship and its direction will be identified. 
7.2.2.2 ARIMA models and interventional analysis 
The black market premium is defined as the amount by which the parallel rate exceeds 
the official rate (Figure 7.2). It is one of the most important measures that have been 
discussed in previous research. Agenor ( 1 992) compares the parallel market premium of 
some typical developing countries in 1980s and indicates that a negative black market 
premium was rarely found. Examining the data from these developing countries, a 
negative premium appears only when there is a revaluation of the official rate, or it is the 
result of "laundering charging" (Dombusch et al., 1 983) by commercial banks which had 
been paid by selling foreign currency to parties with no right to buy. Other than these 
exceptions the black market premium was always positive. The reason is, as Boulding 
( 1 947) pointed out, that the black market yield can only exist when the official rate is 
below the theoretical free market price. A negative premium has never happened in the 
history of foreign exchange in China. 
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If the black market premium varied too much, the government would adjust the official 
rate to fit the market. A high black market level would to some extent weaken the balance 
of payments and also limit the effectiveness of capital controls (Agenor, 1 992). There is 
no any official statistical data about the size of black markets, also, it verified in different 
time period according to the national and international situation. However, data from IMF 
shows that during the 1 987 and 1 989, the black market premium rose dramatically, mean 
while, the current account balance dropped from $3 million in 1 987 to minus $43 million 
by the end of 1 989. 
Generally, the authorities use a one shot devaluation of the official rate to unify the 
official and black market rates. The black rate establishing balance of payments 
equilibrium in the long-run should be equal to the rate under a floating regime. In the 
short-run, the rate is largely associated with the expectations of private agents. For most 
developing countries research suggests that the unification between the parallel markets 
(e.g. official and black market, or official and swap market) is achieved by the authorities, 
what the analysis interestingly shows is that the post unification exchange rate is close to 
the pre-reform black rate . This is what happened in China in 1 985 ,  when the authorities 
used the real time black market rate to unify the official market, replacing the coexistence 
of a swap and official market. 
Yin and Stoever ( 1 994) conducted empirical research on the black market premium in 
China. They use monthly data on the black market premium from January 1 975 to June 
1 99 1  in an ARIMA model, adding two independent variables (the real exchange rate, 
adjusted interest rate differential) based on the approach of Dombusch et al. ( 1 983), thus 
combining interventional analysis with three impulse dummy variables. This model tests 
five hypotheses using an ARIMA(l ,  1 ,  1 )  model: the linear relationships of black market 
premium and the real exchange rate (negative), the interest rate differential (positive), the 
issuance of Foreign Exchange Certificates (FEC) (negative), the large-scale importation 
of consumer goods (negative), and the large-scale operation of the Foreign Exchange 
Adjustment Centres (FEACs) (negative). The results confirm the significant relationships 
with the real exchange rate, and the three dummies: the issuance of FEC, the large-scale 
importation, and the large-scale FEACs. 
In this study, a similar model will be applied for a longer range of data. After selecting a 
suitable ARIMA model, the real exchange rate and an intervention dummy relating to the 
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unification policy of the authorities will be taken account. The aim is to establish the 
nature of the relationship between the black market and the official market, to see 
whether the official price can be replaced by the black market price or not. 
7.2.3 Methodology and the test results 
7.2.3.1 Granger Causality tests with an ECM 
Data 
The data on the RMB/USD official exchange rate is taken from the International 
Financial Statistics, various volumes. The Black market rate data is from the China 
section in the World Currency Yearbook which referenced the investigations of Shanghai 
peddlers and vendors 1 .  Both the official rate data and the black market rate data are 
monthly as reported at the end day of each period. The data range is from January 1 971  to 
December 2002. 
Unit root test (Stationarity test) 
For testing a bivariate relationship using the Granger causality test (Granger, 1 969), a 
necessary, but not sufficient condition for this test is that the series involved should be 
stationary. Here the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test is used to examine both series: 
the official market exchange rate and the black market exchange rate. The ADF is a 
primary stationarity test for time series data through the hypothesis test. In this section, 
the ADF unit root test is applied as was introduced previously in Section 6. 1 .2.2 and the 
Eq. (6.5) is adopted to test the null hypothesis H0: fJ- 1 =0, that is whether the data series 
not stationary can be rejected or not. 
Table 7.2 ADF test for the official exchange rate and the black exchange rate 
1(0) !(!) 
Official Market Exchange Rate 0.055355 (0.961 9) - 1 9.5 1 638  (0.0000) 
Black Market Exchange Rate - 1 .67 1 1 68 (0.4452) -4.357058 (0.0004) 
1 Most of the empirical research on the Chinese underground market uses the same source, e.g. Ding ( 1998); Phylaktis 
& Girardin (200 l );Yin and Stoever ( 1 994), etc. Given the reputation of this organization, the data is considered reliable 
to use. 
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In Table 7.2, results are shown for tests conducted on both the original series and their 
first differences. For the official exchange rate, the result concludes that the null 
hypothesis - the series is not stationary- cannot be rejected; the same result is given from 
estimating the black market exchange rate (with probability values of 0.96 1 9  and 0.4452 
respectively). The results for the first differenced official exchange rate and the first 
differenced black rate show that they are both stationary (rejecting the null with p-values 
of 0.0000 and 0.0004). Therefore, through the test, both series are non-stationary and 
have one unit root; they are 1(1). This means the first differenced series are stationary and 
can be used in the Granger causality test. 
A Granger causality test for the official rate and the black rate (short-run) 
The Granger causality test is based on a vector autoregressive system - see equations 
(7. 1 ) . Lle and Llb denote the transformed (first differenced) values of the official and parallel 
exchange rates, e and b respectively. 
(4. 1 a) 
( 4. 1 b) 
When all the coefficients f31k and at least one coefficient a1k are significantly different 
from zero, the lagged values of .!Jb can help to forecast the values of .!Je; this is what it 
called Llb Granger causing .!Je. The test results are shown in Table 7.3 for a maximum lag 
of 1 ,  2, and 3 months. The lag length is chosen via AIC (Akaike Criteria) and SBC 
(Schwarz Criteria). It can be seen that the differenced black exchange rate can help to 
predict the value of the differenced official exchange rate, but not vice versa. 
Table 7.3 Granger causality test results 1 
Null Hypothesis: L1e does not Granger cause L1b L1b does not Granger cause L1e 
Lag1 1 .47643 (0.225 1 )  9.4402 (0.0023) 
Lag2 1 .07552 (0.3422) 6 .2 1 65 1  (0.0022) 
Lag3 1 . 1 4230 (0.33 1 8) 5 .68 1 45 (0.0008) 
I 
It is worth to mention that in the study by Xia (2007) a same data set was applied with a different outcome from this 
study. It may caused by two reasons. Firstly, the different data ranges are applied in this study from Xia (2007). 
Secondly, the original causality test functions maybe different. In the study by Lu and Zhang (2000), a same Granger 
Causality test result as this study has been found by applying the swap exchange rates and official exchange rates. 
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However, as Agenor and Taylor ( 1 993) noted, quoting Geweke ( 1 984), any 
transformation of the original series, such as taking the logarithm or differencing, may 
affect the causality structure, and so the test result cannot be guaranteed for the long run. 
Agenor and Taylor ( 1 993) introduced an error correction term in each equation of the 
vector autoregressive when testing Granger causality. This error correction term helps to 
distinguish long-run from short-run Granger causality and plays a speed adjustment role. 
By including these terms the model has been transformed to a cointegration V AR test 
function. 
The Vector Autoregressive (V AR) model with an Error Correction Mechanism 
(ECM) 
Engle and Granger first suggested the concept of cointegration in 1 987. Cointegration can 
be defined as follows: if two series are I( l ), integrated of order 1 ,  but a linear 
combination of the series is I(O), stationary, then the series can be said to be cointegrated. 
Engle and Granger also established a link between cointegration and error correction 
models (the so-called Representation Theorem). If two series are cointegrated then there 
exists an error correction representation connecting the series. 
In this part, the more satisfactory Johansen ( 1 988) approach1 was applied for testing the 
cointegrating vector among the variables. In this part, the cointegration V AR test is 
estimating the eigenvalues of the 2 *2 matrix and the result is shown on Table 7.4. 
Table 7.4 Cointegration VAR test for the black market rate and the official market rate 
Maximum Eigenvalue Trace 
None * 1 3 .60283(0.0 1 88) 1 3 .7853 1 (0.0282) 
At most 1 0. 1 824 73(0. 7233) 0. 1 82473(0.7233) 
As the results show in Table 7.4, the long-run cointegration between the official exchange 
rate and the black exchange rate can be confirmed. Both Maximum Eigenvalue and Trace 
statistics reject the null of zero cointegrating vectors. There is one cointegration rank 
existing in this bivariate system. 
1 The details of the approach applied in this section is mentioned in Chapter 3 . 1 .2.3 Conintegrating test for PPP. 
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Granger-causality Test with Error correction mechanism (ECM) for the Long-run 
Once the cointegration vector has been confirmed, the error correction mechanism (ECM) 
is used to model the long-run equilibrium relationship between the two cointegrating 
variables. The ECM is necessary to ensure a long-run equilibrium solution linking the 
variables. The official exchange rate used in this study has been controlled to take the 
same value for a number of years. So when this data series is differenced, there is a long 
sequence of zero values. The ECM, on the other hand, incorporates not only these first 
difference terms, but also an error correction term which is made up of lagged levels of 
the cointegrated variables. Thus, it is able to capture both short-run movements and the 
long-run relationship. The ECM for the official exchange rate e and the black exchange 
rate b can be written as shown in Eq. (7.2). 
/h describes the short-run relationship between e and b. fh describes the speed of 
adjustment back to equilibrium, or to be more precise, it measures the proportion of last 
period' s equilibrium error that has been corrected. This term, e1_1-yb,_1, is the error 
correction term. y is the cointegrating coefficient, which describes the long run 
relationship between e and b. The next step is to construct the ECM as a normalized 
equation which, in this case, produces the following estimates :  ECM= I *Official rate -
0. 939647*Black rate 
Single equation least squares are used to test for long-run Granger-causality. 
(7.3a) 
(7.3b) 
It can then be test separately to see if the coefficients of the ECM terms in these equations 
are significantly different from zero, as well as checking whether the lagged values of the 
first-differences of each variable contributes in any way to improving predictions of the 
other first-differenced variable. Table 7.5 results show that the black rate Granger-causes 
the official exchange rate in the long-run, while there is no statistical evidence of Granger 
causality in the other direction. The official rate and black rate in China are cointegrated 
and so the black rate Granger-causes the official rate in both the long-run and short run. 
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Table 7.5 Granger causality model with ECM test results 
Granger causality from the black to the 
official rate 
Wald test for linear restrictions 
F-statistic (P-probabilityl 
7.9644 (0.0050) 
9.7537  (0.0000) 
1 0.385 1 (0. 0000) 
Granger causality from the official to the black rate 
1 .3 65 5  (0.2434) 
1 .3 862 (0.2098) 
1 .5640 (0. 1 34 1 )  
7.2.3.2 ARIMA model and Intervention Analysis for the black rate 
In this section of the study an Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA) 
model is employed, based on the work of Yin and Stoever ( 1 994) incorporating the 
interventional analysis by Box and Tiao ( 1 975), to model the Chinese black market 
premium. In an ARIMA(p, d, q) model, p indicates the autoregressive (AR) order, d is the 
differencing order, and q is the order of moving average disturbances (MA). The order of 
differencing d is established by the number of times the series must be differenced to 
obtain a stationary series. 
The data used in this part is the same as 7.2.3 . 1 .  The data range is the same from January 
1 97 1  to December 2002 and the frequency is monthly. The USDIRMB black market 
premium data, as explained before, is the difference between the black market rate and 
the official market rate. 
The ADP test results for stationarity of the black market premium shown in Table 7.6 
indicate that the series has to be differenced once to become stationary. Thus the order 
number d takes the value of 1 .  
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Table 7.6 ADP test for the black market premium 
p(O) p(l) 
Black market premium - 1 . 3 1 7 1 64 (0.6227) - 1 7.9093 8 (0.0000) * *  
Then, for deciding the AR order p and MA order q, the Akaike Criteria (AIC) and 
Schwarz Criteria (SBC) will be compared between each ARMA model. Comparing the 
results in Table 7.7 it can be seen that the lowest values for both AIC and SBC occurs for 
the ARMA( 1 , 1 )  model. Based on the principle of parsimony, the ARIMA(1 , 1 , 1 )  model is 
adopted. 
Table 7.7 AIC & SBC comparison for ARMA mode1 
Akaike info Schwarz criterion 
ARMA(l , 1 ) 0.48 1 330*  0.50 1 946* 
ARMA(l ,2) 0.484785 0.5 1 57 1 0  
ARMA(l ,3) 0.487966 0.5291 98 
ARMA(2, 1 )  0.487367 0.5 1 8352 
ARMA(2,2) 0.487367 0 .51 8352 
ARMA(2,3) 0.495454 0.547095 
ARMA(3, 1 )  0.492407 0.533801  
ARMA(3 ,2) 0.497506 0.549248 
Following the approach of Dombush, et al. ( 1 983), the real exchange rate will be added 
into the ARIMA model to assess its effect on the black market premium. The justification 
for the inclusion of this variable comes from the theory of Purchasing Power Parity (PPP), 
which is related to the law of one price (LOOP) for a standard basket of goods. Through 
the PPP theory, the exchange rate between two currencies should be equal to the ratio of 
the two relevant national price levels. 
The exchange rate between two currencies and their prices level can be written as Eq. 
(7.4). There, Pt is the domestic price level at time t, p 
*t denotes the price level of some 
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foreign countries at time t. s1 is the nominal exchange rate of these two countries' 
currencies at the same time. 
Pt = StP; t = 1,2, . . . I N (7.4) 
The real exchange rate is the ratio of the real purchasing power between these two 
countries through the official exchange rate. The real exchange rate q1 function is shown 
in Eq. (7.5). 
The price levels in the two countries can be measured by their respective national 
consumer price index (CPI) series. Hence, the real exchange rate between China and 
United States is identically equal to the official exchange rate of RMB/USD s1 (counted 
by the amount of RMB required to buy one unit of USD) multiplied by the ratio of the 
Chinese CPI 1 p1 to the U.S.  CPI2 p *1• The real exchange rate series is also monthly, 
running from January 1 97 1  to December 2002. 
This model also includes two intervention dummies to represent policy differences over 
the period. This relates to phases where the authorities effectively unified the official 
market and swap market rates3 . This occurred twice, phase one running from 1 970: 1 to 
1 985 :8 ,  and phase two from 1 985 :9 to 2002 : 1 2 . The reason for picking this date as the 
divided point of two phases is not only because of the currency unification, but also for 
the other reason. The black market premium reached to approximately zero in this month 
then rose again afterwards. This is a significant boundary quantitatively in the whole data 
range. Therefore, the dummy variable D 1  is set equal to one from January 1 970 to August 
1 985 ,  and zero otherwise. The dummy variable D2 is zero from 1 970: 1  to 1 985 :8 and one 
in the second phase. 
Incorporating these dummies and the real exchange rate into the ARIMA( 1 , 1 , 1 )  model for 
the black market premium yields the following estimated equation: 
L1bt = 0 .08796ARt_1 - 0.08146MAt-l - 0.08556qt + 0.308D1 + 0.6552D2 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0 .0001) (0.0000) 
1
Chinese CPI source: National Bureau of Statistics, China. Price index set 2000=1 00. 
2 US CPI source: US Department ofLabor, Bureau ofLabor Statistics. Price index set 2000=100. 3 See before the timeline 2 & 3 in 2.2. 1 the review of the Chinese exchange market and the D point of Figure 7.2. 
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The figures in brackets show the probability value of the t-test. The result confirms our a 
priori assumptions about the effects of changes in the real exchange rate. When the RMB 
nominal price increases, the black market premium will scale down. We see that 
government action, as represented by the dummy variables, can also influence the black 
market premium significantly. 
7.2.4 Summary 
The main aim of this part has been to test whether or not the black market exchange rate 
can replace the official market rate in a particular period when the official rate was fixed 
by the authorities. Analysing the data we see that these two market rates show similar 
trends. However the black market rate showed itself to be more sensitive than the official 
rate in responding to changes in market conditions. In confirming the requirements of this 
hypothesis, two different methodological approaches have been used; (i) to examine the 
relationship of the official rate and the black rate, and (ii) to examine movements in the 
black market premium. The data used in this study cover 32 years of monthly values of 
the USD/RMB rate from 1 97 1 M l  to 2002Ml 2 .  
First, the Granger causality test confirmed the short-run causal relationship between these 
two variables, and the Johansen test showed that the official exchange rate and the black 
market rate are cointegrated. As Ageno and Taylor (1 993) found when cointegration 
exists in the official-parallel market bivariate model, at least one market rate can help to 
forecast the other. However, there are two limitation to the standard Granger causality test: 
the data structure problem and the absence of a test for a long-run relationship. An ECM 
from the cointegration equation is used to patch into the original Granger model. The 
evidence for the Chinese market showed that the black market rate is able to be used for 
forecasting the official rate but not vice versa. 
Second, the reaction of the black market rate to major events in China confirmed its free 
market credentials. An ARIMA model that also included a real exchange rate term and 
intervention dummies indicated a significant linear relationship between the black market 
premium and the real exchange rate and the authorities' unification policy. The negative 
relationship with the real exchange rate confirms the view that a tight economic policy or 
a higher inflation rate will stimulate the development of the black market and increase the 
black market premium. The significant positive reaction to the government unification 
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policy enables the acceptation to the view that the black market was sensitive to market 
information and policies. 
Application of these two approaches to the black market rate confirmed the linkage 
between the controlled official market and the free market rate. It can therefore be 
concluded that, in the historic period when the official exchange market in China was 
under tight control, the black market had the essential free-market characteristics and also 
was causally connected with the official rate. Therefore it can be used in any analysis 
which requires free market data. 
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7.3 RMB real exchange rates 
According to the Eq. (7.5), the RMB real exchange rates against the United States Dollar 
are determined by the nominal exchange rates of the two currencies and the price level of 
both countries. The Pt series stands for the domestic price level of China whilst the p *1 
series stands for the foreign price level of the US. From Eq. (7.5), there are two main 
variables which determine the real exchange rate: the price level and the nominal 
exchange rate. 
The real exchange price levels in this chapter are measured by three different price 
indices criteria. They are the national consumer price index (CPI), the retail price index 
(RPI) and the product price index (PPI). In this equation, s1 is the nominal exchange price 
of RMB against the USD (counted by the amount of RMB required to buy one unit of 
USD). In this section, the nominal exchange rates are applied by the official exchange 
market rates and the underground black market rates. 
The reason for measuring the RPI and PPI indices is because of the Balassa-Samuelson 
effect mentioned previously in Section 7. 1 .  The Balassa-Samuelson effect is much more 
noticeable when real exchange rates are measured by CPis rather than PPis because PPis 
contain a much higher proportion of traded goods than CPis. (Ronald I Mcknnon, 1 97 1 )  
Therefore in this section, apart from the CPI, the PPI and RPI based real exchange rates 
are considered and taken in to simulations. 
The tradeable goods and non-tradeable goods problem concerning retail prices (RPI) and 
the wholesale prices (PPI) are considered when deriving the real exchange rates, but also 
the other determinant of the real exchange rate is the nominal exchange rates. As was 
discussed before in Section 7.2, the official currency exchange rate in China has been 
highly controlled which could not reflect immediately the market demand and supply. 
There was a period when a parallel rate system operated and swap exchange rates were 
used for trading by specific organisations. Meanwhile the underground black market had 
been in existence for a long time. A non-unified nominal exchange rate consists of a fixed 
official rate for current account and an official freely fluctuating rate for capital accounts 
transactions. The reason is to delink the real side of economy from the highly unstable 
capital movement affect. This non-unified system is highly influenced by the premium 
between the free and fixed rates. 
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The fluctuation of the nominal rate will influence the real exchange rate under these 
circumstances. When the domestic credit increases exceeds the domestic money increases 
this will provoke an excess demand for goods and financial assets. Related policies will 
result in a decline in the stock of international reserves in turn resulting in increased 
prices of non tradable goods and a real appreciation, plus an increasing demand for 
foreign assets. As a consequence there will be a nominal devaluation of the free rate in 
order to change the domestic interest rate. The free rate devaluation will then have a 
secondary effect over the official rate exchange rate via a wealth effect. 
The dual rate system can delay an eventual crisis by partially delinking the current 
account from capital account. The coexistence of a fixed rate and free rate system governs 
the financial transactions. Edward ( 1 989) indicates a misalignment will be generated by 
the use of official market data when a parallel market exists in the country. This happens 
typically in some developing countries such as China. 
In China, apart from the official exchange market pnces, there co-exists another 
underground black market. According to the summary from previous section, black 
market prices are able to reflect market movements more than the official prices which 
are under authority manipulation. Used as the nominate prices of foreign exchange rates, 
the black market rates are as important as the official exchange rates, or sometimes they 
are even more important. 
Apart from the real exchange rates, the real effective exchange rates are also adopted in 
this section for STAR model simulations. The real effective exchange rates are 
determined by a basket of weighted average major currencies according to the relevant 
trade balances, in terms of the currency of the index country. This index measure the 
value of one country' s  currency by its trading situation and the currency price of its 
trading partners. The Chinese real effective exchange rate data used in this study comes 
from the International Monetary Fund database. It is a CPI based index measured by a 
basket of main currencies including the U.S.  Dollar, Euro, Japanese Yen, etc. 
Eight different real exchange rates series are measured by the STAR model in this section. 
They are: CPI based real exchange rates from official market prices of RMB/ USD 
( 1 980m l -20 1 0m06), CPI based real exchange rates from black market prices of RMB/ 
USD ( 1 980ml -2002m12), CPI based real exchange rates from combined RMB/ USD 
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black market prices ( 1 980m 1 - 1 994m1 2) and official market prices ( 1 995m1 -20 1 0m6), 
PPI based real exchange rates from official market prices of RMB/ USD ( 1 995m1 -
20 1 Om6), RPI based real exchange rates from official market prices o f  RMB/ USD 
(1987m1 -20 1 0m6), RPI based real exchange rates from black market prices of RMB/ 
USD ( 1 987m1 -2002m1 2), RPI based real exchange rates from combined RMB/ USD 
black market prices ( 1 987m 1 - 1 994m1 2) and official market prices ( 1 995m l -20 1 0m6) 
and the CPI based REER of China ( 1 980m1 -2002m1 2) .  The basic line graphic of these 
series are shown in Figure 7.3 . The basic Quantiles distribution analysis graphics are as 
Figure 7.4 shows. 
The reason to test the CPI based real exchange rates the sample between 1 980 and 201 0 
taken is because China started its economic reform in 1 979 and before it, as discussed 
previously I Chapter 2, there were many chaos in the statistics data. The black exchange 
prices, as discussed in section 7.2, the data has restriction of ending in 2002. In 1 994, it is 
a milestone year in Chinese foreign exchange market history. The unification of parallel 
exchange system and make RMB managed-floating regime. Therefore, the gap after 1 994 
before 20 1 0  is taken by the official market prices. 
The PPI based real exchange rates data is not published by any source, hence this range of 
data can only be tested from 1 995 to 201 0. Similar situation as the RPI data, the data is 
only start publishing since 1 987. Therefore, RPI related real exchange rates are tested 
from 1 987 to 201 0. 
The data details are demonstrated in the data section. Both Figure 7.3 and 7.4 reveal that 
these data series are non-linear. For a further statistic proof, the later part is the linearity 
tests section. 
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Figure 7.3 Line graphics of real exchange rates 
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Figure 7.4 Quantiles distribution of real exchange rates 
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7.4 STAR Model 
7.4.1 Linearity Test and lag length selection 
For estimating nonlinear real exchange rates, a modified ADF regression with STAR 
model is implied in this part. This approach used by Peel et al. (200 1 )  was also suggested 
recently by Cerrato et al. (201 0) as shown on Eq. (7.6): 
Where S(qt) represents the TAR or STAR model, can be ESTAR, LSTAR, BLSTAR or 
BTAR. The rear part of this function is ADF regression. When S(qt-d) = 1, the model 
follows a linear stationarity test process. Before the STAR regression, the first step is the 
linearity test against STAR nonlinearity. For the STAR nonlinearity test, the null 
hypothesis is H0: f3=0 for this equation. Because under the null, the parameter set y and c 
is not identified, the solution to this problem suggested by Luukk:onen et al. ( 1 988) and 
adopted recently by Cerrato et al. (20 1 0) is to replace the STAR function s( qt) by the 
third order Taylor series with the approximation around y=O. Harvey and Leyboume 
(2007) proposed a standard Wald test for this linearized model, which is implied in the 
processes of the usual x2(2) distribution asymptotically. Therefore, an auxiliary regression 
for linearity test can be written as Eq. (7.7) :  
Where the null hypothesis for linearity is Ho: f32,f33=0 whilst the alternative is H t :  fJ2,fJ#O. 
The statistic processes for estimating the null are using the residual sum of square from 
the ordinary least squares, RSS0 under the null hypothesis and RSS t  from the regression 
of original function. The Wald test calculating function is: 
RSS1 - RSS0 
Wr = RSS0/T 
The test result will use x2(2) distribution with the degree of freedom restricted by the 
number of parameter under the null hypothesis. 
Eq. (7.7) can be derived into a third-order Taylor approximation with p lags, written as 
Eq. (7 .8) :  
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When the null is standard ADF model and the alternative is STAR, the linearity 
hypothesis is H0 : /3i = 0 for all i. The delay parameter k can be chosen on the basis of the 
statistical results of tests of Ho, according to the minimum probability value of the 
individual tests in the sequence. 
The linearity test output of the series for Eq. (7.7) is listed in Table 7.8 1 with both the test 
statistics results and the significant levels of rejecting the null (in brackets). 
The result shows for CPI based real exchange rates from official market prices series, 
according to both F-statistics and x2, the null of linear series cannot be rejected at high 
significant level: at about 14% when the sample is from 1 980m1 to 201 0m6, about 83 .7% 
when the data range is shorter from 1995m1 to 201 0m6. A similar situation happens on 
the test for RPI based real exchange rates from the official market prices. The hypothesis 
of non-linear cannot be rejected because of the low significant level (P-values for F-stat 
and Chi-square are about 92%). 
It is significant that in all series the content of the real exchange rates from black market 
prices show a significant non-linear feature, no matter the real exchange rate series is 
derived from the black market prices or including over a certain period the black market 
prices content. The null hypothesis can be rejected at a high significant level of at least 90 
percent. 
Therefore, it is possible to use a STAR to model the real exchange rates, especially for 
those which involve black market prices. Before the simulation, an appropriate lag length 
has to be chosen for the STAR model. Eq. (7.8) is used to select lag length p through 
comparing the Wald test results. Under the null of fh= fh=fh=O for Eq. (7.8), the test 
values of lag length p from 1 to 4 are compared. The one with smallest statistic value is 
taken on the STAR model. The probability values are in the brackets. 
1 The testing details are listed in Appendix C. 
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Table 7.8 Linearity test result for Eq. (7.8) 
Series F-Statistic Chi-square 
CPI based real exchange rates ( 1 980m1 -20 1 0m6) 1 .95632 3 . 9 1265 
(0. 1 429) (0. 1 4 1 4) 
CPI based real exchange rates ( 1 995m1 -20 10m6) 0.283801  0 .85 1403 
(0.837 1 )  (0.837 1 )  
CPI based real exchange rates from black market prices 2.343525 4.687050 
(1 980ml -2002m1 2) (0.0979) (0.0960) 
CPI based real exchange rates from combined black 3 .32 1 254 6 .642507 
market prices ( 1 980m l - 1 994m 1 2) and official prices (0.0372) (0.036 1 )  
(1 995m l -201 0m6) 
PPI based real exchange rates ( 1 995m1 -201 0m6) 3 .235885 6 .47 1 769 
(0.041 6) (0.0393) 
RPI based real exchange rates ( 1 987m1 -201 0m6) 0.082489 0. 1 64978 
(0.9208) (0.9208) 
RPI based real exchange rates from black market prices 3 .241 667 6.483335 
( 1 987m l -2002ml 2) (0.04 1 3) (0.039 1 )  
RPI based real exchange rates from combined black 4.634629 9 .269257 
market prices ( 1 987m l - 1 994m1 2) and official prices (0.0 1 05) (0.0097) 
( 1 995ml -20 10m6) 
Real effective exchange rates (REER) ( 1 980m l -20 1 0m6) 4. 1 0 1 652 8 .203305 
(0.0 1 73) (0.0 1 65) 
Table 7.9 lists the lag length selected for different series according to the Wald test for Eq. 
(7.8). The full test results are shown in Appendix C. From the Wald test, the result shows 
that CPI based real exchange rates data is non-linear under 1 %  significant level. PPI 
series is also non-linear under 1% significant level. RPI based official real exchange rates 
is non-linear under 1 %  significant level, though the combined black and official market 
prices are linear under 1 %  significant level. REER series is non-linear under 5% 
significant level but linear under 1% significant level. According to the selected lag 
length, ESTAR and LSTAR models are used to simulate these non-linear real exchange 
rates series and the real effective exchange rates series. 
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Table 7.9 Lag length chosen for RER series 
Series lag length/ F- Chi-
Model selected Statistic square 
CPI based real exchange rates ( 1 980m1 -20 1 0m6) p=1 1 .34 1 93 4.02578 
NIA (0.2605) (0.2587) 
CPI based real exchange rates ( 1 995m1 -201 Om6) p=2 1 0.78909 32.36728 
AR ( 1 ,2) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
CPI based real exchange rates from black market p=3 4.2444 1 7  12 .73325 
prices ( 1 980m1 -2002m1 2) AR(1 ,3) (0.0059) (0.0053) 
CPI based real exchange rates from combined p=3 5 .586574 1 6.75972 
black market pnces ( 1 980m 1 - 1 994m1 2) and AR( 1 ,3) (0.0009) (0.0008) 
official prices ( 1995m1 -20 1 0m6) 
PPI based real exchange rates ( 1 995m1 -201 0m6) p=2 3 .645576 1 0.93673 
AR(1 ,2) (0.0 1 3 8) (0.0 1 2 1 )  
RPI based real exchange rates ( 1 987m1 -201 0m6) p=3 0.427557 1 .282671 
NIA (0.7334) (0.7333) 
RPI based real exchange rates from black market p=3 4.2444 1 7  1 2.73325 
prices ( 1 987m1 -2002m1 2) AR(1 ,3) (0.0059) (0.0053) 
RPI based real exchange rates from combined p=2 5 .9 1 052 1 1 7.73 1 56 
black market pnces ( 1 987m 1 - 1 994m1 2) and AR(1 ,2) (0 .0006) (0.0005) 
official prices (1 995ml -201 0m6) 
Real effective exchange rates (REER) ( 1 980m1 - p=2 3 .90507 1 1 .7 1 52 1  
201 0m6) AR(1 ,2) (0.0091 )  (0.0084) 
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7.4.2 ESTAR and LSTAR simulation 
In this section, the ESTAR and LSTAR models used to simulate exchange rates series are 
as Eq. (7.9) and Eq. (7. 1 0) show: 
ESTAR 
qt = f3o + f31 qt-p [1 - ex p [r(qt-p - c)2]} + (f3z + {33 [1 - ex p  [r(qt-p - c)2]) qt-1 
(4.9) 
LSTAR 
(7. 1 0) 
Where p is the lag length selected from the last section. The simulation results are shown 
in Table 7. 1 0  with the regression goodness of fit R square. From the linearity test, the 
REER series are not taken STAR test. The STAR methodology has been illustrated 
previously in section 6.4. Where c is the middle point shows and y shows the transition 
speed between two regimes (as shown in Figure 6. 1 and 6.2 in previous chapter) . The 
more y value is closer to 0, the series is more tend to be linear. The R2 goodness of fit 
shows how the model fits the actually data value. The actual, fitted lines and residual of 
ESTAR and LSTAR are shown in Figure 7.5 and 7.6. 
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Table 7. 1 0  ESTAR & LSTAR simulation output 
' Series ESTAR LSTAR 
y c RL y c RL 
CPI based real exchange rates -0. 1 6  5.97 0.98 1 -0. 1 76 6.53 0.993 
(1 995m1 -20 1 0m6) 
CPI based real exchange rates from -0.53 7 . 1 76 0.988 -0.546 7. 1 1  0.979 
black market pnces ( 1 980m 1 -
2002m1 2) 
CPI based real exchange rates from -0.47 6.65 0.988 -0.447 6 .93 0.989 
combined black market pnces 
( 1 980m 1 - 1 994m12) and official 
prices ( 1 995m1 -201 0m6) 
PPI based real exchange rates -0. 1 8  6.68 0.98 1 -0. 1 98 6.78 0.957 
( 1 995m1 -201 0m6) 
RPI based real exchange rates from -0.37 7.27 0.979 -0.46 7.3 0.979 
black market pnces ( 1 987m l -
2002m1 2) 
RPI based real exchange rates from -0.32 7.80 0.982 -0.42 8 . 1 1  0.982 
combined black market pnces 
( 1 987m 1 - 1 994m1 2) and official 
prices ( 1 995ml -201 0m6) 
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The parameter c can be interpreted as the midpoint of the transition whilst the y controls 
the speed of regime switching. From Table 7. 1 0, the midpoint of CPI based real exchange 
rates are approximately 6-7. The series derived from the official market prices is smaller c 
(5.97 for ESTAR and 6.53 for LSTAR) than the series data from the black market 
midpoint (7. 1 7  for ESTAR and 7. 1 l for LSTAR) because the black market prices are 
always higher than the official market. The c values for the models using combined data 
are in between (6.65 for ESTAR and 6.93 for LSTAR) and are higher than the series from 
the official rates and lower than the series from the black rates. 
Therefore, for the series derived from combined official and black markets prices, the 
subsequently fitted ESTAR model is: 
qt = 0.09 - 0.13qt_3{1 - ex p[ -0.47(qt_3 - 6.65)2]} + 
( -5.9 + 7.01{1 - ex p [-0.47(qt_3 - 6.65)2]}) qt-1 
Where the y value shows the speed of transition between regimes. The threshold is 6.65 
which is larger than 0.5. Therefore it is an inflation regime with an increase speed of 47 
percent (0.47) monthly and has a random walk with a drift of 13 percent (0. 1 3) per month, 
which is close to the average growth rate of Chinese economy. 
The LSTAR model is estimated as 
0.148qt-3 
q = 0 .96 - + t 1 + exp[-0.447(qt_3 - 6.93)] 
0.08 
{0.899 + }qt-1 1 + exp [-0.447 (qt_3 - 6.93)] 
The fits of the two models are very similar. The y value of LST AR model shows a rapid 
transition between two regimes with a 44.7 percent per month speed while the midpoint is 
6 .93 .  The normal regime is that of random walk with a drift of 1 4.8 percent monthly. The 
residual standard errors is 0.399 for the LSTAR while it is 0.422 for the ESTAR model, 
respectively, these two models are similar. 
For the PPI based real exchange rates series, the ESTAR model is: 
qt = 0.14 - 0.13qt_2 {1 - ex p [-0.18(qt-2 - 6.68) 2]} + 
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(1 .15 + 7.0 1{1 - ex p [-0.03 (qt_2 - 6.68)2 ]}) qt-1 
The LST AR model is: 
0.192qt-2 qt = 1 .2 3 - + 1 + exp[ -0.198(qt_2 - 6.78)] 
0.609 
{0.54 + 1 + exp[-0.198(qt-2 - 6.78)]}
qt-1 
Different from the CPI, the PPI contains more wholesale products which can be defined 
as tradeable goods. From the outputs, the speed of transition between regimes is faster 
than the CPI based data. The ESTAR model shows the transition speed is 1 8  percent and 
the LSTAR model is 1 9 .8  percent per month. The regime switching speed is slower than 
the CPI based RER. It takes about five month to switch from the one regime to the other. 
The middle points of both models are similar but slightly smaller than the CPI based data: 
6.68 for the ESTAR model and 6.78 for the LSTAR model. The standard errors of 
residuals are similar too, 0.088 for the ESTAR model and 0.087 for the LSTAR model. 
The RPI based real exchange rates series concerns the retail goods price level impact 
which related to non-tradeable goods comparing with the PPI concerning tradeable goods. 
The ESTAR model for the RPI based RER from official and black markets data 
combined is: 
qt = 0 .352 - 0.134qt_2 {1 - ex p [  -0.37(qt-2 - 7.27)2] }  + 
(-3.4 + 4.5 2{1 - ex p [-0.37(qt_2 - 7.27)2 ]}) qt-1 
The LST AR model regression output is: 
0.12qt-2 qt = 0 .101 - + 1 + exp [-0.46(qt_2 - 7.3)] 
3.98 
{-3·07 + 1 + exp [-0.46(qt-2 - 7.3)] }qt-1 
Obviously, the non-tradeable goods prices push the real exchange rates transitions 
between regimes at a faster speed in comparison with the tradeable goods from RPI. In 
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the ESTAR model, the transition speed is 37 percent monthly and in the LSTAR model, 
the speed is 46 percent monthly. Therefore, it takes only about three months on average in 
the RPI based real exchange rates series to switch from one regime to another, which is 
about twice as fast as the PPI based data. The middle points of both models are similar, 
located at around 7.3 . The ESTAR model output shows the inflation regime is a driftless 
random walk whilst the normal regime is that of a random walk with a drift of 1 3 .4 
percent. With a similar threshold value of ESTAR (c=7.3), the LSTAR model has a 
random walk with a drift of 1 2  percent. 
The real effective exchange rate series simulated by STAR model has been taken by 
logarithm from the original data. Because its data considered from a basket of main 
currencies and the domestic price level of relative countries, the series is subjected to less 
fluctuation than the other series taken from single US data. According to the ESTAR 
model: 
qt = 0.05 - 0.125qt_2 {1 - ex p [0 .12 (qt-z - 5.065) 2] }  + 
( -5.898 + 7.01{1 - ex p [0.12 (qt-z - 5.065)2]}) qt-1 
And the LSTAR model: 
0 .125qt-2 11 .7 qt = 0 .05 - + {10.8 + }qt-1 1 + exp [0.13 (qt-z - 5.02)] 1 + exp [0 .13 (qt-z - 5.02)] 
The threshold in output is about 5 (5.65 for ESTAR model and 5 .02 for LSTAR model) 
two months previously with a monthly speed of regime transition at 1 2  percent ( 1 2  
percent for ESTAR and 1 3  percent for LSTAR), which on average takes approximately 
eight months to switch from one regime to another. The real effective exchange rates 
series has the slowest speed in regime transition among all tested series. The two models 
have identical random walk with drift of 1 2 .5 percent. 
Figure7.5 shows that all the non-linear STAR regression gives a high rate of goodness of 
fit against the actual value. The R square values are above 95%. The high goodness of fit 
level can also be proved by the graphic of Figure 7.5 and 7.6. For all the real exchange 
rates derived from official market prices, the residuals are in boundaries of between -0. 1 
and 0 . 1  levels, including a) the CPI based real exchange rates from official market prices, 
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d) the PPI based real exchange rates from official market prices and g) the CPI based real 
effective exchange rates. 
For the data series content of the black market prices, it is obvious that the residual 
fluctuations are much more volatile than the data period from official market prices, 
about 1 0  to 1 00 times of the volume. The residual before the end of 1 980s can stay 
approximately among - 1  to 1 bound. However, during the five-year period between 1 989 
and 1 994, the large market fluctuations reach more than double higher level. The absolute 
values of residuals were more than 2 .  
The unstable and volatile market from 1 989 to 1 994 was caused by the political and 
economic changes during this five-year period, as was discussed previously in Section 2. 1 .  
The negative effects from the external international background is that the collapse of the 
socialist system at the end of the 1 980s, starting from the former Soviet Union and which 
was followed by a chain reaction affecting other East Europe socialist countries. People 
wavered from their faith in the socialistic system. Under these circumstances, China as 
one of the main remaining socialist countries, the stability of its political and economic 
system was questioned by its overseas trading partners. Meanwhile, internal social unrest 
happened in China: the Tian-an-men Square incident being a prime example, then 
followed a series of frequent political and economic reforms introducing new and 
progressive policies. Therefore, it can easily be seen that both internal and external 
pressure resulted in major and rapid market fluctuations during this period. 
Comparing the data derived from official market prices and data containing black market 
prices which are less manipulated by authorities it can be seen that there are larger 
volatiles during this five years period. In figure c) and f) of 7.5 and 7.6, this contrast is 
especially significant: before 1 995 when the residual volatility is much more intense than 
data after 1 995. 
The STAR model is able to give the middle point and the transition speed of two regimes. 
To divide a time series into different regimes, in this study a further Makov-Switching 
model is applied in the next section. 
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Figure 7.5 ESTAR actual, fitted and residual graphics 
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7.4.3 BESTAR & BLSTAR 
The band logistic smooth transition autoregression (BLSTAR) and band TAR (BTAR) 
models as suggested by Kim and Moh (20 1  0) are applied. The equations are shown on the 
Eq. (7. 1 1 ) and Eq. (7 . 1 2) :  
BLSTAR 
BTAR 
d d 
S(qd y C C ) = qt -c1 + qt -Cz C < C (7 1 1 ) t '  ' 11 2 1+exp[y(q1-c1)] 1+exp[-y(q1-cz)] 1 - 2 · 
The BLSTAR and BTAR models allow an inaction band [c l ,  c2] where real exchange 
rates follow unit root process inside the band. Therefore, a BTAR model as Eq. (7. 1 1 ) can 
be derived into BESTAR and BLST AR for a further test for the band of threshold value 
of real exchange rates series in this section. 
BTAR 
BESTAR 
(qt-v - c2 (1 - ex p [r(qt-v - c2)2])} + ({32 + {33{(qt-p - c1) (1 - ex p [r(qt-v ­
c12)+(qt-p-c2){1-expyqt-p-c22}qt- 1 (7. 14) 
BLSTAR 
flqt = {3 
t - 1 
+ 
t - 2 + 
{ qd c qd c } 1 + exp [y(qf - c1)] 1 + exp [-y(qf - c2)] 
(7. 1 5) 
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The BESTAR model as Eq. (7. 1 4) and BLSTAR model as Eq. (7. 1 5) are regressed by 
NLS module. In these models, p denotes the lag length selected from the last section. The 
simulation results of the band c1 and c2 shown on Table 7. 1 1 .  
It can be seen that all the BESTAR and BLSTAR output for c1 and c2 is surrounding the 
values of ESTAR and LSTAR middle point value c (Table 7. 1 0) and the band width is 
around 1 .67 (crc1) . Therefore, the BESTAR and BLSTAR estimation prove the testing 
value accuracy of previously ESTAR and LSTAR testing value furthermore. 
Table 7. 1 1  BESTAR & BLSTAR simulation results 
Series BESTAR BLSTAR 
CJ C2 CJ C2 
CPI based real exchange rates ( 1 995ml -20 1 0m6) 4.63 6.30 4.59 6.26 
CPI based real exchange rates from black market prices 5 .59 7.27 5 .33  7. 1 03 
( 1 980ml -2002m1 2) 
CPI based real exchange rates from combined black market 5 .82 7.47 5 .28 7.04 
prices ( 1 980m l - 1 994ml 2) and official prices ( 1 995m1-
201 0m6) 
PPI based real exchange rates ( 1 995ml -20 1 0m6) 5.85 7 .5 1 5  5 .84 7.50 
RPI based real exchange rates from black market prices 7.44 9 . 1 1 5 6.47 8 . 1 1  
( 1 987m1 -2002m1 2) 
RPI based real exchange rates from combined black market 7.45 9. 1 2  7.27 8 .935 
prices ( 1 987ml - 1 994m1 2) and official prices ( 1 995m 1 -
201 0m6) 
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7.5 Markov-Switching Model 
The Markov switching model applies unobservable regime variables to generate the 
dependent variable by using the probability of an exogenous unobservable Markov chain. 
Dueker and Neely (2006) points there are two benefits of using of Markov trading rules. 
Firstly, the combination of Markov and conventional technical rules has better risk­
adjusted performance than either individually. Secondly, Markov rules perform better on 
recent data than conventional trading rules when estimating exchange rate returns. 
In this section the three state Markov process is applied to estimate the real exchange rate 
series derived from variety price indices and also the real effective exchange rate series. 
The three state Markov process involves three orders S1, S2 and S3. The first order S1 is the 
realisation of a binary variable, the second binary variable S2 determines the kurtosis 
parameter whilst the third binary variable S3 governs the expect return of residual. These 
three Markov S1, S2 and S3 states switch independently. 
The Markov-Switching Dynamic Regression (MS-DR) model follows the dynamic 
regression model in the specification of the dynamics as Eq. (7. 1 6) shows: 
The Markov-Switching Autoregression (MS-AR) model, also named as Hamilton model 
(Hamilton, 1 994) is written as Eq. (7. 1 7): 
Where St is the random variable of regime, for a three-regime model, there is: 
Regime 0 :  qt = v(O) + aqt-p + X�{J + Et 
Regime 1 :  qt = v(l) + aqt-p + X�{J + Et 
Regime 2 :  qt = v(2) + aqt-p + X�{J + Et 
Where St can be written as: 
f.Uo if St = 0 (recession regime) 
,u(St) = {,u1 if St = 1 (expansion regime) 
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In MS model, the unobserved random variable S1 follows a Markov chain. The 
probabilities between the Nth states is defined as : 
Pilj = P [St+l = i iSt = j] i, j = 0, . . . N - 1 
Therefore the duration of regime j is determined by exogenous variables probabilities. 
Defining D as the duration of different regimes, there are: 
D=I if St=O and mt+1= 1 ,  P(D=I )= l -p 
D=2 if St= St+I =0 and mt+2= 1 ,  P(D=2)=p( l -p) 
The expected duration of regime 0 is 
E (D) = �� iP(D = i) = (1 - p) �� i pi-l = (1 - p)-1 z=l z=l 
Since Lb:1 ipi-l = (1 - p) -z.  
Figure 7. 7 to 7. 1 5  shows the three state Markov-Switching tests with the regime change 
the smoothed probabilities of three regimes. The first graphic Figure 7.7 is  the regime 
division for CPI based RER series from official market prices during the January 1 995 to 
June 201 0. From the test result (details in Appendix C), the transition matrix is estimated 
as: 
P =  
Regime 0, t 
Regime 0, t + 1 Polo = 0.00  
Regime 1 ,  t + 1 P11 o  = 0.18 
Regime 2, t + 1 p2 10 = 0.82 
I: 1 
Regime 1, t 
PO l l  = 0.0000 
P1 1 1  = 0.9945 
Pz 1 1  = o.oo5 5 
1 
Regime 2, t 
Po 12  = 0 
P1 1 2  = 1 
Pz 1 z  = 0 
1 
Regime 0 represents as the contractionary/stationary regime whist Regime I and Regime 
2 can be combined together as expansionary regimes. From the probability matrix above, 
it shows that there is very little probability to move from stationary into expansion (with 
only 4.77* 1 0-4 percent in original output approximately equal to 0), contrarily, it is much 
easier to leave the expansionary regimes.  
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Filter the massive market volatile period between 1 989 and 1 995, the regime 0 stays for 
more than five years until the first changes occur at the end of 2000. Then the temporary 
regime changes occur at the end of 2001 ,  during 2003 to the early 2004, in the mid-2005, 
from the last quarter of 2006 until the beginning of 2008 and on the first half year of 2009. 
If a contrast between these regime switching periods is made with the timetable of 
Chinese monetary policy changes (listed in Appendix A) most of them can find a 
corresponding explanation based on the political and economic perspectives. The regime 
change which occurred at the end of 2001 may well have been caused by China joining 
the WTO as a full member. The transition in 2003 can be explained as the State 
Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) allowing a free transaction of foreign 
exchange under the current account. The switch in the mid-2005 could be the result of the 
approved policy which allowed foreign exchange currencies trading free in the inter-bank 
exchange market and the adoption of a new managed floating foreign exchange regime. 
The frequent regime changes between the end of 2006 and the beginning of 2008 were 
caused by a series of more open policies by SAFE which allows not only enterprises but 
also local residents to use their foreign exchange accounts to conduct investment in 
overseas stock markets. The transition on the 2009 first half year may be because 
financial derivative trading is now permitted in China. 
Figure 7 .8 presents the regime division for CPI based RER series from black market 
prices during the January 1 980 to December 2002 period. The regime transition 
probability matrix is shown as: 
P =  
Regime O, t 
Regime 0, t + 1 Polo  = 0.98 
Regime 1, t + 1 P11o = 000 
Regime 2, t + 1 Pz lo  = 0.02 
I: 1 
Regime 1, t 
Pol l  = 0.418 
Pil l = 0.218 
Pz l l  = 0.364 
1 
Regime 2, t 
Po1z = 0.00 
P1 1z  = 0.29 
PZ IZ = 0.71 
1 
From the test result, it is an 4 1 . 8 percent probability for Regime 1 to move to Regime 0 
and 36.4 percent probability to move to Regime 2 monthly, with 29 percent of probability 
to move back from Regime 2. It is obviously that the black market based RER series has 
more frequent switches among regimes. 
The same as was found on the previous STAR model, most of regime switching occurs 
during the time period from 1 988 to 1 99 1 .  This transition can be explained by the 
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instability caused by both the international collapse of socialist countries and the 
consequent internal social unrest, i.e. the Tian-an-men Square incident. These all brought 
out the same result: panic on the Chinese domestic currency RMB. The exchange sky 
rocketing price of the RMB against the US Dollar in underground black markets pushed 
even SAFE to make a decision to adjust the official exchange rate up by nearly 1 0 percent 
from 4.27 RMBIUSD to 5 .22 RMBIUSD. The next main regime switching happened in 
1993-1 994. During this time, there was real meaningful exchange market reform in China. 
The establishment of an inter-bank foreign exchange market meant that for the first time 
foreign exchange dealing became legal. 
Figure 7.9 shows the graphics of the regime division for CPI based RER series from 
combined black ( 1 980m l - 1 994m 1 2) and black market ( 1995ml -201 0m6) prices during 
the January 1 980 to June 20 1 0  and shows the identical regime transition as Figure 7.8. All 
switchings are gathered in the "instable five-year" period. For the regime division after 
1 995, it is better to reference Figure 7.7. The regime transition probability matrix is very 
similar to the black market based data: 
P =  
Regime 0, t 
Regime 0, t + 1 Polo = 0.98 
Regime 1, t + 1 P11o = 000 
Regime 2, t + 1 p2 1 0  = 0.02 
I; 1 
Regime 1, t 
Poll = 0.496 
p111 = 0.183 
Pzi l  = 0.321  
1 
Regime 2, t 
PoJz = 0.00 
Pliz  = 0.31 
p212 = o.69 
1 
There is a 2 percent probability to move from stationary/contractionary Regime 0 to 
expansionary Regime 2 in monthly average. It is an 49.6 percent probability for Regime 1 
to move to Regime 0 and 32. 1 percent probability to move to Regime 2, with a 3 1  percent 
of probability to move back from Regime 2 .  Therefore, the expected duration of Regime 
0 is ( 1 -0.98 1 56r1=54 months, and for Regime 1 is ( 1 -0. 1 8307r1= 1 .2 months whist ( 1 -
0.69058r1=3.2 months for Regime 2 .  It shows that even with more fluctuations, the real 
exchange rates of RMB stays in the stationary/contractionary regime. 
Figure 7. 1 1  shows the regime division for RPI based RER series derived from official 
market rates from January 1 995 to June 201 0. From the graphic, main regime switching 
occurs during the period from 2006 to 2009. With a similar explanation as the situation of 
CPI based RER series during the same time period, the transition is mainly caused by a 
series of market opening policies. The regime transition probability matrix shown as: 
1 98 
P = 
Regime 0, t 
Regime 0, t + 1 Pol o = 0.9865 
Regime 1, t + 1 P110 = 0.0135 
Regime 2, t + 1 Pz 1 o = 0.0000 
£ 1 
Regime 1, t 
Pol l  = 0.48 
Pl l l  = o.oo 
PZ i l  = 0 .52 
1 
Reg ime 2, t 
Po1z = 1 
PliZ = 0 
Pz 1 z  = 0 
1 
There is a 1 .35  percent probability to move from stationary/contractionary Regime 0 to 
expansionary Regime 1 in monthly average but much easier to move back with a 48 
percent probability and even faster to move from Regime 2 with a 52 percent probability. 
The data shows it is hardly stop and stay in Regime 1 or Regime 2 longer than a month 
(with almost 0 probability) . Similar as the CPI based data, it stays long in Regime 0 with 
the expected duration of ( 1 -0.98654r1=72.3 months, representing that the RPI based real 
exchange rates of RMB stays in the stationary/contractionary regime. 
In Figure 7 . 1 2  the regime division for RPI based RER series from black market data 
( 1 980m1 -2002m1 2) and Figure 4. 1 3  which combined black ( 1 980m l - 1 994m1 2) and 
black market ( 1 995ml -201 0m6), a similar scenario is repeated for CPI based RER series 
on Figure 7.8 and 7.9.  Most of the regime switching has taken place in 1 988- 1 99 1 . 
Another significant switch occurs in mid 1 994 and represents the impact from the 
exchange market reforms. The regime transition probability matrix of the black market 
based data shown as: 
P = 
Regime 0, t 
Reg ime 0, t + 1 Polo = 0.984 
Regime 1, t + 1 P11o = 0.000 
Regime 2,  t + 1 p21 0  = 0 .016 
£ 1 
Reg ime 1, t 
Po11 = 0.19 
Pl l l  = 0.2 7 
Pz l l  = 0.54 
1 
Regime 2, t 
Po1z = 0.000 
PliZ = 0.315  
Pz 1 z  = 0.685 
1 
The expected duration of staying in Regime 0 is ( 1 -0.984 1 1 )-1=63 months, in Regime 1 is 
( 1 -0.27 1 7r1=1 .4 months and in Regime 2 is ( 1 -0.685o7r1=3 .2 months. Whilst the 
combined official and black market probability matrix is: 
P = 
Regime 0, t 
Regime 0, t + 1 Polo = 0.96 
Regime 1, t + 1 P1 1o = 0.04 
Regime 2, t + 1 p2 1 0  = 0.00 
}; 1 
199 
Regime 1, t 
Poll  = 0.36 
Plll  = 0.64 
Pz ll  = 0.00 
1 
Regime 2, t 
Po1z = 0.3 13 
Pli Z  = 0.000 
Pz1z = 0.687 
1 
The expected durations of three regimes are: Regime 0 is ( 1 -0.95978r1=25 months, in 
Regime 1 is ( 1 -0.64095r1=2. 8  months and in Regime 2 is ( l -0.68685r1=3 .2 months. This 
reveals that the RPI based real exchange rate series can stay in a regime for over 2 years. 
Figure 7 . 14  and 7. 1 5  represent the same series of CPI based real effective exchange rates 
with different length data samples. Figure 7. 1 4  shows the series from January 1 980 to 
June 201 0  while Figure 7. 1 5  contents the data range only after January 1 995  to June 201 0. 
The comparison of these two graphics reveals that for the same data but with a different 
sample range, the regimes can be divided into quite differently. For the longer data range 
of REER series, only three significant regime transitions occur, in 1 986, 1 989-90 and 
1 994. They represent three of the most remarkable market shocks in history: two main 
exchange market reforms and significant social unrest. 
Apart from these three most significant maj or transitions, other minor regime switching 
can only be shown when a particular period is considered independently, such as in 
Figure 7 . 1 5 . There are frequent minor regime transitions during this one and half decade. 
However, none of them can compare with the three m�or ones shown in Figure 7 . 1 4. 
The regime transition probability matrix of the longer is  shown as: 
P = 
Regime O, t 
Regime 0, t + 1 Polo = 0.989 
Regime 1, t + 1 P1 1o  = 0.000 
Regime 2, t + 1 p210 = 0.011  
I 1 
Regime 1, t 
Po/1 = 0.63 
P1/1 = o.oo 
P2/1  = 0.37 
1 
Regime 2, t 
Po/2 = 0.57 
P1/ 2  = 0.24 
P2/ 2  = 0. 19 
1 
There is  very little chance for the REER move from the Regime 0 to other regimes, if it 
occurred there is high probability for them to switch back to Regime 0. The expected 
duration of staying in Regime 0 is ( 1 -0.98887r1=90 months and for the expansionary 
regimes it is ( 1 -0. 1 9278r1= 1 .2 months. Therefore it shows that in the long-run the REER 
data can stay in the same regime without transition for about 8 years. 
The transition probability matrix for a shorter time ranger with the same series is: 
P =  
Regime 0, t 
Regime O, t +  1 Po1o = 0.797 
Regime 1, t + 1 P11o = 0.083 
Regime 2, t + 1 p210 = 0.320  
I 1 
200 
Regime 1, t 
Po/1 = 0.33  
P1/1  = 0.35 
P2/1  = 0.32 
1 
Regime 2, t 
Po12 = 0.575 
tJ112 = 0. 1 17 
P21 2  = 0.308 
1 
It shows that in a shorter data ranger, the REER moves more frequently between regimes. 
The expected duration of staying in each regime is: Regime 0 is ( 1 -0.79662Y1=5 months, 
in Regime 1 is ( 1 -0.34829r1= 1 . 5  months and in Regime 2 is ( l -0.30792Y1=1 . 5  months. 
This reveals that the CPI based real exchange rate series switches in between regimes 
every one and a half month and will not stay in a certain regime for more than 5 months. 
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7.6 Forecasting and discussion 
Compare with the model mentioned previously, STAR and Markov-Switching, MS 
model is the better model to characterise time series data, especially for generating 
exchange rates. It uses stochastic process to estimate exchange appreciations and 
depreciations as switching regimes. The actually data sample is from 1 995ml to 2010m6, 
the forecasting range is from 20 1 0m7 to 201 1 m6.  
Figure 7 . 1 6,  7. 1 7, 7. 1 8  and 7. 1 9  show the one year ahead forecasts of CPI, RPI and PPI 
based real exchange rates and CPI based real effective exchange rates. The forecasts of 
12-month ahead CPI based series, as shown in Figure 7. 1 6  are dominated by gradually 
declining real exchange rates. Figure 7. 1 7  and 7. 1 8  for the RPI and PPI based real 
exchange rates for the 1 2-month ahead forecast show that they would roughly stay at the 
same level as previous period. Figure 7. 1 9  predict that the CPI based real effective 
exchange rates may have slightly dropped in a 1 2  months ahead period. 
Neither of the forecasts of these four data predicts that RMB real exchange rates will rise 
in the future. The forecasts from MS models show the real exchange rates may either stay 
at the same level of the mid 201 0  or have further drop down. 
The data analysis in this chapter illustrates that even theoretically the real exchange rates 
should stay constant, however, the misalignment of real exchange rates exist in all long­
term medium-term and short-term. This can be interpreted by impeded instantaneous 
adj ustments from monetary and financial sectors and rigidities. 
When there are multiple nominal exchange rates (swap rate and official rate in China), the 
system should work almost in the same way as under unified predetermined nominal rates. 
This is because the tax on certain external transactions has been fixed, the multiple fixed 
nominal exchange rates are perfectly equals to an unified rate system. Therefore ' 
inconsistent macroeconomic policies will cause the lost of international reserves, certain 
l evel of domestic inflation which exceed the world average level and the real exchange 
rate overvaluation, then influence the sustention in the long-run. 
From the STAR model, the midpoint of CPI based real exchange rates are approximately 
6-7. The middle point for official market prices is smaller c than the series data from the 
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black market midpoint because the black market prices are always higher than the official 
market. The BSTAR and BLSTAR test gives the band of CPI based real exchange rates is 
between 4.6 and 6.3 .  Combined CPI based exchange rates data band is between 5.5 and 7. 
Middle point of PPI series is 6 .7, whilst the band of this series is from 6 to 7 .5 .  Middle 
point of RPI based real exchange rates series is 7.3 and the combined RPI series is higher. 
RPI based data series is located in the band of 7.5 to 9. This shows the foreign exchange 
in retail price is higher than the basic price index and PPI. 
About the speed of regime switching from one to the other, the speed of regime switching 
for CPI based real exchange is 1 6% (per month), which means it takes about 6 months to 
move from regime A to regime B.  This is the slowest speed among all data series in this 
test. The combined CPI based data regime switching speed is 4 7%, therefore from one 
regime changes to another it will take about 2 months. The regime changing speed for 
PPI based real exchange rates is 1 8%, it also take about 6 month to change like CPI based 
data. For the RPI based data, the switching speed is 32% and 37% according to the 
different data sample. It means it takes 3 months to switch from one regime to another. 
The PPI based real exchange rates which concerns the non-tradeable goods vary less than 
the CPI based data or RPI concerns the tradeable goods. This because the contains of 
highly homogeneous tradable goods' prices tend to be equated when counted in certain 
currency, which will reduce the real exchange rate vary, without measuring the actual 
value of real exchange rate competitiveness degree. Also, in different countries, the PP Is 
use different weight. The increase in government consumption will generate a non­
tradeable goods real exchange rates appreciation and tradeable goods real exchange rates 
depreciation. 
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Chapter 8 Conclusion, policy implication and further 
research 
8.1 Answers to research questions 
This study focuses on the Chinese foreign exchange markets and domestic currency RMB. 
Both qualitative and quantitative tools have been applied to solve targeted research 
questions. The most advanced achievement of this study is to forecast the future exchange 
rates of Chinese currency RMB through both quantitative econometric models and the 
use of qualitative theory analysis. Both methodologies give the similar analyses 
conclusions: The RMB prices will still be controlled by authorities and stay at a certain 
stage with a gradually decrease. 
There gives the answers and conclusions for each question: 
1. What is the situation of the Chinese monetary system and the foreign exchange 
market in the past and at present? 
The foreign exchange market and financial reforms in 1 994 marked the establishment of a 
formal foreign exchange market. Before the reform, foreign currency transactions and 
foreign exchange markets were still under restricted control by the authorities in China. 
After that, a series of policies including the abandonment of using swap rate and the 
adoption of interbank market has gradually shaped a formal exchange market for China 
which has had a rapid development after the 1 994 reforms. In order to become a full 
WTO member, China accepted the WTO obligations articles including the current 
account convertibility. China has swapped the single pegging system with the US dollar 
to a multilateral pegging system under which RMB prices are referenced by a currency 
basket. This system was also known as the "managed floating exchange regime". Later 
the inter-bank exchange transactions including RMB and other main currencies were 
permitted. To date, RMB can be used as the settle currency in international trades. 
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2. To what extent do the RMB exchange rates influence Chinese foreign trade? 
The foreign trade can be influenced directly by the currency price changes. The Chinese 
situation in recent years is that the rise of raw material costs, labour costs, falling overseas 
demand and the biggest pressure from the appreciation of domestic currency RMB 
together brought the Chinese export into a tough time. Therefore, boosting domestic 
demand become the main policy thrust of China which was scheduled in the 5-year plan 
of the Chinese central government. 
3. What are the relationships between Chinese foreign trade, real effective exchange 
rates, foreign direct investments and GDP? What is the future trend of these 
variables? 
Significant relationships have been found iamong Chinese foreign trade, real effective 
exchange rates, foreign direct investment and GDP. The forecast of GDP shows that it 
will reach 85 trillion Yuan in 201 6. The real effective exchange rate at CPI level will rise 
more than 25 percent n the 5-year period of 201 1 -201 6. The domestic demand will double 
up to 83 .6 trillion Yuan. The forecast data of net export and foreign direct investments 
shows they all drop. Foreign direct investment will drop about one third in 5 years. The 
net export will also decrease dramatically. 
4. Similarities between the situation of the Chinese financial market today and the 
German market around 1970s. 
There are both external and internal background similarities which created similar 
development progress in both China and Germany. The five common financial market 
development steps confirm on one hand that the two countries have had similar 
circumstances although in different periods. On the other hand they prove the hypothesis 
that the German policy application experiences can be referenced for the future 
development of China, particularly the experience of controlling inflation. 
5. How can China reference the historic experiences in developing and 
administrating the foreign exchange market and its currency prices? 
The German economic development progress and its varied experiences can also be 
applied to other hypotheses that have been proposed about the future market. For example, 
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vvill other currencies such as the Euro, or the Chinese RMB, which showed their strength 
in the economic recession, replace the Dollar in the same way that the Dollar replaced 
Sterling to become the main currency? Secondly, in a further step, how do those new 
emerging market countries like China reform their domestic financial markets through 
capital control? Thirdly, to what extent can they benefit the central country as a result of 
geo-political power? To find more answers to these questions in depth it is necessary to 
make yet more searching reference to the economic histories of these countries. 
6. Analysis on the key reasons which resulting in the 2008 global financial crisis. 
A global credit and financial crisis occurred in 2008 which was followed by a global 
range recession. The essential reason was global imbalances between the economies of 
eastern and western countries. On one hand, sophisticated markets in western countries 
had asset shortages, whilst on the other hand, eastern countries such as China, had the 
capability to supply large amounts of money. In addition, due to the fact that global 
returns on capital today are much higher than ever before assets tend to flow more readily 
towards higher profit markets. These reasons combined to create the global asset levels 
and over liquidity which led to the 2008 crisis. 
7. Discussion about the main reasons which have caused global imbalances. 
The global imbalances were mainly caused by the "saving glut" of some country with 
large assets and "saving shortage" of the others .  According to the current account 
balances it can be found that it was caused by foreign trade imbalances and national 
custom habits. The linkage of China and America can be a typical symbiosis to illustrate 
the imbalances scenario. 
8. Based on the "Chimetirca" phenomena, to what extent does the Chinese economy 
and its position influence the US? 
China has the fastest growing and America has the most advanced economy. The 
Chimerica linkage is not only displayed through the current account balances, but there 
are also deeper reasons to link these two big economies. 
RMB prices have become the largest factor believed to have caused the US trade deficit. 
Therefore, pressure has been put on China that it should revaluate the RMB exchange 
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rates. Many critics have argued that with the Chinese RMB pegged to the US dollar it is 
at an undervalued level. This has been believed to be the main reason which has caused 
the US significant trade deficit with China. 
9. Is there any causal link existing between the official and the black exchange rate 
of China? 
From the traditional Granger Causality test results, there is a causal link between the 
official and the black exchange rates. The black exchange rate can help to predict the 
official exchange rate exchange, but not vice versa. To avoid the influence of testing 
results by taking logarithm of original data a Granger causality model with ECM is 
applied. This error correction term helps to distinguish long-run from short-run Granger 
causality and plays a speed adjustment role. It shows that the black rate Granger-causes 
the official exchange rate in the long-run, while there is no statistical evidence of Granger 
causality in the other direction. The official rate and black rate in China are cointegrated 
and so the black rate Granger-causes the official rate in both the long-run and short run. 
10. To what extents have the government policies had effect upon both the official 
exchange and the black exchange market? 
According to the model formulating black market premium, the RMB official prices have 
a negative impact to the black market premium. The government action, as represented by 
the dummy variables in the black market premium model, has a significant link with the 
dependent variable. 
An ARIMA model involving a real exchange rate term and intervention dummies 
indicated a significant linear relationship between the black market premium and the real 
exchange rate and the unification policy of the authorities. The negative relationship with 
the real exchange rate confirms the view that a tight economic policy or a higher inflation 
rate will stimulate the development of the black market and increase the black market 
premium. The significant positive reaction to the government unification policy supports 
enables an acceptatance to the view that the black market was sensitive to market 
information and policies. 
11. What are the differences between CPI, RPI and PPI based RMB real exchange 
rates? 
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The Balassa-Samuelson effect is much more noticeable when real exchange rates are 
measured by CPis rather than PPis because PPis contain a much higher proportion of 
traded goods than CPis. The PPI based real exchange rates which concerns the non­
tradeable goods vary less than the CPI based data or RPI concerns the tradeable goods. 
This because the contains of highly homogeneous tradable goods' prices tend to be vary 
without measuring the actual value of real exchange rate competitiveness degree. Also, in 
different countries, the PPis use different weight. The increase in government 
consumption will generate a non-tradeable goods real exchange rates appreciation and 
tradeable goods real exchange rates depreciation. 
12. Using the Smooth Threshold Auto-Regression (STAR) model to simulate the 
RMB real exchange rates and estimate the regime transition situation, what are the 
middle points and the speed of regime transition? 
The midpoint of CPI based real exchange rates are approximately 6-7. The midpoint of 
PPI based RER series located at around 6.7. For RPI based data, the midpoint is around 
7.2 higher than CPI based series. The REER series has the midpoint of 5 .  
Compared with data derived from official market rates, the black market prices derived 
data has faster speed in the regime transitions. In average, the transition speed of series 
from black market is about 30-50 percent monthly, whist the speed of official market 
prices based data is slower at about 1 2- 1 5  percent monthly. 
13. Using the Markov-Switching (MS) model to simulate the RMB real exchange 
rates and estimate the regime transition situation, what is the regime distribution 
situation? How long is the duration for the real exchange rates staying in a specific 
regime? How fast the rate switching from one regime to another? 
For CPI based RER series from official market prices during the January 1 995 to June 
20 1 0. There is very little probability of a move from stationary regime into expansionary 
regime, contrarily, it is much easier to leave the expansionary regimes. All the regime 
transitions occurred when there were some relevant policies issued or incidents, e.g.China 
joining the WTO in 200 1 ,  SAFE allowing a free transaction of foreign exchange under 
the current account in 2003, policy approved to allowed foreign exchange currencies 
trading free in the inter-bank exchange market and a new managed floating foreign 
exchange regime adopted in 2005 and, financial derivative trading is permitted in 2009. 
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For CPI based RER series from black market prices during the January 1 980 to December 
2002 period. There is a 4 1 .8 percent probability for Regime 1 to move to Regime 0 and 
36.4 percent probability to move to Regime 2 monthly, with 2 9  percent of probability to 
move back from Regime 2 .  It is obvious that the black market based RER series has more 
frequent switches among regimes. 
For CPI based RER series from combined black ( 1 980m 1 - 1 994m1 2) and black market 
(1 995m1 -20 1 0m6) prices, there is a 2 percent probability to move from stationary/ 
contractionary Regime 0 to expansionary Regime 2 in monthly average. It is an 49.6 
percent probability for Regime 1 to move to Regime 0 and 32. 1 percent probability to 
move to Regime 2,  with a 3 1  percent of probability to move back from Regime 2. 
Therefore, the expected duration of Regime 0 is about months, 1 .2 month for Regime 1 
and 3 .2 month for Regime 2 .  It shows that even with more fluctuations, the real exchange 
rates of RMB stays in the stationary/contractionary regime. 
For RPI based RER series derived from official market rates from January 1 995 to June 
201 0, there is only a 1 .3 5  percent probability to move from stationary/contractionary 
Regime 0 to expansionary Regime 1 in monthly average, but much easier to move back 
with a 48  percent probability and even faster to move from Regime 2 with a 52 percent 
probability. The duration of staying the stationary Regime is as long as 72.3 months. 
For the RPI based RER series from black market data ( 1 980m1 -2002m1 2) and Figure 7.3 
combined black ( 1 980m 1 - 1 994m1 2) and black market ( 1 995m1 -20 1 0m6), a similar 
scenario is repeated for CPI based RER series. Most of the regime switching has taken 
place in 1 988- 1 99 1 .  Another significant switch occurs in mid 1 994 and represents the 
impact from the exchange market reforms. 
For the series derived from black market prices, the expected duration of staying in 
Regime 0 is 63 months, in Regime 1 is 1 .4 months and in Regime 2 is 3 .2 months. For the 
combined series, the expected durations of three regimes are: Regime 0 is 25 months, 
Regime 1 is about 2 .8  months and Regime 2 duration is about 3 .2 months. 
For a long-term REER series from January 1 980 to June 201 0, there is very little chance 
for the REER move from the Regime 0 to other regimes, if it occurred there is high 
probability for them to switch back to Regime 0. The expected duration of staying in 
220 
Regime 0 is about 90 months and for the expansionary regimes the duration is 1 .2 months. 
The REER data can stay in the same regime without transition for about 8 years. 
However, in a shorter data range, the REER moves more frequently between regimes. 
The expected duration of staying in each regime is less than 5 months. This reveals that 
the CPI based real exchange rate series switches in between regimes every one and a half 
month and will not stay in a certain regime for more than 5 months. 
14. Forecast the future trend of RMB real exchange rates by MS model. 
Estimating four series: CPI based RER, RPI based RER, PPI based RER and CPI based 
REER, results show that neither of the forecasts of these four data predicts that RMB real 
exchange rates will rise in the future. The forecasts from MS models show the real 
exchange rates may either stay at the same level of the mid 201 0  or have further drop 
down. 
8.2 Policy implication and further research 
In the past half decade from 2005 e RMB price has been raised against the US dollar by 
more than 25%. However, the financial markets of China are not mature enough. If by 
unpegging the RMB with the US Dollar too fast or freeing the foreign exchange market at 
an unsuitable time, before the total market was prepared, on one side China might have to 
pay heavily to keep its economy stable, on the other side, the US may also meet a 
negative impact from market shocks. 
At the same moment when China is criticised by taking advantage from undervalued 
RMB price to win massive trade surplus, Beijing complains that the US also use the 
dollar 's  position to borrow cheaply, exchange valuable goods by selling assets, in a 
totally opposite way of china. Compare with the US, China would rather lend its currency 
to the rest of the world rather than seeking to borrow. Holding large shares on the US 
treasury, Australian mines, African farms and Swedish car companies, China has none of 
these assets in RMB. When its currency rises, it has to pay for the capital loss. 
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Therefore, on certain perspective, China can learn from or share some risk with the 
country which has many similarities, Germany. Not only as discussed in Chapter 4, the 
similarities in the history, but also today. Germany holds 70 percent of its foreign assets 
in Euros. 
The German economic development progress and its varied experiences can also be 
applied to other hypotheses that have been proposed about the future market. For example, 
will other currencies such as the Euro, or the Chinese RMB, which showed their strength 
in the economic recession, replace the Dollar in the same way that the Dollar replaced 
Sterling to become the main currencies? Secondly, in a further step, how do those new 
emerging market countries like China reform their domestic financial markets through 
capital control? Thirdly, to what extent can they benefit the central country as a result of 
geo-political power? To find more answers to these questions in depth it is necessary to 
make yet more searching reference to the economic histories of these countries. 
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Appendix A China Foreign Exchange Reform Chronology 
1 979 
1 3th March. The Bank of China (BOC) was independent from the People' s  Bank of China 
(PBC, China central bank) as the foreign exchange bank and assisted the PBC to manage 
the foreign exchange reserves, together with the new established State Administration of 
Foreign Exchange (SAFE), which was assumed the function of foreign exchange control. 
1 8th August. China State Council promulgated "Decisions on Several Questions 
Concerning Promotion of Foreign Trade and Increasing Foreign Exchange Income" and 
"Foreign Exchange Retention Scheme for Exportations" to allow exporters retain a 
certain portion of their foreign exchange earnings based on the amount of exportable 
goods procured in the previous year. 
1 980 
1 9th March. The State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) promulgated 
"Announcements of lssuing the Foreign Exchange Certificate by the Bank of China". The 
"Foreign Exchange Certificates" were issued as a special currency at the official rate 
exclusive for foreigners. 
1 ih April. The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) passed the 
resolution to assume China a seat on IMF. 
1 5th May. The World Bank passed the resolution to assume China a seat. 
30th August. The State Council passed the agreement of "Reports about the Solutions to 
Request of the Short Foreign exchange Load". 
9th October. The State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) and the Bank of 
China (BOC) established the "Announcements about Foreign Exchange Transferring" to 
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allow domestic enterprises to transfer their retained foreign exchange earnings. The BOC 
acted as the broker to regulate the retained foreign exchange among enterprises. 
1 8th December. The State Council promulgated the "Provisional Regulations for Foreign 
Exchange Administration", which was the first foreign exchange regulations of China 
Since 1 949. 
1 9 8 1  
1 st January. The State Council approved the SAFE to introduce different exchange rates 
for foreign trade and non-trade settlements. The Internal Rate for Trade Settlement (IRTS) 
was applied for trade-related transactions. The RMB IRTS rates were depreciated than the 
official exchange rates. 
1 982 
1 ih July. Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, together with the State Council 
promulgated the "Decisions about Inhibition Actions on Violating Foreign Exchange 
Disciplines". 
26th October. People's Bank of China (PBC), the State Planning Commission, the 
Ministry of Finance, and the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation 
together promulgated the "Provisional Regulations about Enhance Administrations on the 
Foreign Exchange Retentions". 
1 983 
2nd January. The State Administration of Foreign Exchange was officially named and was 
under the leadership of the People' s Bank of China. 
1 985 
1 st January. The use of the Internal Settlement Rate was terminated and the Renminbi 
(RMB) official exchange rate was set at 2 .8 Yuan per U.S.  dollar by authorities. 
1 3th March. The State Council imposed the "Decisions about Strict Controls on the 
Foreign Currencies Exchange". 
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29th March. The State Council promulgated the "Methods of the Export Foreign 
Exchange Retentions". This new Formula was adopted to regulate the foreign exchange 
retention ratios according to the actual foreign exchange earnings on current year instead 
of the amount of export procurement in the previous year. 
22nd July. The People's Bank of China (PBC) announced all external borrowing should be 
subjected to the PBC approval and under its supervision. 
1 st December. The Bank of China terminated the foreign exchange swap business. The 
Foreign Exchange Swap Centre was established in Shenzhen Special Economic Zone. 
1 986 
20th February. The State Council assigned the State Administration of Foreign Exchange 
(SAFE) replace the Bank of China to monitor the foreign exchange market. 
July. Chinese foreign exchange regime was transferred from single pegging to U.S.  
Dollar to a basket of currencies multi-pegging and managed floating system. 
1 6th August. The State Council passe the "Agreements about using external borrowing" 
through the Ministry of Planning, and authorized the SAFE to supervise all the external 
borrowings. 
October. Foreign funded enterprises located in special economic zones and major costal 
cities were allowed to trade foreign exchange with each other in the exchange swap 
markets with the rates agreed between buyers and sellers. 
October. The state owned China Industrial and Commercial Bank and 1 0  other newly 
established commercial banks were allowed to engage in the foreign currency business 
after the termination of the Bank of China monopoly. 
1 988  
1 oth March. The State Administration of  Foreign Exchange (SAFE) promulgated the 
"Regulations about Foreign Exchange Adjustments". The adjusted foreign exchange 
prices were floated according to the spot supply and demand. 
24 1 
March. Foreign exchange swap centers were established in all provinces around national 
wide. The price control on the swap markets was removed. 
March. Foreign funded enterprises were allowed to trade with domestic enterprices in the 
foreign exchange swap market. 
lOth September. Shanghai foreign exchange swap centre adopted the first electronic open 
bidding system in china. 
1 990 
1 ih November. The State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) announced an 
adjustment on RMB official price against U.S.  dollar by 9.57 percent from 4.27 Yuan per 
dollar to 5 .22 Yuan per dollar. 
1 991 
141h January. Export subsidies were abolished. 
March. The State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) adopted a uniform foreign 
exchange retention scheme, which was based on major categories of export commodities. 
gth April. Authorities adopted a gradualist approach to adjust the official exchange rate by 
small amount and frequent intervals, in order to reduce the differential between the swap 
rate and official rate. 
1 st December. All restrictions on the sales of foreign exchange swap market were 
removed. Individuals were permitted to sell foreign exchange they hold on the swap 
market. 
1 992 
gth August. The "Foreign Exchange Adjustment Centre" was established in Beij ing. 
1 993 
201h January. The State Council promulgated the "People' s  Republic of China, Solutions 
on Administration Currencies Exiting and Entering", The State Administration of Foreign 
242 
Exchange (SAFE) imposed a cap of 8 .2 Yuan per U.S.  dollar as the swap market rate to 
adjust the continuous increase. 
May. China started negotiating with the World Trade Organisation about the GATT 
commitment. China committed to unify the dual rate system and establish a market based 
floating exchange rate system within five years. 
November. On the Third Plenum of the 1 4th Party Congress, Chinese central government 
settled the target of foreign exchange reform was to establish a market based, managed 
floating exchange rate system, together with integrated and standardised foreign exchange 
market, based on which the RMB becomes a convertible currency gradually. 
28th December. The People 's  Bank of China published the "Announcements about the 
Further Reforms on the Foreign Exchange Management System". 
1 994 
1 st January. Chinese government launched a major market-oriented foreign exchange 
reform. The reform included a unification of dual exchange rate system, abolishment 
foreign exchange retention system and government allocation of foreign exchange for 
imports, creation of a retail foreign exchange market for transactions among banks, 
between banks and individuals, between banks and other financial institutions. 
25th February. The State Council officially authorized the SAFE deal in foreign reserves. 
1 st April .  China Foreign Exchange Centre was established in Shanghai, as the interbank 
foreign exchange market. The People's  Bank of China started the open market operations 
in this inter-bank foreign exchange market. 
1 st August. A verification system for import payment was introduced. 
1 995 
1 st January. Authorities terminated the circulation of the foreign exchange certificate in 
the market and stopped the use of accounts for retention foreign exchange ratio. 
March. Three foreign currencies were allowed trading in the inter-bank foreign exchange 
market. There are Japanese Yen, U.S.  dollar and Hong Kong dollar. 
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1 996 
1 st January. The People's  Bank of China started publish the data of money supply 
including MO (money in circulation), M l  (narrow money), and M2 (broad money). 
29th January. The State Council promulgated the "Regulations for Foreign Exchange 
Administration of People' s  Republic of China". 
1 st March. The SAFE started its experiments in Shanghai, Shenzhen, Dalian, and Jiangsu 
province. The trial system allowed foreign funded enterprises to trade foreign exchange 
under current account through designated foreign exchange banks. 
July. The trial system was introduced nation wide. 
29th November. The People's  Bank of China published the "Provisional Regulations for 
Inter-Bank Foreign Exchange Administration". 
1 st December. China accepted the Article VIII of the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
obligations, agreed the current account convertibility. 
2nd December. People's Bank of China promulgated the "Provisional Solutions for 
Foreign Funded Financial Institution trial Operation of Renminbi Transactions in Pudong, 
Shanghai" to allow foreign funded financial institutions to engate in local currency 
operations. 
1 997 
1 8th January. The State Council modified the "Regulations for Foreign Exchange 
Administration of People' s  Republic of China" promulgated in January 1 996, to eliminate 
the restrictions on international transactions under current account. The Bank of China 
and its 1 2  branches were allowed to do trial operations in forward exchange transactions 
for hedging purpose. 
1 4th October. Domestic enterprises were allowed to open foreign exchange current 
account for international transactions. The maximum balance of the account was 1 5  
percent of the total annual inputs and exports of this company. 
1 998 
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1 1 th August. The People' s Bank of China continued and extended trial areas of foreign 
funded financial institution on RMB operations. 
1 st September. The SAFE published the "Provisional Solutions for Local Residents 
Foreign Exchange Administration". 
December. Foreign exchange swap centers for foreign funded enterprises were closed 
down. 
1 999 
April. Foreign funded enterprises were allowed to use foreign exchange settlement 
accounts as time deposits. 
2000 
April. The maximum amount allowance of foreign exchange account for domestic 
enterprises was raised to 30 percent of annual imports and exports. 
2001 
1 9th February. Local residents were allowed to open foreign exchange account for 
participating the B share trading. 
1 st August the SAFE introduced the export foreign exchange repayment system in nation 
wide. The system allowed advance repayment of domestic foreign currency debts, 
re lending of foreign currency debts and external borrowings. 
1 1 th December. China became a member of the World Trade Organization, then it 
published its schedule on opening its financial market. 
2002 
1 st April .  Euro was allowed to trade in the inter-bank market. 
1 st July. The SAFE launched a reform on exchange settlement administration for foreign 
investment capitals. 
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9th September. The SAFE eliminated restrictions on domestic funded enterprises to open 
foreign exchange current account, combine with the foreign exchange settlement account 
and foreign exchange special account to be the foreign exchange current account. 
2003 
1 st September. The SAFE approved qualified domestic insurance companies to deal the 
inter-bank borrowings in the China Foreign Exchange Centre. 
1 st October. China Foreign exchange Centre introduced two-side trading in the inter-bank 
foreign exchange market. 
2004 
1 st May. The SAFE released restrictions on the amounts and conditions to open foreign 
exchange current account. 
2005 
1 8th May. The People' s  Bank of China approved foreign exchange currencies trading in 
the inter-bank foreign exchange market. 
1 9th May. The SAFE extended trial areas of foreign exchange administration on foreign 
investments. 
2 1 st July. China adopted a managed floating foreign exchange regime based on the market 
force and referenced by "a basket of currencies". 
2nd August. The SAFE released the control on domestic enterprises foreign exchange 
incomes under current account. 
2006 
4th January. Authorities adjusted the foreign exchange middle price formation mechanism, 
introduced inquiry pricing transactions and RMB foreign exchange market maker. 
1 3  April. The People's  Bank of China issued the "Announcements of Modifications on 
Foreign exchange Administration Policies". 
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25th December. The People' s  Bank of China promulgated the "Solutions for Foreign 
exchange Administrations on Individuals". 
2007 
1 ih August. The SAFE abolished restrictions on domestic firms foreign exchange 
accounts amounts. 
20th August. The SAFE first allowed the local residents to do direct investment on the 
oversea stock markets by using their own foreign exchange or domestic currency RMB. 
The initial trial area was the Hong Kong market. 
2008 
28th April. The People' s  Bank of China established payment system for paying foreign 
currencies overseas. 
20th August. The SAFE approved individuals in operations of RMB foreign currency 
trading in Beijing and Shanghai. 
2009 
20th January. The People 's  Bank of China signed a currency swap agreement with the 
Hong Kong Monetary Authority. The swap volume was RMB 200 billion Yuan which 
equaled 227 billion Hong Kong dollars. 
1 1 th March. The People' s  Bank of China promulgated the "Agreements of Financial 
Derivative Trading in China Inter-Bank Market". This agreement regulated all the curb 
market financial derivatives trading. 
1 1 th November. The SAFE promulgated the "Announcements about Extending Trial 
operations of Individuals Exchanges Between the Renminbi and Other Foreign Exchange 
Currencies". 
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Appendix B Data list and source 
Data Frequency Data Range Source 
Black Market Exchange Rates Monthly 1 980m 1 - World Currency Year Book 
RMB/USD 2002m l2 
Consumer Price Index, China, Year Monthly 1980m l - China National Bureau of 
2000= 1 00 20 1 0m6 Statistics 
Consumer Price Index, United States, Monthly 1 980m l - International Monetary 
Year 2000=1 00 20 1 0m6 Fund data 
Crude Oil Prices ($/Barrel) Monthly 1 969m l - Department o f  Energy, UK 
2009m1 2  
Current Account Balances, China Annual 1 990-2000 IMF data 
Current Account Balances, China Monthly 2005m l - IM F  data 
2009m 1 2  
Current Account Balances, Germany Monthly 1 968m l - Statistiches Bundesamt, 
1 972m 1 2  Wiesbaden 
Foreign Exchange Reserves, China Annual 1 990-2000 IMF data 
Foreign Exchange Reserves, China Monthly 2005m l - IM F  data 
2009m 1 2  
Foreign Exchange Reserves, Germany Monthly 1 968m l - IMF data 
1 972m l2 
Inflation Rates, Argentina Annual 2006-2009 IMF data 
Inflation Rates, Australia Annual 2006-2009 IMF data 
Inflation Rates, Brazil Annual 2006-2009 IMF data 
Inflation Rates, Canada Monthly 1 967m l - CANSIM- Statstics 
1 97 1 m l  
Inflation Rates, Canada Annual 2006-2009 IMF data 
Inflation Rates, China Annual 2006-2009 IMF data 
Inflation Rates, France Monthly 1 967m l - IMF data 
1 97 1 m l  
Inflation Rates, France Annual 2006-2009 IMF data 
Inflation Rates, Germany Monthly 1 967m l - ZEW 
1 97 1 m l  
Inflation Rates, Germany Annual 2006-2009 IMF data 
Inflation Rates, India Annual 2006-2009 IMF data 
Inflation Rates, Indonesia Annual 2006-2009 IMF data 
Inflation Rates, Italy Monthly 1 967m l - Istituto Nazionale Di 
1 97 1 m l  Statistica 
Inflation Rates, Italy Annual 2006-2009 IMF data 
Inflation Rates, Japan Monthly 1 967m l - IMF data 
1 97 l m l  
Inflation Rates, Japan Annual 2006-2009 IMF data 
Inflation Rates, Russia Annual 2006-2009 IMF data 
Inflation Rates, Saudi Arabia Annual 2006-2009 IMF data 
Inflation Rates, South Africa Annual 2006-2009 IMF data 
Inflation Rates, South Korea Annual 2006-2009 IMF data 
Inflation Rates, Turkey Annual 2006-2009 IMF data 
Inflation Rates, UK Monthly 1 967m l - Office for National 
1 9 7 l m l  Statistics 
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Inflation Rates, UK Annual 2006-2009 IMF data 
Inflation Rates, US Monthly 1 967m l - Bureau of Labor Statistics 
1 97 1 m l  
Inflation Rates, U S  Annual 2006-2009 IMF data 
Inflation Rates, Mexico Annual 2006-2009 IMF data 
Official Exchange Rates RMB/USD Monthly 1 980m l - People's Bank of China 
20 1 0m6 
Product Price Index, China, Year Monthly 1 995m 1 - China National Bureau of 
2000= 1 00 20 1 0m6 Statistics 
Product Price Index, Year 2000= 1 00 Monthly 1 995m 1 - International Monetary 
20 1 0m6 Fund data 
Real Effective Exchange Rates based Monthly 1 980ml - International Monetary 
on CPI, China 2 0 1 0m6 Fund data 
Retail Price Index, China, Year Monthly 1 987m l - China National Bureau of 
2000= 1 00 20 1 0m6 Statistics 
Retail Price Index, United States, Year Monthly 1 987m 1 - International Monetary 
2000= 1 00 2 0 1 0m6 Fund data 
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Appendix C STAR model original testing output 
CPI based real exchange rate from official rates ( 1980ml - 2010m6) 
1. Linearity test 
Basic linearity test is based on Eq. (7. 7) : 
Where the null hypothesis of Wald test for linearity is H0: fhfh=O whilst the alternative is 
H1 : /h/hl-0. The test result shows on Table C . l :  
Table C. l Wald Test for CPI based real exchange rates ( 1 980m l -20 1 0m6) 
Wald Test: 
Test Statistic Value df Probability 
F -statistic 1 .95632 (2, 361)  0 . 1429 
Chi-square 3 .9 1 265 2 0 . 14 14  
Null Hypothesis Summary: 
Normalized Restriction (= 0) Value Std. Err. 
�2 0.0 1 035 0.0386 
�3 -0.0009 0.001 99 
A further third-order Taylor approximation with p lags derived from Eq. (7.7) is used for 
advanced linearity test, written as Eq. (7.8): 
qt = L.L1 Piqt-i + "'Lf=1 fl1iqt-jqt-k + 'Lf=1 flzi qt-iqf_k + L.f=1 fl3iqt-iq
g_k + Et Eq. 
(7.8) 
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The linearity hypothesis is H0 : f3i = 0 for all i. The Wald test of Eq. (7.7) for CPI based 
real exchange rates series can help to confirm it is an AR(l )  equation where i= 1 .  The 
value of lag length p from 1 to 4 has been tested and the result is shown on Table C.2: 
Table C.2 Lag length selection for CPI based real exchange rates ( 1 980m l -201 0m6) 
AR( l , l )  Value Probability 
F -statistic 1 .341 93 0.2605 
Chi-square 4.02578 0.2587 
AR(1 ,2) 
F -statistic 1 .25349 0.2902 
Chi-square 3 .76047 0.2885 
AR( l ,3) 
F -statistic 1 .33384 0.263 1 
Chi-square 4.00 1 53 0.261 3  
AR(l ,4) 
F -statistic 1 .3 1 522 0.2692 
Chi-square 3 .94565 0.2674 
The AR( 1 , 1 )  model with the greatest F-statistic/ x2 value will be chosen for STAR model 
to simulate the CPI based real exchange rates from 1 980m1 to 201 0m6. 
2 5 1 
2 .  ESTAR 
Table C.3 shows the nonlinear least square regression output for AR( 1 , 1 )  ESTAR 
equation: 
qt = f3o + fJ1qt-1{l - ex p [-y(qt-1 - c)2]} + (f3z + {33{ 1  
- ex p [-y(qt-1 - c)2]}) qt-1 
Table C.3 ESTAR regression for CPI based real exchange rates ( 1 980m 1 -201 0m6) 
Coefficient 
�0 �I  y c �2 p3 
0 . 14769 0.0 1 1 72 -0. 1 6  0.5383 0.8 1 978 0. 1495 
R-squared 0.98 143 Mean dependent var 7. 1 7953 
Adjusted R-squared 0.98 1 1 7  S .D. dependent var 1 .60 1 73 
S .E.  ofregression 0.21 977 Akaike info criterion -0. 1 762 
Sum squared resid 1 7.3879 Schwarz criterion -0. 1 122 
Log likelihood 38.244 Durbin-Watson stat 1 . 99999 
Figure C. 1 shows the actual, fitted lines and residual of the ESTAR non-linear regression. 
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Figure C. l ESTAR Residual, Actual and Fitted Graphic ( 1 994m l -2010m6) 
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Table C.4 shows the nonlinear least square regresswn output for AR( l , l )  LSTAR 
equation: 
Table C.4 LSTAR regression for CPI based real exchange rates ( 1 980m 1 -201  Om6) 
Coefficient 
�0 �1 y c �2 P3 
0. 86665 -0.6623 -0. 1 763 6.5366 -6. 1 38 6.77557 
R-squared 0.98 1 63 Mean dependent var 7 . 1 7953 
Adjusted R-squared 0.98 137  S.D. dependent var 1 .60 1 73 
S .E. of regression 0.2 1 86 1  Akaike info criterion -0. 1 868 
Sum squared resid 1 7.2052 Schwarz criterion -0. 1 228  
Log likelihood 40. 1 77 1  Durbin-Watson stat 1 .98905 
Figure C.2 shows the actual, fitted lines and residual of the LSTAR non-linear regression. 
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Figure C.2 LSTAR Residual, Actual and Fitted Graphic ( 1 994m1-201 0m6) 
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CPI based real exchange rate from official rates (1995ml - 2010m6) 
1. Linearity test 
Basic linearity test is based on Eq. (7. 7) : 
Where the null hypothesis of Wald test for linearity is H0: fh/h=O whilst the alternative is 
H1 : /h/h/-0. The test result shows on Table C .5 :  
Table C .5  Wald Test for CPI based real exchange rates ( 1 995m l -2010m6) 
Wald Test: 
Test Statistic Value df Probability 
F -statistic 0.283801  (3 , 1 8 1 )  0.8371 
Chi-square 0.85 1 403 3 0.8371 
Null Hypothesis Summary: 
Normalized Restriction (= 0) Value Std. Err. 
�2 0.771 898 0.834779 
�3 -0.032 1 76 0.035092 
A further third-order Taylor approximation with p lags derived from Eq. (7.7) is used for 
advanced linearity test, written as Eq. (7.8): 
qt = If=l Piqt- i  + If=l f31iqt-jqt-k + If=l f32iqt-iqE-k + Lf=l f33iqt-iql-k + Et Eq. 
(7.8) 
The linearity hypothesis is  H0 : Pi = 0 for all i. The Wald test of Eq. (7.8) for CPI based 
real exchange rates series can help to confirm it is an AR( l )  equation where i= 1 .  The 
value of lag length p from 1 to 4 has been tested and the result is shown on Table C.6:  
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Table C.6 Lag length selection for CPI based real exchange rates ( 1 995ml -2010m6) 
AR(1 , 1 )  Value Probability 
F -statistic 0 .283801 0.8371  
Chi-square 0.85 1403 0.8371  
AR(1 ,2) 
F -statistic 1 0.78909 0.0000 
Chi-square 32.36728 0.0000 
AR(1 ,3) 
F -statistic 1 3 .62677 0.0000 
Chi-square 40.8803 1 0.0000 
AR( 1 ,4) 
F -statistic 1 3 .4939 0.0000 
Chi-square 40.48 1 7 1  0.0000 
The AR(1 ,2) model with the greatest F-statistic/ x2 value will be chosen for STAR model 
to simulate the CPI based real exchange rates from 1 995m1 to 201 0m6. 
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2 .  ESTAR 
Table C7 shows the nonlinear least square regression output for AR( l  ,2) EST AR 
equation: 
qt = f3o + fJ1qt-2{l - ex p [-y(qt-2 - c)2]} + CfJ2 + {33{1  
- ex p [-y(qt-2 - c)2]}) qt-1 
Table CC. 7 ESTAR regression for CPI based real exchange rates ( 1 995m 1 -201  Om6) 
Coefficient 
�0 �I y c �2 �3 
-0.3 639 -0.3551  -0. 1 59 5 .97501 -84.821  86.2 1 6  
R-squared 0.99291  Mean dependent var 8.05943 
Adjusted R -squared 0.99271  S .D. dependent var 0.56568 
S.E. ofregression 0.04829 Akaike info criterion -3. 1 9 1 6  
Sum squared resid 0.41969 Schwarz criterion -3 .0875 
Log likelihood 302 .8 1 8  Durbin-Watson stat 2 . 1 3 7 1 9  
Figure C3 shows the actual, fitted lines and residual o f  the ESTAR non-linear regression. 
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Figure C.3 ESTAR Residual, Actual and Fitted Graphic ( 1994m 1 -2010m6) 
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3 .  
Table C S  shows the nonlinear least square regression output for AR( l ,2) LSTAR 
equation: 
Table C.8 LSTAR regression for CPI based real exchange rates ( 1995m1-201 0m6) 
Coefficient 
�0 �I y c �2 �3 
0.00574 -0.391 9  -0. 1 76 6.52855 0.30475 0.41434 
R-squared 0.99289 Mean dependent var 8.05943 
Adjusted R-squared 0.9927 S .D. dependent var 0.56568 
S .E. ofregression 0.04834 Akaike info criterion - 1 .9924 
Sum squared resid 0.42066 Schwarz criterion - 1 . 8883 
Log likelihood 302 .604 Durbin-W atson stat 0.49286 
Figure C4 shows the actual, fitted lines and residual of the LSTAR non-linear regression. 
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Figure C.4 LSTAR Residual, Actual and Fitted Graphic ( 1 995ml -2010m6) 
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CPI based real exchange rate from black rates ( 1980m l - 2002m 12) 
1. Linearity test 
Basic linearity test is based on Eq. (7.7): 
Where the null hypothesis of Wald test for linearity is H0: fhfJ3=0 whilst the alternative is 
Hr :  fJ2,fJ#O. The test result shows on Table C9: 
Table C.9 Wald Test for CPI based real exchange rates from black market prices 
( 1 980m1 -2002m12) 
Wald Test: 
Test Statistic Value df Probability 
F -statistic 2.343 525 (2, 361)  0.0979 
Chi-square 4.687050 2 0.0960 
Null Hypothesis Summary: 
Normalized Restriction (= 0) Value Std. Err. 
�2 0.0 163 1 9  0.0 1 008 1 
�3 -0.000497 0.000278 
A further third-order Taylor approximation with p lags derived from Eq. (7.7) is used for 
advanced linearity test, written as Eq. (7.8): 
qt = Lf=l fJiqt-i + Lf=l fJliqt-jqt-k + "£f=l fJziqt-iqf_k + L,f=l f33iqt-iqt-k + Et Eq. 
(7. 8) 
The linearity hypothesis is H0 : [Ji ::::: 0 for all i. The Wald test of Eq. (7.8) for CPI based 
real exchange rates series can help to confirm it is an AR( l )  equation where i= 1 .  The 
value of lag length p from 1 to 4 has been tested and the result is shown on Table C. l 0: 
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Table C . 1 0 Lag length selection for CPI based real exchange rates ( 1 980m 1 -20 1 Om6) 
AR( l , 1 )  Value Probability 
F -statistic 2.045961 0. 1 078 
Chi-square 6 . 1 37882 0. 1 05 1  
AR(1 ,2) 
F -statistic 1 .940296 0. 1 234 
Chi-square 5 .820888 0. 1 207 
AR(1 ,3)  
F -statistic 4.2444 1 7  0.0059 
Chi-square 1 2.73325 0.0053 
AR(l ,4) 
F -statistic 2 .844363 0.038 1  
Chi-square 8 .533089 0.0362 
The AR( 1 ,3) model with the greatest F-statistic/ l value will be chosen for MS model to 
simulate the CPI based real exchange rates from 1 980m1 to 2002m12 .  
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. ESTA . · 
Table C 1 1 shows the nonlinear least square regression output for AR( 1 ,3) ESTAR 
equation: 
qt = Po + f31qt-3 {1 - ex p [-y(qt-3 - c)2]} + CfJ2 + f33 {l 
- ex p [-y(qt-3 - c)2]}) qt-1 
Table C. 1 1  ESTAR regression for CPI based real exchange rates from black market prices 
( 1 980ml-2002m12) 
Coefficient 
�0 � I  y c �2 �3 
0 . 1 1 1 76 -0. 1 258 -0.5329 7. 1 7595 0.50296 0 .61256 
R-squared 0.98765 Mean deEendent var 9.6583 
Adjusted R-squared 0.98742 S .D. dependent var 4.2839 
S .E. ofregression 0.48049 Akaike info criterion 1 .39346 
Sum squared resid 62.3338 Schwarz criterion 1 .472 1 6  
Log likelihood - 1 86.3 Durbin-Watson stat 1 .95408 
Figure C.5 shows the actual, fitted lines and residual of the ESTAR non-linear regression. 
3 
2 
1 
20 
1 5  
1 0  
5 
o ������4���*H�*+����--��� 0 
-1 
-2 
-3+-��������������--��� 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 
1 -- Residual  -- Actual -- Fitted I 
Figure C.5 Residual, Actual and Fitted Graphic ( 1 980m1 -2002m12) 
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3 . LSTAR 
Table C 1 2  shows the nonlinear least square regression output for AR(1 ,3) LSTAR 
equation: 
Table C. 1 2  LSTAR regression for CPI based real exchange rates ( 1980ml -2002m12) 
Coefficient 
Po P I  y c Bz B3 
0.3 1 8  -0. 1 3 14 -0.5465 7. 1 1286 - 1 0.845 1 1 .7493 
R-squared 0.97879 Mean de£endent var 9.82092 
Adjusted R-squared 0.97822 S .D. dependent var 3.3 1 92 
S.E. ofregression 0.48991 Akaike info criterion 1 .44204 
Sum squared resid 43 .922 1 Schwarz criterion 1 .54495 
Log likelihood - 1 30.27 Durbin-Watson stat 1 . 85954 
Figure C.6 shows the actual, fitted lines and residual of the LSTAR non-linear regression. 
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Figure C.6 LSTAR Residual, Actual and Fitted Graphic (1 980m1 -2002m12) 
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CPI based real exchange rate from combined black rate (1980m 1 - 1 994m12) 
and official rates (1 995m 1 - 201 Om6) 
1. Linearity test 
Basic linearity test is based on Eq. (7.7): 
Where the null hypothesis of Wald test for linearity is Ho: /h/33=0 whilst the alternative is 
H r :  f32,f33'FO. The test result shows on Table C 1 3 :  
Table C. 1 3  Wald Test for CPI based real exchange rates from combined black market 
prices ( 1 980m1 - 1994m1 2) and official prices ( 1 995m1 -201 0m6) 
Wald Test: 
Test Statistic Value df Probability 
F -statistic 3 .32 1 254 (2, 361)  0.0372 
Chi-square 6.642507 2 0.036 1  
Null Hypothesis Summary: 
Normalized Restriction (= 0) Value Std. Err. 
�2 0.01 7 144 0.008239 
�3 -0.0005 1 8  0.000228 
A further third-order Taylor approximation with p lags derived from Eq. (7.7) is used for 
advanced linearity test, written as Eq. (7.8): 
(7.8) 
The linearity hypothesis is H0 : /3i = 0 for all i. The Wald test of Eq. (7.8) for CPI based 
real exchange rates series can help to confirm it is an AR(l )  equation where i= 1 .  The 
value of lag length p from 1 to 4 has been tested and the result is shown on Table C 14: 
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Table C. 1 4  Lag length selection for CPI based real exchange rates from combined black 
market prices ( 1 980m l - 1 994m12) and official prices ( 1 995m1 -201 0m6) 
AR( l , l )  
F -statistic 
Chi-square 
AR( 1 ,2) 
F -statistic 
Chi-square 
AR(l ,3) 
F -statistic 
Chi-square 
AR(1 ,4) 
F -statistic 
Chi-square 
Value Probability 
2.703669 0.0453 
8 . 1 1 1 008 0.0438 
2.262808 0.0809 
6.788425 0.079 
5 .586574 0.0009 
1 6.75972 0.0008 
3 .553821 0.0 1 46 
1 0 .661 46 0.0137 
The AR( l ,  3) model with the greatest F-statistic/ x2 value will be chosen for STAR model 
to simulate the CPI based real exchange rates from 1 980m l  to 20 1 0m6. 
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2 .  
Table C. 1 5  shows the nonlinear least square regression output for AR( 1 ,2) ESTAR 
equation: 
qt = f3o + f31qt-3{1 - ex p [-y(qt-3 - c)2]} + C/3z + /33{1 
- ex p [-y(qt-3 - c)2]}) qt-1 
Table C. 1 5  ESTAR regression for CPI based real exchange rates from combined black 
market prices ( 1 980ml - 1 994m12) and official prices ( 1 995m1 -201 0m6) 
Coefficient 
�0 � I  y c �2 �3 
0.08984 -0. 1 274 -0.47 6.64669 -5.8962 7 .0143 
R-squared 0.98804 Mean dependent var 9.09764 
Adjusted R-squared 0.98788 S.D. dependent var 3 . 82341 
S .E. of regression 0.42 1 0 1  Akaike info criterion 1 . 1 2392 
Sum sguared resid 63 .8084 Schwarz criterion 1 . 1 8789 
Log likelihood - 1 99.68 Durbin-Watson stat 1 .96 1 19  
Figure C7 shows the actual, fitted lines and residual of  the ESTAR non-linear regression. 
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Figure C.7 ESTAR Residual, Actual and Fitted Graphic ( 1 980ml-2010m6) 
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Table C. l 6  shows the nonlinear least square regression output for AR( 1 ,3) LSTAR 
equation: 
Table C. 1 6  LSTAR regression for CPI based real exchange rates from combined black 
market prices ( 1 980m l - 1 994m1 2) and official prices ( 1 995ml -201 0m6) 
Coefficient 
�0 � I  y c �2 �3 
0.96032 -0. 1482 -0.4473 6.92707 0 .89898 0 .08053 
R-squared 0.98925 Mean dependent var 9.09764 
Adjusted R-squared 0.9891 S .D .  de_Eendent var 3 . 82341 
S.E. ofregression 0.3992 Akaike info criterion 1 .0 1 757 
Sum sguared resid 57.3707 Schwarz criterion 1 .08 1 54 
Log likelihood - 1 80.2 1 Durbin-Watson stat 1 .92777 
Figure C.8 shows the actual, fitted lines and residual of the non-linear regression. 
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PPI based real exchange rate from official rates ( 1 995m l - 2 0 1 0 m6) 
1. Linearity test 
Basic linearity test is based on Eq. (7.7) :  
Where the null hypothesis of Wald test for linearity is H0 :  fhfh=O whilst the alternative is 
H1 : /h/hf-0. The test result shows on Table C. 1 7: 
Table C. 1 7  Wald Test for PPI based real exchange rates ( 1 995m1 -20 1 Om6) 
Wald Test: 
Test Statistic Value df Probability 
F -statistic 3 .235885 (2, 1 8 1 ) 0.04 1 6  
Chi-square 6.471 769 2 0.0393 
Null Hypothesis Summary: 
Normalized Restriction (= 0) Value Std. Err. 
�2 5 .448574 2.23 1 8 1 4  
�3 -0.26273 0. 1 06997 
A further third-order Taylor approximation with p lags derived from Eq. (7.7) is used for 
advanced linearity test, written as Eq. (7.8): 
qt = Lf=l  f3iqt-i + Lf=l f11iqt-jqt-k + Lf=l f3ziqt-iqf-k + Lf=l  f33iqt-iql-k + Et Eq. 
(7. 8) 
The linearity hypothesis is H0 : f3i = 0 for all i. The Wald test of Eq. (7.8) for PPI based 
real exchange rates series can help to confirm it is an AR( 1 )  equation where i= 1 .  The 
value of lag length p from 1 to 4 has been tested and the result is shown on Table C . l 8 : 
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Table C. l 8  Lag length selection for PPI based real exchange rates ( 1 995ml -201 0m6) 
AR( 1 , 1 )  Value Probability 
F -statistic 2.07927 0. 1 046 
Chi-square 6.2378 1 0. 1 006 
AR(1 ,2) 
F -statistic 3 .645576 0.0 1 3 8  
Chi-square 1 0.93673 0.0 1 2 1  
AR(1 ,3) 
F -statistic 2.7541 4 1  0.0440 
Chi-square 8.262424 0.0409 
The AR(1 ,2) model with the greatest F-statistic/ x2 value will be chosen for STAR model 
to simulate the PPI based real exchange rates from 1 995m1 to 20 1 0m6. 
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Table C. 1 9  shows the nonlinear least square regression output for AR( 1 ,2) ESTAR 
equation: 
qt = flo + fJlqt-2{1 - ex p [-y(qt-2 - c)2]} + CfJ2 + {J3{l 
- ex P [ -y(qt-2 - c )2]}) qt-1 
Table C. 1 9  ESTAR regression for PPI based real exchange rates ( 1 995m1-20 1 Om6) 
Coefficient 
Po P I 'Y c Pz P3 
0. 1 4021 -0. 1 349 -0. 1 809 6.67992 1 . 1 4743 -0.0333 
R-squared 0 .95625 Mean dependent var 6. 89374 
Adjusted R-squared 0.95504 S.D. dependent var 0.41 553 
S.E. of regression 0.088 1 1  Akaike info criterion - 1 .9887 
Sum squared resid 1 .39742 Schwarz criterion - 1 .8847 
Log likelihood 1 90.952 Durbin-Watson stat 2 .0 1 0 1 5  
Figure C9 shows the actual, fitted lines and residual of the ESTAR non-linear regression. 
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Figure C.9 ESTAR Residual, Actual and Fitted Graphic ( 1 995m1 -20 1 Om6) 
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3 .  LST · model 
Table C.20 shows the nonlinear least square regression output for AR(l ,2) LSTAR 
equation: 
Table C.20 LSTAR regression for PPI based real exchange rates ( 1 995m 1 -201 0m6) 
Coefficient 
Bo BI y c Bz B3 
1 .23 126 -0. 1 922 -0. 1 984 6.78533 -0. 54 1 5  0.609 19  
R-squared 0.95717 Mean deEendent var 6.89374 
Adjusted R-squared 0.95598 S.D. dependent var 0.41 553 
S.E. of regression 0.0871 9  Akaike info criterion -2.0098 
Sum squared resid 1 .36823 Schwarz criterion - 1 .9058 
Log likelihood 1 92.9 1 5  Durbin-Watson stat 1 .96 
Figure C. 1 0 shows the actual, fitted lines and residual of the LSTAR non-linear 
regressiOn. 
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Figure C . lO  LSTAR Residual, Actual and Fitted Graphic ( 1 994m1-2010m6) 
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RPI based real exchange rate from official rates (1987ml - 2 0 10m6) 
1. Linearity test 
Basic linearity test is based on Eq. (4.7): 
Where the null hypothesis of Wald test for linearity is H0: /h/h=O whilst the alternative is 
H1 : /h/h:l-0. The test result shows on Table C .2 1 :  
Table C.2 1 Wald Test for RPI based real exchange rates ( 1 987ml -201 0m6) 
Wald Test: 
Test Statistic Value df Probability 
F -statistic 0.082489 (2, 275) 0.9208 
Chi-square 0. 1 64978 2 0.9208 
Null Hypothesis Summary: 
Normalized Restriction (= 0) Value Std. Err. 
�2 0.088532 0 .271 377 
�3 -0.004654 0.0 1 3809 
A further third-order Taylor approximation with p lags derived from Eq. ( 4. 7) is used for 
advanced linearity test, written as Eq. (4.8): 
qt = 'Lf=l fliqt-i + 'Lf=l flliqt-jqt-k + 'Lf=l flziqt-iq'f_k + 'Lf=1 /l3i qt-iqf_k + Et Eq. 
(4.8) 
The linearity hypothesis is H0 : fli = 0 for all i. The Wald test of Eq. (7.8) for RPI based 
real exchange rates series can help to confirm it is an AR(l )  equation where i=l .  The 
value of lag length p from 1 to 4 has been tested and the result is shown on Table C.22 : 
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Table C.22 Lag length selection for RPI based real exchange rates ( 1 987ml -20 1 Om6) 
AR( l , l )  Value Probability 
F -statistic 0. 1 9 143 0.9022 
Chi-square 0.57429 1 0.9023 
AR(1 ,2) 
F -statistic 0.33353 0.80 1 1 
Chi-square 1 .000591 0.80 1 1 
AR(1 ,3) 
F -statistic 0.427557 0.7334 
Chi-square 1 .28267 1 0.7333 
AR(1 ,4) 
F -statistic 0.353 145 0.7869 
Chi-square 1 .05943 5 0.7869 
The AR( 1 ,3)  model with the greatest F-statistic/ i value will be chosen for STAR model 
to simulate the RPI based real exchange rates from 1 987m l  to 20 1 0m6. 
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Table C.23 shows the nonlinear least square regression output for AR( l ,  3 )  ESTAR 
equation: 
qt = f3o + f31qt-3{1 - ex p [-y(qt-3 - c)2]} + (f3z + /33{1 
- ex p [-y(qt-3 - c)2]}) qt-1 
Table C.23 ESTAR regression for RPI based real exchange rates ( 1 987m l -201 0m6) 
Coefficient 
Po P I  y c P2 P3 
0.2277 0.00128 -0.3272 6.34883 -0.5547 1 .52 1 
R-squared 0.93874 Mean dependent var 6.95571 
Adjusted R-squared 0.93762 S.D. dependent var 0 .8352 
S .E. of regression 0.2086 1  Akaike info criterion -0.2755 
Sum squared resid 1 1 .8801  Schwarz criterion -0. 1 974 
Log likelihood 44.427 Durbin-Watson stat 2 .00042 
Figure C. l l  shows the actual, fitted lines and residual of the ESTAR non-linear 
regression. 
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Figure C. l l  ESTAR Residual, Actual and Fitted Graphic ( 1 987m1 -20 1 Om6) 
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Table C.24 shows the nonlinear least square regression output for AR(1 ,3) LSTAR 
equation: 
Table C.24 LSTAR regression for RPI based real exchange rates ( 1 987m1-201 Om6) 
Coefficient 
�0 � I  y c �2 �3 
0.2277 0.00128  -0.3272 6.34883 -0.5204 1 .55529 
R-squared 0.93874 Mean dependent var 6.95571 
Adjusted R-squared 0.93762 S.D. dependent var 0.8352 
S.E. of regression 0.20861 Akaike info criterion -0.2755 
Sum squared resid 1 1 .8801  Schwarz criterion -0. 1 974 
Log likelihood 44.427 Durbin-Watson stat 2 .00042 
Figure C. 1 2  shows the actual, fitted lines and residual of the LSTAR non-linear 
regresswn. 
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Figure C. 1 2  LSTAR Residual, Actual and Fitted Graphic ( 1 987m1-20 10m6) 
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8.3 RPI based real exchange rate from black rates (1987m l - 2002 m l2) 
1. Linearity test 
Basic linearity test is based on Eq. (7.7): 
Where the null hypothesis of Wald test for linearity is H0: fhfh=O whilst the alternative is 
H1 : /32,/h:/-0. The test result shows on Table C.25: 
Table C.25 Wald Test for RPI based real exchange rates from black market prices 
( 1 987m 1 -2002m1 2) 
Wald Test: 
Test Statistic Value df Probability 
F -statistic 3 .241 667 (2, 1 85) 0.04 1 3  
Chi-square 6.483335  2 0.039 1  
Null Hypothesis Summary: 
Nonnalized Restriction (= 0) Value Std. Err. 
�2 0.077760 0.0421 00 
�3 -0.002294 0.001 1 5 8  
A further third-order Taylor approximation with p lags derived from Eq. (7.7) i s  used for 
advanced linearity test, written as Eq. (7.8): 
qt = L,f=l f1iqt-i + "L.f=l fJ1i qt-jqt-k + "L,f=l f3ziqt-iqf_k + f.f=l f33iqt-iql-k + Et Eq. 
(7.8) 
The linearity hypothesis is H0 : /3i = 0 for all i. The Wald test of Eq. (7.8) for CPI based 
real exchange rates series can help to confirm it is an AR(1 )  equation where i=l .  The 
value of lag length p from 1 to 4 has been tested and the result is shown on Table C.26: 
274 
Table C.26 Lag length selection for CPI based real exchange rates ( 1 980m1 -20 10m6) 
AR( 1 , 1 )  Value Probability 
F -statistic 2 .04596 1 0. 1 078 
Chi-square 6. 1 37882 0. 1 05 1  
AR( 1 ,2) 
F -statistic 1 .940296 0. 1 234 
Chi-square 5 .820888 0. 1 207 
AR( 1 ,3) 
F -statistic 4.2444 1 7  0.0059 
Chi-square 1 2.73325 0.0053 
AR( 1 ,4) 
F -statistic 2 .844363 0.03 8 1  
Chi-square 8.533089 0.0362 
The AR( l ,3) model with the greatest F-statistic/ i value will be chosen for STAR model 
to simulate the RPI based real exchange rates from 1 987m1 to 20 1 0m6. 
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Table C.27 shows the nonlinear least square regression output for AR( l ,3) ESTAR 
equation: 
qt = f3o + fJlqt-3{1 - ex p [-y(qt-3 - c)2]} + Cf3z + {33{1 
- ex p [-y(qt-3 - c)2]}) qt-1 
Table C.27 ESTAR regression for CPI based real exchange rates from black market prices 
( 1 987m 1 -2002m12) 
Coefficient 
�0 � I  y c �2 
0. 14596 -0. 1 1 94 -0.366 -7.2705 - 1 0.745 1 1 .8495 
R-squared 0 .97877 Mean dependent var 9. 82092 
Adjusted R-squared 0.978 1 9  S .D. dependent var 3 .3 192 
S .E. ofregression 0.4901 5  Akaike info criterion 1 .4430 1  
Sum squared resid 43 .9645 Schwarz criterion 1 .54592 
Log likelihood - 1 30.36 Durbin-Watson stat 1 . 86 125 
Figure C. 1 3  shows the actual, fitted lines and residual of the ESTAR non-linear 
regressiOn. 
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Figure C. 1 3  Residual, Actual and Fitted Graphic ( 1 980m1 -2002m12) 
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Table C.28 shows the nonlinear least square regression output for AR(1 ,3) LSTAR 
equation: 
Table C.28 LSTAR regression for CPI based real exchange rates ( 1 987m1-2002m12) 
Coefficient 
Bo �I y c �2 �3 
0.3 1 8  -0. 1 3 14 -0.4625 7.3 1286 - 1 0. 845 1 1 .7493 
R-squared 0.97879 Mean dependent var 9.82092 
Adjusted R-squared 0.97822 S .D. dependent var 3 .3 192 
S .E. of regression 0.48991 Akaike info criterion 1 .44204 
Sum squared resid 43 .922 1 Schwarz criterion 1 .54495 
Log likelihood - 1 30.27 Durbin-Watson stat 1 .85954 
Figure C. 14  shows the actual, fitted lines and residual of the LSTAR non-linear 
regression. 
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Figure C. 14  LSTAR Residual, Actual and Fitted Graphic ( 1987ml -2002m1 2) 
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RPI based real exchange rate from combined black rate ( 1 987m l - 1 994m l 2 )  
and official rates ( 1 995m l - 201 0m6) 
1. Linearity test 
Basic linearity test is based on Eq. (7.7) : 
Where the null hypothesis of Wald test for linearity is H0: fh,fJ3=0 whilst the alternative is 
H1: fJ2,fJJ::f-0. The test result shows on Table C.29 : 
Table C .29 Wald Test for RPI based real exchange rates from combined black market 
prices ( 1 987m l - 1 994m1 2) and official prices ( 1 995m1 -20 1 0m6) 
Wald Test: 
Test Statistic Value df Probability 
F -statistic 4.634629 (2, 275) 0.0 1 05 
Chi-square 9.269257 2 0.0097 
Null Hypothesis Summary: 
Normalized Restriction (= 0) Value Std. Err. 
�2 0.066854 0.030985 
�3 -0.0020 1 0.000864 
A further third-order Taylor approximation with p lags derived from Eq. (7.7) is used for 
advanced linearity test, written as Eq. (7.8): 
qt = Lf=1 {3iqt-i + Lf=1 f31iqt-jqt-k + Lf=1 f32iqt-iqf_k + Lf=1 {33iqt-iqg_k + Et Eq. 
(7.8) 
The linearity hypothesis is H0 : fli = 0 for all i. The Wald test of Eq. (7.8) for CPI based 
real exchange rates series can help to confirm it is an AR( l )  equation where i= 1 .  The 
value of lag length p from 1 to 4 has been tested and the result is shown on Table C.30: 
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Table C.30 Lag length selection for CPI based real exchange rates from combined black 
market prices ( 1 980m 1 - 1 994m1 2) and official prices ( 1 995m1 -20 10m6) 
AR( 1 , 1 )  
F -statistic 
Chi-square 
AR( 1 ,2) 
F -statistic 
Chi-square 
AR(1 ,3) 
F -statistic 
Chi-square 
AR( 1 ,4) 
F -statistic 
Chi-square 
Value Probability 
3 . 1 47305 0.0255 
9.44 1 9 14  0.024 
5 .9 1 052 1 0.0006 
1 7.73 1 56 0.0005 
6 .436329 0.0003 
1 9 .30899 0.0002 
2 .736952 0.0439 
8.2 1 0856 0.04 1 8  
The AR( l ,  3 )  model with the greatest F-statistic/ ·/ value will be chosen for STAR model 
to simulate the RPI based real exchange rates from 1 987m l  to 20 1 0m6. 
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Table C.3 1 shows the nonlinear least square regression output for AR(l ,2) ESTAR 
equation: 
qt = f3o + f31qt-3{1 - ex p [-y(qt-3 - c)2]} + (f3z + f33 {l 
- ex p [-y(qt-3 - c) 2]}) qt-1 
Table C.3 1  ESTAR regression for RPI based real exchange rates from combined black 
market prices ( 1 987m l - 1 994m1 2) and official prices ( 1995ml -201 0m6) 
Coefficient 
�0 � I  y c �2 �3 
0.35 1 82 -0. 1 345 -0.3 1 72 7 .81274 -3.4 158  4.52269 
R-squared 0.98238 Mean dependent var 8 .88809 
Adjusted R -squared 0 .98205 S.D. dependent var 3 .04129 
S .E. of regression 0 .40742 Akaike info criterion 1 .06332 
Sum squared resid 45.3 1 53 Schwarz criterion 1 . 14141  
Log likelihood - 1 42.33 Durbin-Watson stat 1 .87424 
Figure C. 1 5  shows the actual, fitted lines and residual of the ESTAR non-linear 
regression. 
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Figure C. 1 5  ESTAR Residual, Actual and Fitted Graphic ( 1 987ml -20 1 Om6) 
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Table C.32 shows the nonlinear least square regression output for AR( 1 ,3) LSTAR 
equation: 
Table C.32 LSTAR regression for RPI based real exchange rates from combined black 
market prices ( 1 987m1 - 1 994m1 2) and official prices ( 1995m1 -201 0m6) 
Coefficient 
Po PI y c P2 P3 
0. 1 0 1 0 1  -0. 1 1 73 -0.4226 8 . 1 1 079 -3.0722 3 .9765 
R-squared 0.98234 Mean dependent var 8 .88809 
Adjusted R-squared 0.98202 S.D. dependent var 3 .04 129 
S .E. of regression 0 .40782 Akaike info criterion 1 .06529 
Sum squared resid 45.4045 Schwarz criterion 1 . 14338 
Log likelihood - 142 .61  Durbin-Watson stat 1 . 87665 
Figure C. 1 6  shows the actual, fitted lines and residual of the non-linear regression. 
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Figure C. 1 6  LSTAR Residual, Actual and Fitted Graphic ( 1 987m1 -20 1 Om6) 
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Appendix D Markov-Switching model original testing output 
CPI based real exchange rate from official rates (1980 m l - 2010m6) 
Coef f i c i en t  S t d . E r r o r  t -va l ue t -p r ob 
Q_1 0 . 9851 78 0 . 003943 250 . 0 . 000 
Cons t an t ( O ) -0 . 307576 202 . 5  -0 . 00 152 0 . 999 
Cons t an t ( 1 )  0 . 1 041 64 0 . 02899 3 . 59 0 . 000 
Con s t an t ( 2) 2 . 55829 0 . 08968 28 . 5  0 . 000 
s i gma 0 . 1 21 772 0 . 004501 27 . 1  0 . 000 
p_{O I O} 4 . 76937e-006 0 . 7645 0 . 00 1 . 000 
p_{ 1 I O} 0 . 1 78471 2 . 1 73 0 . 0821 0 . 935 
p_{ 1 1 1 }  0 . 994502 0 . 003876 257 . 0 . 000 
I og- I i ke I i hood 238 . 599831 
no . o f  obse r va t i ons 366 no . o f  pa r ame t e r s  8 
A I C . T  -461 0 1 99663 A I C  -1 . 2601 0837 
mean ( Q) 7 . 1 7953 var ( Q )  2 . 55852 
L i near i t y LR- t es t  Ch i A2 ( 5 ) = 400 . 76 [ 0 . 0000 ]** app rox i ma t e  uppe r bound : 
[ 0 . 0000 ] ** 
T r ans i t i on p r obab i l i t i es p_{ i l j } = P( Reg i me i a t  t+1 I Reg i me at t )  
Reg i me 0 ,  t Reg i me 1 ,  t Reg i me 2 ,  t 
Reg i me 0 ,  t +1 4 . 7694e-006 0 . 00000 0 . 00000 
Reg i me 1 , t +1 0 . 1 7847 0 . 99450 1 . 0000 
Reg i me 2 ,  t +1 0 . 821 52 0 . 0054983 0 . 00000 
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CPI based real exchange rate from black rates ( 1 980m l - 2002m 12) 
QB_1 
QB_2 
QB 3 
Cons t an t ( O) 
Cons t an t  ( 1 )  
Cons t an t ( 2) 
s i gma 
p_{0 / 0} 
p_{0 / 1 }  
p_{ 1 / 1 }  
p_{ 1 / 2} 
I og- 1 i ke I i hood 
Coe f f i c i en t  S t d . E r r o r  t-va l ue t -p r ob 
0 . 97201 6 0 . 04956 1 9 . 6  0 . 000 
0 . 238261 0 . 07906 3 . 01 0 . 003 
-0 . 246827 0 . 051 03 -4 . 84 0 . 000 
0 . 2841 96 0 . 05841 4 . 87 0 . 000 
-0 . 600397 0 . 1 741 -3 . 45 0 . 001 
1 . 34342 0 . 1 356 9 . 91 0 . 000 
0 . 309805 0 . 01 443 21 . 5  0 . 000 
0 . 980302 0 . 009794 1 00 .  0 . 000 
0 . 41 8248 0 . 1 602 2 . 61 0 . 01 0  
0 . 21 7581 0 . 1 356 1 . 60 0 . 1 1 0 
0 . 290853 0 . 0851 2 3 . 42 0 . 001 
-1 1 6 . 600049 
no . o f  obse r vat i ons 276 no . o f  par ame t e r s  1 1  
A I C . T  255 . 200099 A I C  0 . 924638038 
mean ( QB)  9 . 6583 var ( QB)  1 8 . 2853 
L i near i t y LR- t es t  Ch i A2( 6) � 1 39 . 1 1  [ 0 . 0000 ] ** app r ox i ma t e  uppe r bound : 
[ 0 . 0000 ] ** 
T r ans i t i on p r obab i l i t i es p_{ i / j }  � P( Reg i me i a t  t+l  I Reg i me j at t )  
Reg i me 0 , t + 1 
Reg i me 1 , t +1 
Reg i me 2 , t + 1 
Reg i me O , t  Reg i me 1 , t  Reg i me 2 , t 
0 . 98030 0 . 41 825 0 . 00000 
0 . 00000 0 . 21 758 0 . 29085 
0 . 01 9698 0 .  3641 7 0 . 7091 5 
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CPI based real exchange rate from combined black rate ( 1980m l - 1994ml2) 
and official rates (1995m l - 201 0m6) 
QC_1 
QC_2 
QC_3 
Con s t an t ( O) 
Cons t an t ( 1 )  
Cons t an t ( 2 ) 
s i gma 
p_{O I O} 
p_{O I 1 }  
p_{ 1 1 1 } 
p_{ 1  1 2} 
I og- 1 i ke I i hood 
Coe f f i c i en t  S t d . E r r o r  t -va l ue t -p r ob 
0 . 987741 0 . 03889 25 . 4  0 . 000 
0 . 245954 0 . 05884 4 . 1 8  0 . 000 
-0 . 2669 1 2  0 . 03873 -6 . 89 0 . 000 
0 . 252094 0 . 04525 5 . 57 0 . 000 
-0 . 736804 0 . 1 284 -5 . 74 0 . 000 
1 . 25233 0 . 1 049 1 1 . 9  0 . 000 
0 . 266075 0 . 01 008 26 . 4  0 . 000 
0 . 981 562 0 . 007595 1 29 .  0 . 000 
0 . 495796 0 . 1 460 3 . 40 0 . 001  
0 . 1 83067 0 .  1 1 63 1 . 57 0 .  1 1 6  
0 . 30941 9 0 . 08296 3 . 73 0 . 000 
-93 . 7542602 
no . o f  obse r va t i ons 366 no . of pa r ame t e r s  1 1  
A I C . T  209 . 50852 A I C  0 . 572427651 
mean ( QC) 9 . 09764 var ( QC) 1 4 . 5785 
L i near i t y LR- t es t  Ch i �2 ( 6) = 21 1 . 55 [ 0 . 0000 ] ** app r ox i ma te  uppe rbound : 
[ 0 . 0000 ] ** 
T r ans i t i on p r obab i I i t i es p_{ i l j }  = P( Reg i me i a t  t+1 I Reg i me at t )  
Reg i me 0 , t + 1 
Reg i me 1 ,  t+ 1  
Reg i me 2 ,  t+ 1  
Reg i me 0 ,  t Reg i me 1 ,  t Reg i me 2 ,  t 
0 . 981 56 0 . 49580 0 . 00000 
0 . 00000 0 . 1 8307 0 . 30942 
0 . 01 8438 0 . 321 1 4  0 . 69058 
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PPI based real exchange rate from official rates ( 1 995m l - 2 0 1 0 m6) 
QPP I _1 
QPP I _2 
Cons t an t ( O ) 
Cons t an t  ( 1 )  
Cons t an t ( 2) 
s i gma 
p_{O I O} 
p_{ 1 I O} 
p_{ 1 1 1 }  
p_{O j 2} 
I og- 1 i ke I i hood 
Coe f f i c i en t  S t d . E r r o r  t-va l ue t -p r ob 
0 . 931 372 0 . 07884 1 1 . 8  0 . 000 
0 . 0566284 0 . 07852 0 . 721 0 . 472 
-0 . 0223797 0 . 1 1 81 -0 . 1 89 0 . 850 
0 . 1 1 0357 0 . 1 1 50 0 . 960 0 . 338 
0 . 1 1 7 1 65 0 . 1 1 34 1 . 03 0 . 303 
0 . 0666671 0 . 00531 9 1 2 . 5  0 . 000 
0 . 576267 0 . 1 008 5 . 72 0 . 000 
0 . 39771 1 0 . 1 287 3 . 09 0 . 002 
0 . 765795 0 . 1 41 7  5 . 40 0 . 000 
0 . 298394 0 . 1 964 1 . 52 0 . 1 30 
1 94 . 777357 
no . of obse r va t i ons 1 86 no . of pa r ame t e r s  1 0  
A I C . T  -369 . 55471 4 A I C  -1 . 9868533 
mean ( QPP I )  6 . 89374 var ( QPP I )  0 . 1 7 1 735 
L i near i t y LR- t es t  Ch i A2 ( 6) = 9 . 2360 [ 0 . 1607 ] app r ox i ma t e  upper bound : 
[ 0 . 4765 ] 
T r ans i t i on p r obab i l i t i es p_{ i l j }  = P ( Reg i me i a t  t+1 I Reg i me at  t )  
Reg i me 0 ,  t+1  
Reg i me 1 ,  t +1 
Reg i me 2 , t + 1 
Reg i me 0 ,  t Reg i me 1 ,  t Reg i me 2 ,  t 
0 . 57627 0 . 00000 0 . 29839 
0 . 39771 0 . 76580 0 . 00000 
0 . 026022 0 . 23420 0 . 701 61 
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r� ��j I 
2010 
RPI based real exchange rate from official rates ( 1 987m l - 20 1 0m6) 
Coe f f i c i en t  S t d . E r r o r  t-va l ue t -p r ob 
QRP I _1 1 .  01 739 0 . 03291 30 . 9  0 . 000 
QRP I _2 -0 . 0428545 0 . 04568 -0 . 938 0 . 349 
QRP I _3 0 . 0261 643 0 . 03283 0 . 797 0 . 426 
Cons t an t ( O )  -0 . 01 65554 0 . 05975 -0 . 277 0 . 782 
Cons t an t  ( 1 )  -0 . 081 2910  0 . 1 043 -0 . 779 0 . 436 
Cons t an t ( 2) 2 . 051 54 0 . 09246 22 . 2  0 . 000 
s i gma 0 . 1 1 3377 0 . 004808 23 . 6  0 . 000 
p_{O I O} 0 . 986544 0 . 02747 35 . 9  0 . 000 
p_{O I 1 } 0 . 480577 1 . 038 0 . 463 0 . 644 
I og- 1 i ke I i hood 1 99 . 31 851 9 
no . o f  obse r va t i ons 279 no . o f  par ame t e r s  9 
A I C . T  -380 . 637038 A I C  -1 . 36429046 
mean ( QRP I )  6 . 95571 var  ( QRP I )  0 . 695062 
L i near i t y LR- t es t  Ch i A2 ( 4) = 309 . 78 [ 0 . 0000 ] ** app r ox i ma t e  upper bound : 
[ 0 . 0000 ] ** 
T r ans i t i on p r obab i I i t i es p_{ i l i } = P( Reg i me i a t  t +1 I Reg i me j a t  t ) 
Reg i me 0 ,  t Reg i me 1 ,  t Reg i me 2 ,  t 
Reg i me 0 , t + 1 0 . 98654 0 . 48058 1 .  0000 
Reg i me 1 , t + 1 0 . 01 3456 0 . 00000 0 . 00000 
Reg i me 2 , t + 1 0 . 00000 0 . 51 942 0 . 00000 
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RPI based real exchange rate from black rates ( 1 987m l - 2002m l2) 
Coef f i c i en t  S t d . E r r o r  t -va l ue t-p r ob 
QRP I B_1 1 . 01 564 0 . 05259 1 9 . 3  (}, 000 
QRP I B_2 0 . 07091 70 0 . 07660 0 . 926 0 . 356 
QRP I B_3 -0 . 1 5061 5  0 . 05022 -3 . 00 0 . 003 
Cons t an t ( O) 0 . 502245 0 . 1 066 4 . 71 0 . 000 
Con s t an t ( 1 )  -0 . 0388902 0 . 2363 -0 . 1 65 0 . 869 
Cons t an t ( 2)  1 . 56633 0 . 1 981 7 . 91 0 . 000 
s i gma 0 . 287578 0 . 01 527 1 8 . 8  0 . 000 
p_{O I O} 0 . 9841 1 1  0 . 01 1 38 86 . 5  0 . 000 
p_{O I 1 }  0 . 1 93240 0 . 1 264 1 . 53 0 . 1 28 
p_{ 1 1 1 } 0 . 271 697 0 . 1 350 2 . 01 0 . 046 
p_{ 1 1 2} 0 . 31 4929 0 . 08751 3 . 60 0 . 000 
I og- 1 i ke I i hood -72 . 3449724 
no . o f  obse r va t i ons 1 89 no . o f  parame t e r s  1 1  
A I C . T  1 66 . 689945 A I C  0 . 881 957379 
mean ( QRP I B ) 9 . 82092 va r ( QRP I B ) 1 0 . 9588 
L i near i t y LR- t es t  Ch i A2 ( 6) = 1 1 4 . 51 [ 0 . 0000 ] **  app r ox i ma te  upperbound : 
[ 0 . 0000 ] ** 
T r ans i t i on p r obab i I i t i es p_{ i l j } = P ( Reg i me i a t  t+1  I Reg i me j at t )  
Reg i me 0 ,  t Reg i me 1 ,  t Reg i me 2 ,  t 
Reg i me 0 ,  t+ 1  0 . 9841 1 0 . 1 9324 0 . 00000 
Reg i me 1 ,  t +1 0 . 00000 0 . 271 70 0 . 3 1 493 
Reg i me 2 ,  t +1 0 . 01 5889 0 . 53506 0 . 68507 
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RPI based real exchange rate from combined black rate ( 1 98 7m I - 1 994m l 2) 
and official rates (1995m l - 2010m6) 
QRP I C_1 
QRP I C_2 
QRP I C_3 
Con s t an t ( O) 
Cons t an t ( 1 )  
Cons t an t ( 2) 
s i gma 
p_{O I O} 
p_{ 1 1 1 }  
p_{ 1  1 2} 
I og- 1 i ke I i hood 
Coe f f i c i en t  S t d . E r r o r t -va l ue t -pr ob 
0 . 908846 0 . 03875 23 . 5  0 .000 
0 . 1 04472 0 . 05702 1 . 83 0 . 068 
-0 . 1 08639 0 . 03666 -2 . 96 0 . 003 
0 . 871 853 0 . 3692 2 . 36 0 . 01 9  
2 . 09541 0 . 1 043 20 . 1 0 ' 000 
0 . 706272 0 . 05456 1 2 . 9  0 . 000 
0 . 243298 0 . 01 038 23 . 4  0 . 000 
0 . 686854 0 . 6290 1 . 09 0 . 276 
0 . 640953 0 . 09096 7 . 05 0 . 000 
0 . 040221 4 0 . 0 1247 3 . 22 0 . 001 
-61 . 235351 3 
no . o f  obse r vat i ons 279 no . of par ame t e r s  1 0  
A I C . T  1 42 . 470703 A I C  0 . 51 064768 
mean ( QRP I C) 8 . 88809 va r ( QRP I C) 9 . 21 631 
L i near i t y LR- t es t  Ch i A2( 5 )  = 1 60 . 97 [ 0 . 0000 ] ** approx i ma t e  uppe r bound : 
[ 0 . 0000 ] ** 
T r ans i t i on p r obab i l i t i es p_{ i l j } = P( Reg i me i a t  t +1 I Reg i me at  t )  
Reg i me 0 , t + 1 
Reg i me 1 , t + 1 
Reg i me 2 , t + 1 
Reg i me 0 ,  t Reg i me 1 ,  t Reg i me 2 , t 
0 . 68685 0 . 00000 0 . 00000 
0 . 00000 0 . 64095 0 . 040221 
0 . 31 31 5  0 . 35905 0 . 95978 
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:"' 
CPI based Real Effective Exchange rates ( 1 980ml  - 2 0 1  Om6) 
Coef f i c i en t  S t d . Er r o r  t -va l ue t -p r ob 
I r ee r  _1 
I r ee r  _2 
Cons t an t ( O )  
Cons t a n t  ( 1 )  
Cons t an t ( 2) 
s i gma 
p_{O I O} 
p_{O I I }  
p_{O I 2} 
p_{ 1 1 2} 
I og- 1 i ke I i hood 
1 . 0071 9 0 . 04591 21 . 9  0 . 000 
-0 . 01 84528 0 . 04564 -0 . 404 0 . 686 
0 . 0547592 0 . 01 682 3 . 26 0 . 00 1  
-0 . 05041 94 0 . 03532 -1 . 43 0 . 1 55 
-0 . 1 391 41 0 . 0221 6 -6 . 28 0 . 000 
0 . 021 9674 0 . 001 004 21 . 9  0 . 000 
0 . 988868 0 . 006391 1 55 .  0 . 000 
0 . 629869 2 . 563 0 . 246 0 . 806 
0 . 569977 0 . 5794 0 . 984 0 . 326 
0 . 237244 0 . 21 1 1  1 . 1 2  0 . 262 
639 . 07289 
no . of obse r va t i ons 275 no . of pa r ame t e r s  1 0 
A I C . T  - 1 258 . 1 4578 A I C  -4 . 57507557 
mean ( I r ee r )  4 . 9259 var ( l r ee r )  0 . 1 53606 
L i near i ty LR- tes t Ch i A2 ( 6 )  = 1 70 . 80 [ 0 . 0000 ] ** appr ox i ma t e  uppe r bound : 
[ 0 . 0000 ] ** 
T r ans i t i on p r obab i I i t i es p_{ i l i }  = P( Reg i me i a t  t+1  I Reg i me 1 a t  t )  
Reg i me 0 ,  t+1 
Reg i me 1 , t+1  
Reg i me 2 ,  t+1 
Reg i me 0 ,  t Reg i me 1 ,  t Reg i me 2 ,  t 
0 . 98887 0 . 62987 0 . 56998 
0 . 00000 0 . 00000 0 . 23724 
0 . 01 1 1 32 0 . 3701 3 0 . 1 9278 
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CPI based Real Effective Exchange rates (1995ml - 20 10m6) 
Coe f f i c i en t  S t d . E r r o r  t-va l ue t -p r ob 
I r ee r  _1 1 . 1 85 14  0 . 1 01 4  1 1  . 7  0 . 000 
I r ee r  _2 -0 . 21 6880 0 . 1 01 3  -2 . 1 4 0 . 034 
Cons t an t ( O )  0 . 1 3331 9 0 . 0831 7 1 . 60 0 . 1 1 1  
Cons t an t  ( 1 )  0 . 1 64081 0 . 08445 1 . 94 0 . 054 
Cons t an t ( 2) 0 . 1 51 268 0 . 08304 1 . 82 0 . 070 
s i gma 0 . 0081 7962 0 . 001 283 6 . 38 0 . 000 
p_{O I O} 0 . 30791 7 0 . 1 600 1 . 92 0 . 056 
p_{ 1 I O} 0 . 1 1 7294 0 . 1 765 0 . 664 0 . 507 
p_{O I 1 }  0 . 320342 0 . 231 0 1 .  39 0 . 1 67 
p_{ 1 1 1 }  0 . 348288 0 . 2475 1 . 41 0 . 1 61 
p_{O I 2} 0 . 1 1 9939 0 . 07395 1 . 62 0 . 1 07 
p_{ 1 1 2} 0 . 0834400 0 . 07663 1 .  09 0 . 278 
I og- 1 i ke I i hood 559 . 48331 4 
no . o f  obse r va t i ons 1 85 no . o f  par ame t e r s  1 2  
A I C . T  -1 094 . 96663 A I C  -5 . 91 873853 
mean ( I r ee r )  4 . 6741 3 var ( I r ee r ) 0 . 0051 2351 
L i near i t y LR- t es t  Ch i A2( 8) = 6 . 461 6 [ 0 . 5957 ] app r ox i mate uppe r bound : 
[ 1 . 0000 ] 
T r ans i t i on p r obab i l i t i es p_{ i l i }  = P( Reg i me i a t  t+1 I Reg i me j at t )  
Reg i me 0 ,  t Reg i me 1 ,  t Reg i me 2 ,  t 
Reg i me 0 , t + 1 0 . 30792 0 . 32034 0 . 1 1 994 
Reg i me 1 , t+1 0 . 1 1 729 0 . 34829 0 . 083440 
Reg i me 2 ,  t+1  0 . 57479 0 . 33 137 0 . 79662 
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